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The potential criminalization of deceptive advertising implicates the adequacy of 
regulatory oversight by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the proper balance 
between the free flow of information and the Government’s role in consumer protection. 
Is there a need for, and room for, both FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight on 
the deceptive advertising front? These issues have ramifications for the courts, who bear 
the burden of adjudicating challenged applications of that policy, and also for the orderly 
functioning of government, which must accommodate the convergence of competing 
interests and divisions of authority. 
Many fraudulent schemes are perpetuated without the use of advertising, but 
fraudsters frequently incorporate advertising, most often as a lure. To date, advertising 
has directly intersected with federal fraud statutes most often not because the advertising 
was regarded as the fraud, but because of its utility as a lure and a jurisdictional hook to 
bring conduct within prosecutorial reach. Exceptions exist, however, in which advertising 
appears to have been regarded as the fraud, rather than an instrumentality of a fraud. 
Multiple parties—prosecutors, the courts, defense attorneys, advertisers, 
advertising agencies, media, consumers and policy influencers—have potential roles to 
play in assuring an acceptable balance between speech rights and consumer-protection 
efforts. Prosecutorial discretion, however, is essentially all that stands between a 
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Consider this statement to voters during a televised debate from a politician 
running for reelection: “Under my proposed plan, if you like your insurance, you can 
keep your insurance. Period.” Consider this statement to consumers in a television 
commercial from a car dealer trying to outpace the competition: “I’m ready to make a 
deal. If you like this new car, it can be in your driveway for only $79 a month. Just sign 
and drive.” 
Fifty years after the Supreme Court declared that “erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate,”1 it appears well-settled2 that “noncommercial speech,” such as 
that conveyed by the first statement,3 is fully protected by the First Amendment.4 Even if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). 
2 This statement is based on an aggregate reading of the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment opinions in general and its holding in Alvarez v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 
2537 (2012), in particular. Recently, the Court considered a specific challenge to an Ohio 
election law that criminalizes falsehoods expressed in a political campaign. See Susan B. 
Anthony List v. Driehous, 134 S.Ct. 2334 (2014). Although the questions before the 
Court concerned the law’s procedural aspects, as opposed to substantive constitutionality, 
members of the Court appeared skeptical regarding the law’s constitutionality. In oral 
arguments April 22, 2014, individual justices expressed reservations about the law itself. 
See Sabrina Eaton, U.S. Supreme Court Justices bash Ohio election law, 
CLEVELAND.COM (April 22, 2014, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/04/us_supreme_court_justices_bash.html   
3 Noncommercial speech, sometimes called ideological speech, is broadly defined as 
speech about matters of public concern. Commercial speech clearly includes speech that 
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the speaker knew his or her promise to be false—or at least, unlikely to be realized—at 
the time it was made, the deceived voter’s sole recourse is to harness similarly situated 
voters to try and effect change through the routine political process.5 
Equally well established is that “commercial speech,” such as that conveyed in 
the second statement, is First Amendment-protected to a lesser extent, and if false, not 
constitutionally protected at all.6 If the commercial speaker’s promise was false or 
unlikely to be realized—even if the speaker did not know that to be the case at the time, 
and even if no actual deception occurred—the speaker could face legal repercussions for 
the speech,7 including civil fines and—because the speech appeared on television— 
possibly federal, criminal charges. 
 
 
Statement of Problem  
Because potential criminal jeopardy is likely “off the radar” of many advertisers 
and their agents, this project examines the connection between advertising and federal, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proposes a commercial transaction. Debate exists about whether the definition also 
should include speech that is economically motivated. 
4 “The Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
5 Howard notes that state and local laws regulating deceptive speech in political 
campaigns mostly address only false speech about candidates and all are subjected to “at 
least strict scrutiny under the first amendment, applying standards and analyses totally 
different than with commercial speech.” Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive 
Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based 
Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L. Rev., 1093, 1163 (1991). 
6 Preston says that advertising regulation and the First Amendment are not incompatible, 
and that the prohibition of deception, in particular, is in keeping with the First 
Amendment. See Ivan L. Preston, The Compatibility of Advertising Regulation and the 
First Amendment, 9 J. OF ADVERTISING 12 (1980). See also Howard, supra note 5, for a 
discussion of the constitutionality of deceptive political speech regulation. 
7 These range from private, civil lawsuits to public, civil actions initiated by State 
Attorneys General (SAGs) acting on behalf of the consuming public. 
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criminal fraud charges. With the First Amendment as a backdrop, it categorizes and 
contextualizes instances in which advertising has intersected with federal wire-fraud and 
related statutes.  
Background 
The constitutional hierarchy evidenced by the above examples is manifest in the 
Supreme Court’s “commercial speech doctrine.” The doctrine provides that the content of 
commercial speech may be regulated more readily than the content of noncommercial 
speech, and that false or deceptive commercial speech is devoid of constitutional 
protection. Like other categories of speech found by the Court to be unconstitutional—
obscene speech, extortive speech and fighting words, for example—false or misleading 
(“deceptive”) commercial speech may be readily restricted.8 
Traditionally in the United States, legal repercussions for deceptive commercial 
speech have consisted of civil penalties meted out primarily by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC). The FTC is a civil law enforcement agency and the only federal 
agency with general jurisdiction over consumer fraud.9 The FTC has jurisdiction over 
such speech “in or affecting interstate commerce,” meaning all but the most 
geographically limited intrastate speech is subject to FTC authority. 
In practice, the FTC’s consumer-fraud focus is directed largely toward either 
fraudulent schemes or deceptive advertising that crosses state lines or otherwise affects a 
significant number of consumers. A review of FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
cases suggests that a fraudulent scheme may be defined as a pattern of conduct devised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Id. 
9 Constitutional authority for FTC oversight of advertising springs from the commerce 
clause in Article I, Section 8, applicable to interstate commerce: “The Congress shall 
have Power To regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
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by illegitimate merchants bent on duping consumers in the marketplace. Such schemes 
are viewed as conduct detrimental to society, not unlike the conduct of robbing a bank. 
Attempts to both prevent such conduct with civil penalties—as the FTC might—and 
punish it with criminal sanctions—as might the DOJ—are hardly controversial. 
Unlike fraudulent schemes, however, which are enterprises the whole of which 
are regarded as socially undesirable conduct, deceptive advertising claims may emanate 
from legitimate merchants conducting otherwise legitimate business enterprises. In such 
cases, any alleged deceit generally has to do with some aspect of the seller’s speech about 
his or her products or services. Even given the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to extend 
constitutional protection to false or misleading commercial speech (discussed more fully 
in Chapter Two), the Court has made clear that, for First Amendment reasons, curbs on 
such speech should employ the least restrictive means possible. Unfortunately, separating 
deceptive advertising from fraudulent schemes for this purpose may be difficult, at best. 
The difficulty means seller-to-consumer communications may themselves be regarded as 
the fraudulent scheme, effectively subjecting commercial speech to one of the most 
restrictive means—criminal prosecution—possible. 
The FTC’s civil authority over deceptive commercial expression in the legitimate 
commercial marketplace is largely unquestioned; the DOJ’s authority to prosecute 
criminal conduct is equally accepted. In fact, the FTC and DOJ routinely bring parallel 
civil and criminal proceedings based on the same pattern of fraudulent conduct, with the 
civil complaint forming the basis of the criminal charge.10 (Parallel FTC and DOJ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See, e.g., United States v. Tankersley, 96 Fed. Appx. 419 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming the 
Circuit Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think 
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proceedings are discussed more fully in Chapter Four.) Less considered, however, is the 
DOJ’s potential role in addressing deceptive advertising. DOJ authority to punish less-
than-truthful advertisers, as it does fraudulent actors, may not be as easily acknowledged 
or reconciled in light of the First Amendment, irrespective of the commercial speech 
doctrine. Yet, as two unrelated events, described below, suggest, seemingly deceptive 
advertising claims by a seller engaging in an ostensibly legitimate business enterprise11 
may attract DOJ attention; the FTC is not the only sentinel at the advertiser’s gate. 
The Case of the Car Dealers 
On January 9, 2014, the FTC announced it had settled deceptive advertising 
claims with multiple automobile dealers across the United States. The FTC operation, 
called Operation Steer Clear, was a nationwide sweep focusing on the sale, financing and 
leasing of motor vehicles.”12 After months of FTC investigation, nine automobile dealers 
across the country agreed to settle deceptive advertising charges alleging that a variety of 
print, online and broadcast advertising misrepresentations “violated the FTC Act, falsely 
leading consumers to believe they could purchase vehicles for low prices, finance 
vehicles with low monthly payments, and/or make no upfront payment to lease 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Achievement Corp., 312 F.3d 259 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant's 
representations were actionably fraudulent). 
11 The indicted car dealer and employees faced two additional counts. Count Two was for 
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud as to Fraudulent Financing; Count Three was for 
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud as to False Reports to American Suzuki Corporation. 
While this suggests possible impropriety in the conduct of the business, there was no 
indication that the business itself was not legitimate or that customers were being sold 
horses when they thought they were buying cars; the dealership was, in fact, engaged in 
the selling, buying and financing of automobiles. 
12FTC Announces Sweep Against 10 Auto Dealers, FTC.GOV (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-announces-sweep-against-10-
auto-dealers (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
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vehicles.”13 Each of the nine dealerships accepted proposed consent agreements 
“designed to prevent the dealerships from engaging in similar deceptive advertising 
practices in the future.”14 The orders bar the dealerships from deceptive advertising 
practices for 20 years and carry hefty monetary penalties for any violations.15 
As the FTC was announcing Operation Steer Clear, an automobile dealership 
owner and his sales manager in South Carolina16 were contemplating another kind of 
settlement with an arm of the Federal Government: a criminal plea bargain.17 Sixteen 
months earlier, the dealership owner and sales manager had been criminally indicted for 
three felony counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and their February trial date was 
fast approaching.18 According to the criminal indictment, allegedly deceptive broadcast 
advertising in the form of radio and television commercials qualified the dealership 
owner, the sales manager and eight members of the sales staff for federal prosecution.19 
This was notable because the first charged count, which carried a potential prison term of 
20 years, described advertising practices almost identical to those targeted by the FTC in 
Operation Steer Clear. With the indictment, the South Carolina car dealer and sales crew 
were confronted with another, less-considered potential penalty associated with allegedly 
deceptive advertising: criminal charges that contemplate significant prison time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., New World Auto Imports, Inc., Doing Business as Southwest Kia, et al.; 
Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment,” 79 Federal Register 
3,370-02, 3,370–72 (Jan. 21, 2014). 
16 The South Carolina auto dealership was not among those targeted in Operation Steer 
Clear. 
17 The dealer and sales manager entered plea agreements for prison terms of one year and 
one day and six months followed by six months’ house arrest, respectively. 
18 The indictment was handed down Sept. 12, 2012. 
19 Charges later were dropped against all but the dealership owner and sales manager. 
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Viewed separately, the above-described events may appear remarkable only to the 
parties involved. Juxtaposed, however, they illustrate that DOJ attorneys have the 
authority, and sometimes the inclination, to leverage federal fraud statutes against 
advertisers in a way that shifts the focus from one of FTC-oriented prevention to DOJ-
oriented punishment. 
In some cases, the FTC encourages DOJ involvement in consumer-protection 
matters. Since 2003, DOJ fraud-enforcement efforts have been formally aided by the 
FTC, which that year launched a Criminal Liaison Unit (CLU).20 Housed in the FTC’s 
Division of Enforcement, the CLU seeks to “increase the criminal prosecution of 
consumer fraud” by referring certain cases to federal prosecutors for potential indictment. 
Noting its own lack of criminal authority, the FTC’s position is that “some offenders will 
be stopped only by criminal prosecution.”21  
Courts also have aided DOJ efforts by declining to foreclose or restrict DOJ 
prosecution on the heels of FTC intervention. In 2004, for example, a Federal Court of 
Appeals held that the civil penalties imposed by the FTC did not constitute double 
jeopardy22 because they were not “so punitive in purpose of effect as to be in actuality a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In its first decade of operation, the CLU helped secure more than 550 indictments for 
FTC defendants and their associates. In 2013 alone, prosecutors working with the CLU 
initiated 76 indictments or complaints and obtained 65 convictions or guilty pleas with an 
average prison sentence of more than 40 months. Since 2007, particularly effective 
prosecutors have been singled out for recognition with the CLU Prosecuting Attorney’s 
Award; each year, the award honors “prosecutors who have made a significant 
contribution to the protection of American consumers.” 
21 Video: Criminal Liaison Unit, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/criminal-
liaison-unit (last visited July 13, 2014) [hereinafter CLU Video]. 
22 The Double Jeopardy Clause is found in the Fifth Amendment: “Nor shall any person 




criminal penalty.”23 Such FTC action “does not approach the more serious sanction of 
imprisonment”24 and thus does not implicate the protection against the imposition of 
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.  
Clearly, not all advertisers, even those whose commercial claims are dubious, are 
at risk for potential criminal prosecution, and not all CLU-referred cases necessarily will 
include an advertising element. The FTC has described “repeat offenders, egregious 
behavior, or other evidence that criminal conduct is involved”25 as primary concerns. 
Informational materials prepared by the FTC for distribution to federal prosecutors 
emphasize large-scale, widespread operations that defraud a large number—often 
hundreds of thousands—of victims and produce significant—often tens of millions of 
dollars—financial loss that cannot be recovered or repaid.26 
These parameters, if maintained, suggest that a majority of advertisers are 
unlikely to be referred by the CLU for potential criminal prosecution. The unit’s 
existence, however, underscores the potential for seller conduct, including deceptive 
commercial speech, to trigger parallel civil and criminal law-enforcement proceedings. 
Aside from the CLU’s focus on “big-fish” fraudsters, the South Carolina car dealer case 
illustrates the corresponding potential for even “routine” advertising on a relatively small 
scale to trigger a criminal prosecution, irrespective of CLU involvement. A public 
admonishment from the FTC along with an extracted civil fine and a promise from an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Tankersley, 96 Fed. Appx. at 421. 
24 Id. at 422. 
25 FTC Presents Criminal Liaison Award to Assistant United States Attorney Ellyn 
Lindsay, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/06/ftc-presents-
criminal-liaison-award-assistant-united-states (June 18, 2010). 
26 See CLU Video, supra note 21.In one CLU-referred case involving a “$34 million 
cramming scam,” prosecutors secured a 21-year sentence; in another, involving a “$106 
million advance-fee loan scam,” prosecutors obtained a 29-year sentence. 
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advertiser to “do better” in the future is one matter; a grand-jury indictment, a costly 
criminal trial, potential federal prison time and a criminal record is another. Advertisers 
should be aware, if not beware. As one author, commenting on the criminalization of 
certain accounting practices in the early 2000s, expressed it, “Nothing concentrates the 
mind like the prospect of a hanging.”27 
Advertising and Deception 
The rise of advertising—and advertising deception—in America is often 
attributed to the Industrialization Era of the 1800s. Accompanied by the rise of the mass 
media, the Industrial Revolution28 created new markets and new means for sellers to 
reach prospective buyers within those markets. Smith, for example, observed, “the 
introduction of the assembly line and techniques for mass marketing have made available 
to consumers a continually expanding assortment of goods,”29 and “radically changed” 
the relative bargaining power of parties to a sales transaction.30 During this shift in 
markets and media, commercial transactions were conducted within an atmosphere of 
caveat emptor (buyer beware) that “assumed that the necessary facts were available to all 
participants.”31 As transactions became less personal, however, deceptive advertising 
began to populate the mass media and reliance on caveat emptor began to wane. Among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ann Marie Tracey and Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the Mind Like the Prospect 
of a Hanging, 25 N. Ill. U. L. REV. 125, 125 n.1 (Fall 2004) (paraphrasing a quote 
attributable to Samuel Johnson) (citing Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations,  
http://www.bartleby.com/73/369.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004)). 
28 The Industrial Revolution refers to a period of significant change in manufacturing that 
occurred between the mid 1700s and mid 1800s. 
29 Christopher Smith, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Turning the Tables on Caveat 
Emptor, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 391, 392 (1977). 
30 Id. 
31 Dee Pridgen & Ivan L. Preston, Enhancing the Flow of Information in the 
Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy and Beyond at the Federal 
Trade Commission, 14 GA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1980). 
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the most common, and egregious, examples of deceptive ads were those for “patent 
medicines,” which “promised a cure for everything from rheumatism to arthritis to 
cancer.”32 Regulation was nonexistent, and unscrupulous advertisers—nicknamed 
“snake-oil salesmen” and “confidence men”—“could outright lie, deceive and otherwise 
cheat with little or no threat of being punished by the government.”33 By the late 1800s—
sometimes called the “P.T. Barnum Era” of advertising34 because of the circus promoter’s 
claim that “there’s a sucker born every minute”—concerns about deception in advertising 
began to set the stage for government intervention. 
The first significant advertising reform came about just prior to the start of World 
War II, when Congress broadened the scope of FTC authority to encompass unfair trade 
practices affecting consumers.35 Prior to this time, the FTC’s chief purpose had been the 
leveling of the playing field between and among competitors in the marketplace. The 
1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) provided 
authority for the agency to enact consumer-protection measures against unfair trade 
practices, including deceptive advertising.36  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 THOMAS C. O’GUINN ET AL., ADVERTISING AND INTEGRATED BRAND PROMOTION 84 
(6th ed. 2012). 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 The Federal Trade Commission Act, passed in 1914, was originally concerned with 
unfair business practices affecting competitors. The 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments 
expanded the agency’s focus to include unfair or deceptive trade practices, including 
advertising. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–51 (2012). 
36 Constitutional authority for FTC oversight of advertising springs from the commerce 
clause in Article I, Section 8, applicable to interstate commerce: “The Congress shall 
have Power To regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
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Alongside federal FTC regulation, individual states took steps to make statutory 
remedies available to counter unscrupulous advertising practices.37 Before states codified 
their intent to address unfair or deceptive advertising, aggrieved individuals who felt they 
were victims of deceptive product claims had to rely on burdensome common-law actions 
for fraud or misrepresentation. In South Carolina, for example, a plaintiff suing a 
merchant for fraud must allege and prove nine elements, and the failure to prove any one 
of them is fatal to recovery.38 State statutes governing deceptive advertising, however, 
generally refer to and incorporate the FTCA39—they often are called “Little FTC Acts” 
or “Mini-FTC Acts”—and are more favorable to consumer-plaintiffs.40 Little FTC Acts 
give state attorneys general (SAGs) the authority to seek injunctions,41 conduct 
investigations42 and sue for and civil penalties43 against advertisers, and often provide a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, for example, declares “[u]nfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 
trade or commerce” to be unlawful. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20. (1976). 
38 The nine elements are (1) a misrepresentation; (2), its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the 
person, (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) 
his right to rely thereon; and 9) his consequent and proximate injury. See Jones v. 
Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5 (1959). 
39 As an example, the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act says: “It is the intent of 
the legislature that in construing paragraph (a) of this section the courts will be guided by 
the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to 
Section 5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time 
to time amended.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (1976). 
40See Jon Mize, Comment, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining the 
Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REV. 653 
(2005). 
41 In South Carolina, for example, the statute reads: “Whenever the Attorney General has 
reasonable cause to believe that any person is using, has used or is about to use any 
method, act or practice declared by Section 39-5-20 to be unlawful, and that proceedings 
would be in the public interest, he may bring an action in the name of the State against 
such person to restrain by temporary restraining order, temporary injunction or permanent 
injunction the use of such method, act or practice.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-50(a) (1976).    
42 The grant of investigative authority in South Carolina, for example, is as follows:  
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private right of action.44 Willful or knowing violations of the law can result in a recovery 
beyond those damages actually sustained, along with attorney’s fees and costs. 
The Literature 
Despite a clear legal shift from caveat emptor to caveat venditor (seller beware) 
provided by FTC regulation and state consumer-protection statutes, concern lingers about 
whether these measures provide the appropriate balance of protection for consumers and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
When it appears to the Attorney General that a person has 
engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any act 
or practice declared to be unlawful by this article, or when 
he believes it to be in the public interests that an 
investigation should be made to ascertain whether a person 
in fact has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage 
in any act or practice declared to be unlawful by this article, 
he may execute in writing and cause to be served upon that 
person or any other person who is believed to have 
information, documentary material or physical evidence 
relevant to the alleged or suspected violation, an 
investigative demand requiring such person to furnish, 
under oath, a report in writing setting forth the relevant 
facts and circumstances of which he has knowledge, or to 
appear and testify or to produce relevant documentary 
material or physical evidence for examination and copying, 
at such reasonable time and place as may be stated in the 
investigative demand, concerning the advertisement, sale or 
offering for sale of any goods or services or the conduct of 
any trade or commerce that is the subject matter of the 
investigation.  
S.C. CODE ANN. § SECTION 39-5-70 (a) (1976). 
43 The availability of a private right of action means that individuals who suffer some 
type of loss as a result of deceptive advertising may invoke the statute to bring a civil 
lawsuit seeking monetary compensation. For example, the South Carolina Unfair Trade 
Practices Act states: “If a court finds that any person is willfully using or has willfully 
used a method, act or practice declared unlawful by Section 39-5-20, the Attorney 
General, upon petition to the court, may recover on behalf of the State a civil penalty of 
not exceeding five thousand dollars per violation.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-110(a) (1976). 
44 The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act provides that “[a]ny person who suffers 
any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or 
employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared 
unlawful … may bring an action individually, but not in a representative capacity, to 
recover actual damages.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976). 
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,markets in a technologically innovative and complex economy.45 The literature reflects 
two perspectives. Observers generally have agreed that a goal of deceptive-advertising 
laws should be the protection of both consumers and markets. The “role of government 
should be to insure a balance between buyer and seller in the marketplace,”46 preserve 
“the integrity of our capital markets”47 and protect “the consumer and the business man 
who provide the resources for these markets.”48 The consensus in the literature is that 
“deceptive advertising is bad.”49 Truthful (or at least, non-misleading) advertising 
performs an important economic function, but deceptive advertising undermines the 
system:  
[I]nformation qua information is not sufficient to sustain an 
economic democracy … For example, when goods are 
praised to the point of untruth, or a competitor’s goods are 
falsely disparaged and the competitor then replies in kind, 
the result is not informed, intelligent choice, but rather its 
perversion; there is no “choice” when selection is a 
function of competing untruths, deceits, and misleading 
comparisons. Production is no longer regulated by 
consumer choice, and business success is no longer 
measured by consumer satisfaction.50 
As Chapter Two will explore, this perspective echoes that of the Supreme Court 
in interpreting the First Amendment’s protective contours. Implicit in the Court’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See, e.g., William B. Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer Protection: The 
Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General, 29 
OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1968).  
46 Id. at 897. 
47 Louis J. Lefkowitz, Consumer Protection: Meeting the Challenge, 4 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
67, 67 (1968-1969). 
48 Id. 
49 Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 658 
(1985). See also Earl W. Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising, 
64 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1966); Lefkowitz, supra note 48. 
50 Kintner, supra note 50 at 1270. 
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commercial speech doctrine and its protection for truthful—but not untruthful—
commercial speech is a concern for “preservation of a fair bargaining process.”51  
A minority viewpoint evident in the literature acknowledges the potentially 
negative impact of deceptive advertising but suggests aggressive government intervention 
is not necessarily the best solution. Government intervention should be weighed against 
the resulting economic costs in a cost-benefit analysis. This viewpoint reflects work by 
Posner and others that applies “economic principles to the analysis of legal process.”52 
Under this theory, “market, not government, regulation in the realm of commerce as well 
as ideas may be a better idea.”53 Posner, for example, regards non-legal preventatives 
against deception as most effective and says “[E]ven in the absence of legal remedies of 
any kind, it is unlikely that deceptive selling would be rampant”54:  
There is first of all the incentive of the consumer to 
exercise reasonable care and common sense in purchasing 
and to learn from any unhappy experiences. Second, there 
is competition. A seller has a strong incentive not to 
antagonize customers lest he lose their patronage to his 
competitors.55 
Craswell, a proponent of a cost-benefit approach to deceptive advertising, says 
“[t]he regulation of deceptive advertising is best viewed as a pragmatic exercise whose 
purpose is to make advertising as useful as possible for consumers.”56 He advocates 
comparing the actual effects of a deceptive ad on consumers with the ease with which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 485 (1996). 
52 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 61 (1969). 
See Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law of False 
Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 527 (1979). 
53 Jordan & Rubin, supra note 52, at 553. 
54 Posner, supra note 52, at 61.  
55 Id. at 61–62. 
56 Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 550, 551 (1991). 
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advertiser could “have constructed an ad that was less deceptive.”57 Using this approach, 
“an ad would be deemed deceptive if and only if the advertiser failed to take some 
precaution that would have reduced the net injury caused by the ad.”58 Applying a cost-
benefit analysis, Jordan and Rubin concluded, for example, that the remedies provided by 
the common law are  “consistent with efficiency”59 craved by economic principles. 
 The predominant viewpoint, however, is that common law and civil litigation 
options available to aggrieved individuals are inadequate or offer “no realistic remedy at 
all.”60 Bernstine, for example, observes that individuals who would stand to gain only a 
small recovery as a result of private litigation may simply allow the matter to drop: 
The time and expense of litigation for what may be a 
comparatively negligible recovery, notwithstanding court 
costs and attorney’s fees, may well have a chilling effect on 
the pursuit of individual recoveries. Merchants may 
calculate their practices to bilk small amounts from 
customers encouraged by the certain knowledge that any 
one customer will probably not sue for a small loss.”61 
Similarly, observers have questioned the adequacy of FTC oversight as a 
consumer-protection mechanism in the area of deceptive advertising. Much concern 
expressed in the literature was inspired by an apparent policy shift by the FTC in 1983 
(discussed more fully in Chapter Four) that modified the Commission’s working 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Id. A year earlier, an experimental study by Preston and Richards suggested that ads 
may easily be rewritten to convey the truth in place of the falsity and also to avoid 
elimination of other useful information. See Ivan L. Preston & Jef. I Richards, The Costs 
of Prohibiting Deceptive Advertising—Are They as Substantial as Economic Analysis 
Impies?, 16 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 209, 209–14 (1989). 
Craswell, supra note 50 at 657. Craswell says this would produce a “rough equivalent” of 
the negligence standard articulated by Judge Learned Hand in the area of tort liability. Id.  
59 Jordan & Rubin, supra note 52 at 528. 
60 Gordon F. Bowley, Law Enforcement’s Role in Consumer Protection, 14 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 555, 556 (1974). See Nancy T. Bernstine, Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Consumer Protection Divisions of Selected State Attorney General Offices, 20 HOW. L.J. 
247, 249 (1977). 
61 Bernstine, supra note 60, at 249.  
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definition of deception.62 Although the FTC chairman characterized the policy statement 
as a “clarification” and not a new definitional approach, critics interpreted the statement 
as giving more leeway to advertisers and effectuating a return toward caveat emptor.63 
State attorneys general, whose enforcement of Little FTC Acts depends on cues from the 
FTC, viewed the policy statement as limiting consumer-protection efforts and responded 
negatively.64 The policy statement was labeled “a significant step backward”65 that failed 
to take “into account the complexities of the modern day marketplace.” 
Although at least one subsequent researcher concluded the FTC’s consumer-
protection efforts were not, in fact, undermined by the 1983 policy statement,66 whether 
concerns about the FTC’s policy shift have been realized or not remains, to some extent, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The 1983 Policy Statement on Deception identified deception as any “representation, 
omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the 
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingle, Chairman House Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983) (on file with author) [hereinafter Policy Statement]. Before 
issuing the policy statement, the FTC used a somewhat vague “acquired or working 
definition of deception” that defined deception as “an act or practice … that has the 
tendency or capacity to mislead a substantial number of consumers in a material way.” 
Thomas C. Kinnear & Ann R. Root, The FTC and Deceptive Advertising in the 1980s: 
Are Consumers Being Adequately Protected?,  J. PUB. POLICY & MARKETING, vol. 7, 
1988, at 40, 41. 
63 See Lee D. Dahringer & Denise R. Johnson, The Federal Trade Commission 
Redefinition of Deception and Public Policy Implications: Let the Buyer Beware, 19 J. 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS 326 (1984). 
64 Kinnear & Root, supra note 62, at 42. 
65 Dahringer, supra note 63, at 327. 
66 Petty concluded that the FTC’s advertising enforcement program not only survived the 
Reagan revolution, but that during this period the Commission “made two important 
improvements that appear lasting and beneficial to consumers,” namely “the pursuit of 
fraud cases in federal district court” and efforts to do away with advertising restraints 
professional societies tended to impose on their members. Ross D. Petty, FTC 
Advertising Regulation: Survivor or Casualty of the Reagan Revolution?, 30 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 1, 31–32 (1992). The former initiative enabled misleading advertising to be stopped 
quickly and assets to be preserved for potential consumer redress; the latter allowed more 
information about professional services to make its way to consumers.  Id.  
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unsettled. Also unsettled is the issue of whether private remedies are adequate to fill gaps 
left by FTC or SAG enforcement. If private remedies are inadequate, are public remedies, 
such as criminal sanctions, the solution? Posner, the proponent of largely non-legal 
approaches to the problem of deceptive advertising, sees room for the alternative of 
criminal proceedings—instead of FTC action—in “hard-core” fraud cases where legal 
malice or willfulness is present.67 “It would be surprising,” says Posner, “if the 
Commission, with its highly limited remedial powers, had much impact on fraudulent 
activity of this sort.”68 Criminal laws “are a useful back-up that gives force to civil 
administrative actions”69 and are “not necessarily bad”70 when “the danger to the public 
is so overwhelming that no one would hesitate to treat the prohibited conduct as a 
crime.”71 On the other hand, the application of criminal sanctions to deceptive advertising 
could “result in unnecessary punishment if civil sanctions would achieve compliance 
with laws and regulations.”72 It also could serve to unduly restrict commercial messages 
and chill otherwise protected commercial speech, raising First Amendment concerns. 
Have federal prosecutors sought to perform a consumer-protection-oriented, gap-filling 
function in pursuing criminal charges springing from deceptive advertising? Or have 
federal prosecutions for advertising-related activity veered into a lane more appropriately 
occupied solely by the FTC?  
Implications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Posner, supra note 52, at 76. 
68 Id. at 76-77. 
69 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing With the Rules: An Effort to Strengthen the Mens Rea 
Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 685, 688 (2011). 
70 Id. at 700. 
71 Id. at 688. 
72 Id. at 690. 
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The potential criminalization of deceptive advertising implicates the adequacy of 
regulatory (FTC) oversight and the proper balance between the free flow of information 
and the government’s role in consumer protection. As a matter of public policy, should 
the aim be protection of the consumer? Or should the aim be punishment of the speaker? 
Is there a need for, and room for, both FTC and DOJ oversight on the deceptive 
advertising front? These issues have ramifications not only for the courts, who bear the 
burden of adjudicating challenged applications of that policy, but also for the orderly 
functioning of government, which must accommodate the convergence of competing 
interests and divisions of authority. 
Overcriminalization 
A related issue is growing public awareness and concern regarding 
overcriminalization. Overcriminalization refers to the potential for unsuspecting citizens 
to run afoul of multiplying, often obscure federal criminal codes or regulations.73 It has 
been described as “[t]oo many crimes, too much punishment.”74 Like the double-jeopardy 
argument, the overcriminalization argument has failed to gain significant traction with 
courts considering whether to limit the application of federal fraud statutes on conduct 
perhaps more suited to noncriminal sanctions. In 1980, a federal appellate court stated: 
In the instant case, we are asked to construe two seemingly 
limitless provisions, the mail and wire fraud statutes, in the 
context of the employer-employee relationship. The 
government urges us to hold that these statutes are violated 
whenever an employee, acting to further a scheme for 
pecuniary gain, intentionally breaches a fiduciary duty of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Press Release, United States House Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary Committee 
Reauthorizes Bipartisan Over-Criminalization Task Force (Feb. 5, 2014) 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?id=2D73C6FD-DAEB-4DA0-B4B4-
7A2F32BA784F (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, House Judiciary 
Comm., Feb. 5, 2014]. 
74 Moohr, supra note 69, at 686. 
	  
19	  
honesty or loyalty he owes his employer. The defendant 
decries this “overcriminalization” of the employment 
relationship, and asks us to declare his alleged conduct 
exempt from criminal sanction. While we reject the 
sweeping theory advanced by the Government, we find that 
the mail and wire fraud statutes do reach the conduct with 
which the defendant is charged.75 
 Today, however, concern over overcriminalization extends beyond an individual 
defendant’s attempt to fend off a felony conviction. On February 5, 2014—as the South 
Carolina car dealership owner and sales manager were awaiting a federal district court 
judge’s approval of their plea deal—a bi-partisan, federal Congressional task force 
received authorization from the House Judiciary Committee to continue its assessment of 
overcriminalization in the federal system, which it had begun the year before.76 
According to the House Judiciary Committee: 
The Unites States Code currently contains some 4,500 
federal crimes. Recent studies estimate that approximately 
60 new federal crimes are enacted each year, and over the 
past three decades, Congress has averaged 500 new crimes 
per decade. In addition to the statutory criminal offenses, 
there are thousands of federal regulations that, if violated, 
can also result in criminal liability. Some of these new 
statutes have been accompanied by hundreds of thousands 
of implementing regulations—studies put the number at 
more than 300,000—many of which, if violated, can also 
result in criminal liability.77 
Overcriminalization also encompasses the related ability for federal prosecutors to 
focus on individuals and then mine those codes and regulations for crimes with which to 
charge them. As Professor Reynolds describes it, rather than waiting to launch an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1980) (footnotes omitted) 
abrogated by Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1988). 
76 The committee, originally convened in May 2013, will examine the current federal 
criminal code and make recommendations for improvements. See Press Release, House 
Judiciary Comm., Feb. 5, 2014, supra note 73. 
77 Id.  
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investigation after finding Professor Plum dead in the conservatory, “authorities can 
instead start an investigation of Colonel Mustard as soon as someone has suggested he is 
a shady character.”78 The “broad, vague language” of the criminal code “invites the 
executive branch to argue, ex post, that an actor's conduct violated the provision.”79 In 
some cases, this process results from “mission creep,”80 in which well-intended 
prosecutors, seeking to punish clear cases of bad or harmful conduct, make use of broadly 
written criminal statutes in ways not necessarily intended by Congress. The Supreme 
Court acknowledged this tendency in 2010 when it held a criminal statute to be in 
conflict with the First Amendment: 
Not to worry, the Government says: The executive branch 
construes § 48 to reach only “extreme cruelty,” . . . and it 
“neither has brought nor will bring a prosecution for 
anything less.” . . . But the First Amendment protects 
against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy 
of noblesse oblige. . . . This prosecution is itself evidence 
of the danger in putting faith in Government 
representations of prosecutorial restraint. When this 
legislation was enacted, the Executive Branch announced 
that it would interpret § 48 as covering only depictions “of 
wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient 
interest in sex. …  No one suggests that the videos in this 
case fit that description.”81  
In addition, overcriminalization may occur when prosecutors’ competitive 
instincts, coupled with almost blanket discretion and prosecutorial immunity, combine to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything is a 
Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102 (2013), available at 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/ham-sandwich-nation_Reynolds. 
79 Moohr, supra note 69 at 689. 
80 Mission creep refers to “the gradual broadening of the original objectives of a mission 
or organization.” Mission Creep Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mission%20creep (last visited July 13, 2014). 
81 United States v. Stephens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010) (citations omitted), superseded by 
statute, 18 U.S.C. 48 (2010), as recognized in United States v. Richards, 13-20265, 2014 
WL 2694225 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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shift the criminal statutes from their legislative moorings.82 In 2002, a Federal District 
Court Judge criticized what he perceived as a tendency among federal prosecutors to seek 
a conviction at all costs, telling an audience of United States Attorneys, “[y]our office is 
perceived as acting like arrogant bullies who over-indict, always believe snitches, 
threaten defendants who seek release on bond, always seek to get the max and go for the 
jugular.”83 The same jurist also began refusing to accept most plea agreements because 
they forced criminal suspects to relinquish their rights to appeal and were, in his view, 
“unconscionable.”84 
Irrespective of a given prosecutor’s motivation, a system that accommodates 
overcriminalization may be, as Larkin suggests, inefficient at best: 
If new statutes are merely copies of existing laws with 
different labels, they are, at best, prescriptions for 
inefficiency (maybe even useless), or, at worst, fraudulent. 
If they outlaw the same conduct but multiply the penalties, 
the punishments become grossly disproportionate to the 
harm they seek to avoid and empower prosecutors to stack 
charges against a defendant to coerce a guilty plea.85 
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82 Competitiveness among federal prosecutors, who enjoy prosecutorial immunity, is a 
natural byproduct of a system that produces wins and losses and in which risk to 
prosecutors is low. Quoting Wu, Professor Reynolds describes “a popular game in the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York,” in which senior 
prosecutors would challenge more junior prosecutors “to figure out a plausible crime for 
which to indict” famous people such as Mother Teresa or John Lennon. Reynolds, supra 
note 80 at 103. He notes, “since, as the game Wu describes illustrates, everyone is a 
criminal if prosecutors look hard enough, they are guaranteed to find something 
eventually.” Reynolds, supra note 78, at 104. 
83 Gary L. Wright, Federal Judge Raps Rules on Sentencing, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
May 29, 2006, at 1A. 
84 Id. 
85 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Article, Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 720 (2013).  
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This study commences with an examination of the Supreme Court’s view of 
commercial falsehood (Chapter Two). Chapter Three looks at how other categorically 
exempt types of speech, including libel, incitement to violence and obscenity, have 
intersected with the First Amendment for lessons applicable to deceptive speech. 
Chapters Two and Three provide necessary context for appreciating FTC and DOJ 
enforcement mechanisms and authority, both of which are discussed in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Five presents specific findings with respect to the application of federal fraud 
statutes to advertising. A summary and recommendations follow in Chapter Six. 
Throughout, unless the context suggests otherwise, the term advertising means a 
“paid, mass-mediated attempt to persuade”—a common industry definition—and is used 
as a synonym for “commercial speech.” Similarly, the term “deceptive advertising” as 
used here means “deceptive commercial speech.” It should be noted that from both an 
industry and legal perspective, however, advertising may convey either commercial or 
noncommercial messages. Similarly, speech conveyed by means other than advertising 
may be either commercial or noncommercial in nature. A politician’s campaign 
advertising may be considered noncommercial, while a car manufacturer’s claims about 
its manufacturing practices made in the editorial pages of a newspaper could be 
considered commercial. In this study, however, the term “deceptive advertising” is used 
as a synonym for “deceptive commercial speech.” 
The methodology employed here is standard legal analysis of case law and legal 
and social-scientific scholarship from juried law reviews and academic journals. Case law 
examined consists of opinions from the Supreme Court and Federal Courts of Appeals. 
Cases used were located and retrieved using the LexisNexis Academic and Lexis 
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Advance databases; articles were located and retrieved using LexisNexis Academic, 
Lexis Advance and Google Scholar. The citation style follows The Bluebook: A Uniform 
System of Citation, and features footnotes.  









FALSEHOOD AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
The Supreme Court’s commercial-speech jurisprudence is hierarchical. Atop that 
hierarchy is noncommercial speech, which, according to the Court, deserves maximum 
constitutional protection. Subordinate to that is commercial speech, which is deserving of 
lesser constitutional protection than noncommercial speech. A second divide also exists, 
where noncommercial falsehoods are viewed as largely protected while commercial 
falsehoods are viewed as largely unprotected. The ability of the Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice to act against deceptive advertising and its 
purveyors owes in large measure to these relative relationships.86 This chapter examines 
Supreme Court cases and doctrine to assess how these judicial divides came into being. 
Its relevance to this dissertation is in assessing the appropriate role, if any, of the First 
Amendment in the criminalization of deceptive advertising. 
Part one presents a discussion of the Court’s interpretation of First Amendment 
protection for deceptive noncommercial statements, a necessary predicate for 
appreciating its very different treatment of deceptive commercial claims. This part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Notwithstanding Supreme Court indications that First Amendment protection extends 
somewhat to advertising claims that merely have “the potential to mislead,” the FTC and 
federal appellate courts reviewing FTC action almost summarily have rejected arguments 
that the First Amendment in any way limits FTC regulatory power over either deception 
(inherently false claims) or deceptiveness (potentially misleading claims). Among the 
issues explored in Chapter Five is whether First Amendment arguments have been 




discussion begins with New York Times v. Sullivan87, in which the Court considered 
falsehood by a speaker about another person. It concludes with United States v. Alvarez88, 
in which the Court considered falsehood by a speaker about himself. Part two presents 
the Court’s commercial speech opinions and their handling of falsity.89  
A key criticism of the Court’s commercial speech doctrine, and a challenge 
inherent in any discussion of this sort, is the difficulty in distinguishing between what is 
“commercial” and what is “noncommercial.” The Court has described the line between 
ideological (e.g. noncommercial) and nonideological (e.g. commercial) speech as 
“impossible to draw with accuracy.”90 Even if bright lines of demarcation were 
discernible, technological innovations increasingly interfere with their ability to be 
perceived. For example, product placement and branded entertainment—both of which 
seamlessly incorporate commercial “advertising” messages into entertainment content—
have been joined on the Internet by “native advertising” and “sponsored content,” whose 
visual style and placement amid editorial content may create—and are designed to 
create—the impression it is something other than advertising.91 Similarly, television 
programming and video-game action routinely incorporate commercial interests in ways 
that make them virtually indistinguishable from noncommercial content. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 376 U.S. 254. 
88 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). 
89 Supreme Court cases addressing trademark infringement, which mislead by causing 
confusion among potential customers about the source of a good, are outside the scope of 
this discussion.  
90 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 319 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
91 In December 2013, the Federal Trade Commission held a one-day workshop on native 
advertising and sponsored content. See Blurred Lines: Advertising or Content?—An FTC 




Although the move toward blended content is a natural consequence of the legal  
“safe haven of noncommercial speech”92—Justice Brennan predicted “those who seek to 
convey commercial messages” likely “will engage in the most imaginative of exercises to 
place themselves within” the noncommercial safe haven—93 other considerations have 
effectuated this shift, as well. Aside from the legal motivation to style their messages as 
noncommercial, contemporary advertisers are responding to changing media usage 
patterns in which consumers rely less and less on traditional media and increasingly on 
online sources for information. Changing media—namely, the use of the Internet and 
portable devices such as tablets and smart phones—have transformed the way consumers 
interact with advertisements. For example, Advertising Age, the industry trade magazine, 
has reported on studies suggesting that Internet users simply do not notice content 
displayed in website banners, irrespective of whether the content is commercial or 
noncommercial. The desire to try and overcome “banner blindness” on the part of 
Internet users has inspired native advertising and similar efforts by sellers to blend 
commercial messages with noncommercial ones.94 Techdirt, an online technology blog 
with a policy orientation, has stated that the Internet is bringing about the end of the 
“captive audience” that formerly viewed “intrusive and annoying ads” whether they 
wanted to view them or not. Instead, the modern, online consumer “has billions of 
choices on what they can be viewing:”95 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 540 (1981). 
93 Id. 
94 Matthew Creamer, Think Different: Maybe the Web’s Not a Place to Stick Your Ads 
ADVERTISING AGE, (March 17, 2008), http://adage.com/article/digital/web-s-a-place-
stick-ads/125741/. 
95 Mike Masnick, Advertising is Content; Content is Advertising, TECHDIRT (Wed., Mar. 
19th 2008, 12:10 PM), 
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Advertising is content. … Content is advertising. … You 
can’t think of ads as separate things any more.  Without a 
captive audience, there’s no such thing as “advertising” any 
more. It’s just content. … Any content is advertising. It’s 
advertising something. … Every bit of content advertises 
something, whether on purpose or not.”96 
 Irrespective of the influences at work in the crafting of advertising messages that 
do not appear to be advertising messages, the commercial speech doctrine’s existence 
puts governmental entities in the unfortunate, at best, position of making decisions about 
the content of speech.97 In Justice Brennen’s view, for example, even though the Court 
has “consistently distinguished between the constitutional protection afforded 
commercial, as opposed to noncommercial, speech,” it would be incorrect to assume 
“that a governmental unit may be put in the position in the first instance of deciding 
whether the proposed speech is commercial or noncommercial. In individual cases, this 
distinction is anything but clear.”98 
Despite grappling with the definitional issue since early in its commercial-speech 
deliberations, the Court has yet to fully draw the contours of commercial speech. The 
certainties—such as they are—are limited to these: 1) Speech “in the form of paid 
commercial advertisement[s]” is not necessarily commercial speech, even though it 
“ha[s] commercial aspects or reflect[s] the advertiser’s commercial interests.”99 2) 
Speech that “does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’” is commercial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080318/004136567/advertising-is-content-content-
is-advertising.shtml. 
96 Id.  
97 Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 536 (Brennen, J., dissenting). 
98 Id. 
99 Bigelow v. Virgina, 421 U.S. 809, 809 (1975). See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254. 
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speech; 100 3) Advertisements may contain both commercial and noncommercial 
elements; even advertisements with commercial elements may convey “information of 
potential interest and value to a diverse audience—not only to readers possibly in need of 
the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity in, the subject matter….”101 
4) Advertising “which ‘links a product to a current public debate’” does not necessarily 
qualify for noncommercial status, particularly when that advertising contains misleading 
product information,102  and 6) “[a] company has the full panoply of protections available 
[to individuals] to its direct comments on public issues.”103 
The definitional uncertainties include 1) Whether a speaker/seller of goods or 
services engages in commercial speech when it enters the public debate in defense of its 
own practices and processes,104 and 2) Whether factual inaccuracies in such defensive 
speech may subject the speaker to liability “on the theory that its statements … might 
affect consumers’ opinions about the business … and thereby affect their purchasing 
decisions.”105  
Matters are further complicated by the fact that “falsity” and “deception” also are 
not necessarily easily identified. Nor are their meanings necessarily synonymous. As will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385) [hereinafter Virginia Pharmacy]. 
101 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822. 
102 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (quoting Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n. 5 (1980) 
[hereinafter Central Hudson]. 
103 Id. 
104 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 657 (2003). 
105 Id. The State of California has answered “yes” to both questions. To the 
disappointment of commercial speakers and legal scholars, the Supreme Court declined 
to opine about these definitions, leaving inconsistencies and uncertainty across the United 
States as to whether this type of speech is commercial or noncommercial for First 
Amendment purposes.  
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be discussed in Chapter Four, the FTC treats advertising claims that have the potential to 
deceive similarly to advertising claims that are factually false or that actually deceive. 
The Supreme Court, however, seems to have drawn a distinction between advertising 
claims that are “inherently misleading” or proven to have mislead, and those that are 
merely “potentially misleading.” According to the Court, inherently false or proven false 
claims may be prohibited, but potentially misleading advertisements should be addressed 
via less restrictive means, such as “a requirement of disclaimers or explanation.”106 
“Although the potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong … restrictions 
upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonable necessary to prevent the 
deception.”107 The Supreme Court has described the process of distinguishing deceptive 
from nondeceptive claims in advertising as something other than “simple and 
straightforward.”108 “[D]istinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising in 
virtually any field of commerce,” observed the Court, “may require resolution of 
exceedingly complex and technical factual issues and the consideration of … questions of 
semantics.”109 
If deceptive commercial speech may be readily subjected to criminal prosecution, 
the ability to distinguish commercial messages from noncommercial messages, and 
deceptive commercial messages from truthful messages, assumes even greater 
significance at a time when doing so is increasingly difficult. This combination of social 
and technological factors suggests it may be time for a reconsideration of the appropriate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 
350, 373 (1977)). 
107 Id. 





scope of governmental action respecting deceptive commercial speech. While this 
Chapter does not seek to ultimately define “commercial” or “deceptive,” it does seek to 
contribute to an enhanced understanding of the existing noncommercial-versus-
commercial divide and its origins; such an understanding may aid in the development of 
prospective legal approaches—particularly those involving criminal sanctions—to 
deceptive advertising. 
Noncommercial Falsehood 
As noted previously, in the arena of noncommercial speech, the Court has rejected 
the notion that First Amendment protection extends only to truthful statements. In several 
early opinions, the Court hinted at some tolerance for government sanctions provoked by 
false, noncommercial statements. On one occasion, for example, it affirmed a speaker’s 
conviction over a public speech that “misrepresented” the Government’s motivations for 
“entering upon a war.”110 And Justice Holmes famously wrote, “The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic.”111 On balance, however, the Court has been consistent in finding 
constitutional protection for noncommercial falsehoods. It has held that prior restraints 
upon speech are inappropriate for “the false as to the true”112 and has written that the 
public should expect pleaders “in the realm of religious faith, and in that of political 
belief”113 to resort “to exaggeration … and even to false statement.”114 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Gilbert v. State of Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
111 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & 
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911)).  
112 Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 





New York Times v. Sullivan 
The foundation for the Court’s approach to falsity is most clearly revealed in its 
1964 Sullivan opinion,115 whose reach has since extended beyond defamation into 
criminal libel statutes and the torts of false light invasion of privacy and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.116 In prescribing a fault standard of “actual malice” 
applicable to lawsuits brought by public officials over defamatory falsehoods relating to 
their official conduct,117 the Court effectuated expansive protection for deceptive speech 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 
116 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan arose over a full-page advertisement in The New York 
Times that described clashes between Alabama law enforcement officers and student 
civil-rights protestors at Alabama State College. The advertisement encouraged readers to 
lend financial support to civil-rights causes and carried the apparent endorsement of 
numerous citizens, many of them celebrities and notable civil-rights activists. It also 
contained what the Court described as statements that were “not accurate descriptions of 
events which occurred in Montgomery.” Id. at 258. For example, “although the police 
were deployed near the campus … they did not at any time ‘ring the campus,’ and they 
were not called to the campus in connection with the demonstration on the State Capitol 
steps, as the third paragraph implied.” Id. at 259. Moreover, the apparent endorsers had 
not given their permission for their names to be used. See id. at 260. In response to the 
advertisement, L.B. Sullivan, a Montgomery city commissioner responsible for 
supervising the police department, brought a defamation lawsuit against the newspaper 
and four clergymen whose names had appeared in the advertisement. See id. at 261. 
Defamation lawsuits allow individuals whose reputations have been harmed by a false 
publication or utterance to seek redress for the injurious falsehood. Sullivan prevailed on 
his libel claim in the Alabama state courts—his $500,000 damages award at trial was 
upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court—but the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed after considering Sullivan’s public-official status and the nature of the speech 
contained in the advertisement. See id. at 264−65. 
117 The actual malice standard allows a public plaintiff to win a lawsuit only if he or she 
can prove that a defamatory falsehood was published “with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” See New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. Because the actual malice standard places a significant proof 
burden on public-official and public-figure plaintiffs, its effect has been expansive 
protection for deceptive speech about people operating in the public sphere. 
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about those operating in the public sphere.118 It also offered repeated justification for a 
First Amendment that protects noncommercial deception: 
[The First Amendment] does not turn upon “the truth, 
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which 
are offered.”119 
Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable 
contribution to public debate, since it brings about the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, 
produced by its collision with error.120 
Authoritative interpretation [] of the First Amendment[’s] 
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an 
exception for any test of truth—whether administered by 
judges, juries of administrative officials—and especially 
one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker.121 
[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it 
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have 
the “breathing space” that they “need to . . . survive.”122 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on the 
pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—
leads to a comparable “self-censorship.”123 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Two additional aspects of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan are relevant here. First, the 
Court rejected the argument that the speech contained in the ad was necessarily  
“commercial” because of its inclusion in a paid advertisement. Id. at 266. “The 
publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement… It communicated information, 
expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial 
support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the 
highest public interest and concern.” Id. In holding that constitutionally protected 
statements “do not forfeit that protection because they were published in the form of a 
paid advertisement,” the Court tied First Amendment protection to the function, rather 
than the form, of speech. Id. 
119 Id. at 271(quoting  N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)). 
120 Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY & CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 15 (Oxford: Blackwell 1947)). 
121 Id. at 271 (citing as comparison Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525—526 (1958)). 
122 Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. at 433). 
123 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
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These statements reveal a “public-purpose” interpretation of the First Amendment 
that almost certainly became part of the rationale for the commercial speech doctrine. 
Grounded in John Locke’s seventeenth-century contract theory and advanced largely by 
Professor Meiklejohn, the public-purpose view of free expression regards it primarily as a 
tool of democracy.124 The view that politically oriented speech is most valued fosters “the 
elaboration of a hierarchy of values”125 doctrinally consistent with a First Amendment 
that accords lesser protection126 to commercial speech: 
In the public-purpose view, commercial speech doctrine 
makes doctrinal sense. Indeed, the public-purpose view 
explains why strict scrutiny [to restrictions on commercial 
speech] is not appropriate. The easy extension of full First 
Amendment protection to corporate advertising disquiets. It 
seems to ennoble hucksters, cheapen political discourse, or 
both.127 
These statements also reveal a reliance on the classic marketplace analogy that 
accompanies the public-purpose perspective. The marketplace analogy, rooted in in the 
words of Milton’s Areopagitica128 of the seventeenth century and Mill’s On Liberty129 
two centuries later, conceives of ideas as competitors in a marketplace, battling for 
acceptance. Notwithstanding a recent suggestion that the marketplace model is actually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Meiklejohn noted that extra-legal theorizing has been present in many of the Court’s 
contemporary First Amendment rulings, many of them “based on highly questionable and 
sharply conflicting views of underlying theory.” Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the 
First Amendment Mean, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461, 462 (1953). 
125 Darrel C. Menthe, The Marketplace Metaphor and Commercial Speech Doctrine: Or 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying About and Love Citizens United, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q 131, 137 (2010). 
126 Lesser protection occurs in the degree of judicial scrutiny applied to regulations 
affecting commercial speech. Commercial speech restrictions are reviewed with 
intermediate scrutiny, while noncommercial speech restrictions must survive strict 
scrutiny in order to comport with the constitution. 
127 Menthe, supra note 125, at 137. 
128 See JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON, vol. 
2, 561 (Ernest Sireluck ed., Yale University Press 1959). 
129 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1947). 
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incompatible with the public-purpose perspective,130 the traditional view has regarded the 
two models as interdependent, with the former enabling the latter. Ingber, for example, 
observes:  
The marketplace doctrine, once rooted in American 
jurisprudence, grew a new shoot that benefitted its new 
environment. In addition to its usefulness in the search for 
truth and knowledge, the marketplace came to be perceived 
by courts and scholars as essential to effective popular 
participation in government.131 
Meiklejohn, the noted legal scholar of the twentieth century, was particularly 
devoted to the view that the Constitutional framers meant for the First Amendment to 
function as a tool of democracy. According to Meiklejohn, the First Amendment was 
intended not as an absolute bar to government restrictions on speech, but as a means to a 
democratic end.132 His premise was that “the fundamental objective of democracy is the 
‘voting of wise decisions’”133 that required access to information with which to make 
those decisions. Meiklejohn saw the First Amendment as an instrument by which the 
people exercised powers of “governing importance.” He “argued that the people … 
granted only some powers to the federal and state instruments they established”134 and 
reserved  “very significant powers of government to themselves.”135  As a result, 
“[f]reedom of expression in areas of public affairs is an absolute.”136 Speech “that did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1984). 
131 Id. at 3. 
132 Martin H. Redish and Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s 
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1303 (2009). 
133 Id. at 1307. 
134 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the 
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1965). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 12. 
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relate to this self-government value”137 should be excluded from First Amendment 
protection.138  
Implicit in the Meiklejohn perspective is a belief that “truth (or the best 
perspectives or solutions)”139 with respect to democratic issues is discoverable, and that 
in a competition with falsity, truth will emerge the victor—a belief articulated by both 
Milton and Mill. Milton wrote that attempts to aid the search for truth by curtailing or 
eliminating certain views were counterproductive and unnecessary: 
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play 
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, 
by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let 
her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the 
worse, in a free and open encounter?140 
Similarly, Mill proposed that truth can emerge only if debate is robust and free 
from governmental interference: 
Defending this [classic marketplace of ideas] theory in On 
Liberty, John Stuart Mill argued that three situations are 
possible: 1) if heretical opinion contains the truth, and if we 
silence it, we lose the chance of exchanging truth for error; 
2) if received and contesting opinions each hold part of the 
truth, their clash in open discussion provides the best means 
to discover the truth in each; 3) even if the heretical view is 
wholly false and the orthodoxy contains the whole truth, 
the received truth, unless debated and challenged, will be 
held in the manner of prejudice or dead dogma, its meaning 
may be forgotten or enfeebled, and it will in inefficacious 
for good. Moreover, without free speech, totally false 
heretical opinions which could not survive open discussion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1982).  
138 Id. at 592. Professor Redish suggests that “Meiklejohn in later years appeared to 
soften the rigidity of his lines of demarcation by effectively extending his doctrine—in a 
somewhat less than persuasive manner—to many forms of apparently nonpolitical 
speech,” namely artistic works, but that “other commentators have adopted his initial 
premise and kept within its logical limits.” 
139 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 
964, 964 (1978).  
140 MILTON, supra note 128. 
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will not disappear; instead, driven underground, these 
opinions will smolder, their fallacies protected from 
exposure and opposition.141 
This perspective clearly has influenced the Supreme Court’s view of the 
relationship between truth, falsity and democratic values. In 1919—well before New York 
Times v. Sullivan—Justice Holmes wrote in dissent “the best test of truth is the power of 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”142 In Holmes’ view, “a 
properly functioning marketplace of ideas … ultimately assures the proper evolution of 
society, wherever that evolution may lead.”143 Although Holmes was in the minority in 
that 1919 opinion, Court observers see the marketplace analogy underpinning much First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Baker, a critic of the marketplace analogy, says the Court 
“steadfastly relies upon a marketplace of ideas theory in determining what speech is 
protected”144 and its “constitutional analysis of defamation invokes Mill’s marketplace of 
ideas theory to justify its conclusion.”145  These theoretical strains, clearly highlighted in 
Sullivan, appear to have shaped subsequent opinions146 in which the Court has balanced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Baker, supra note 139, at 964−65. 
142 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
143 Ingber, supra note 130. 
144 Baker, supra note 139, at 968. 
145 Id. at 972. 
146 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 513 (1991); Hustler 
Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that in order to recover for the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, public officials or public figures such as the 
minister would have to show that the publication contains a false statement of fact was 
made with “actual malice,” Minister who was the subject of a parody ad could not show 
actual malice because of jury determination that no reasonable person would believe the 
ad to be presenting true statements of fact.); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) 
(holding that the actual malice standard is appropriate for public-official and public-
figures plaintiffs, but not private plaintiffs; public-figure plaintiffs, have greater access to 
communication channels and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false 
statements); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 68 (1967) (holding that a plaintiff seeking 
to recover for false-light invasion of privacy must show the defendant had knowledge of 
the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth when the false report pertains to a matter of 
	  
37	  
speech and press interests with states’ interests in protecting individuals and society from 
injurious falsehood. 
United States v. Alvarez 
Sullivan and its progeny concerned primarily falsehoods disseminated by a 
speaker about someone other than the speaker. More recently, the Court considered 
noncommercial falsity from the opposite perspective: the extent to which society may 
protect itself from alleged harm caused by individual speakers who disseminate 
falsehoods about themselves. Because of the source and nature of the falsehood—a self-
promoting speaker communicating about his own putative military service—United 
States v. Alvarez147 is perhaps more relevant to an analysis of deceptive commercial 
speech than the other noncommercial speech cases that preceded it. This is especially so 
in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has treated commercial speech differently in 
part because it is “more verifiable” than noncommercial speech. Presumably, speech by 
an individual about his own experiences and qualifications is equally, if not more, 
verifiable than speech by an organization about its own practices.   
In Alvarez, the Court considered a challenge to the Stolen Valor Act148 and 
whether the First Amendment protects speech in which someone falsely claims to have 
been awarded a military decoration or medal. It held that it does. The Court noted that it 
had never “confronted a measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
public interest); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (holding that the Sullivan rule 
also limits state power to impose criminal libel sanctions for criticism of the official 
conduct of public officials absent a showing of actual malice). 
147 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). 
148 The Act made it a crime for anyone to “falsely represent … verbally or in writing, to 
have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed 
Forces of the United States.” Alvarez, a public official who falsely claimed to have been 




nothing more.” Although the Court had “frequently said or implied that false factual 
statements enjoy little First Amendment protection,”149 it characterized its precedents as 
having resisted singling out falsity for falsity’s sake.150 Instead, its previous decisions in 
which falsity was excluded from constitutional protection were intertwined with “some 
other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement” such as defamation, 
fraud, invasion of privacy or “the costs of vexatious litigation.”151 The Court explained, 
“Falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”  The 
Stolen Valor Act, it said, sought to invert Sullivan’s speech-promoting principle and use 
it “for a new purpose. It seeks to convert a rule that limits liability … into a rule that 
expands liability in a different, far greater realm of discourse and expression:”152 
The requirements of a knowing falsehood or reckless 
disregard for the truth as the condition of recovery in 
certain defamation cases exists to allow more speech, not 
less. A rule designed to tolerate certain speech ought not to 
blossom to become a rationale for a rule restricting it.153 
The Alvarez Court, using a marketplace approach, highlighted the general 
function of counterspeech in a free society and its particular deployment as to Alvarez.154 
“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true,” said the Court. “The 
Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not suffice to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2553. (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., dissenting.) 
150 In dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, asserted that “by 
holding that the First Amendment nevertheless shields these lies, the Court breaks 
sharply from a long line of cases recognizing that the right to free speech does not protect 
false factual statements that inflict real harm and serve no legitimate interest.” Id. at 
2557. 
151 Id. at 2545. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Alvarez, who had been exposed in the community as one who habitually lied, had 
been “ridiculed online,” and had been asked to resign from his public office. 
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achieve its interest”155 in seeking to protect the integrity of the Medal of Honor. “Only a 
weak society needs government protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to 
preserve the truth. Truth needs neither handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.”156 
As these opinions illustrate, the Court has acknowledged a place in the 
marketplace of ideas for noncommercial falsehood. Speakers are given “breathing space” 
with respect to false statements about public officials, public figures and matters of public 
interest or concern, which are broadly defined. Constitutional breathing space also 
protects self-promoters who misrepresent themselves in their personal dealings; the 
appropriate remedy for such falsehood is speech that exposes or corrects the lie.  
Commercial Falsehood 
This contrasts sharply with the Court’s view of commercial falsehood. Unlike 
politically oriented noncommercial speech—which has from the outset enjoyed the 
presumption of constitutional protection—commercial speech has been assigned a 
“subordinate position on the scale of First Amendment values”157 and is “subject to 
‘modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial 
expression.’”158 Although truthful commercial speech enjoys a measure of constitutional 
protection, commercial falsehood that transcends mere “sales talk” or  “puffing”159 has 
been viewed as altogether outside the scope of First-Amendment protection. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2549. 
156 Id. at 2550−51. 
157 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (citing Bd. of Trs. of State 
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 
436 U.S. 447 (1978)). 
158 Id.  
159 The Supreme Court has defined “puffing” as a “magnification of opinion”—a “mere 
exaggeration of the qualities which the article has. The limits of puffing are transcended 
when the article sold “is not of the character or kind represented and hence does not serve 
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Valentine v. Chrestensen 
Understanding this disparity first requires an examination of the Court’s regard 
for commercial speech generally. The Court drew a bright-line distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech in 1942’s Valentine v. Chrestensen,160 in which it 
held constitutional protections for speech were meant to allow the communication of 
information and dissemination of opinion, but not the communication and dissemination 
of commercial messages. Although the Court eventually altered course and concluded 
“commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected,”161 it has yet to completely 
abandon Valentine’s lesser regard for commercial speech: 
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper 
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating 
information and disseminating opinion and that, although 
the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the 
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden 
or proscribe its employment in these public throughfares. 
We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such 
restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising.162 
Valentine, which involved an entrepreneur’s desire to distribute commercial 
handbills to generate tourism for a moored submarine in New York, is regarded as the 
origin of the commercial speech doctrine and it clearly set the stage for the doctrine’s 
contemporary incarnation, which the Court began to define in 1975.163 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the purpose” for which it was purchased. United States v. New S. Farm & Home Co., 241 
U.S. 64, 71 (1916). Puffery becomes fraud when it consists of “material 
representations. . . made with intent to deceive.” Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 274−75 
(1949).  
160 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
161 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755. 
162 Valentine, 316 U.S. 52 at 54. Valentine was the first time the Court considered the 
constitutional implications of restrictions on commercial speech.  
163 See Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809. 
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Unlike its precursor, which viewed commercial speech as outside the scope of 
First Amendment protection, the modern commercial speech doctrine provides that 
truthful, non-misleading commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment and 
may be regulated only if the government can show a) it has a substantial interest in the 
regulation, b) the regulation at issue directly advances that substantial interest, and c) the 
regulation is narrowly tailored to further that substantial interest. .164 Commercial 
falsehood is categorically unprotected.165 
Critics and supporters of the commercial speech doctrine’s lesser regard for 
commercial speech have questioned its legal and theoretical precedents and practical 
impact. It has been called “a doctrine in search of a theoretical justification,”166 and “very 
much out of step with the rest of First Amendment law.”167 Baker, a supporter of the 
doctrine, has described it as “a major anomaly in first amendment theory”168 and an 
“exception that has continually eluded theoretical justification.”169 Farber, a detractor, has 
said “commercial speech stubbornly declines to fit comfortably within our general rules 
of free speech,”170 and the disparity in the Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial 
speech creates “nagging questions:”171 “If a political candidate can lie without fear of 
legal intervention, why can’t a used car dealer?” In Farber’s view, “judicial acceptance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (1980).  
165 See Id. Speech promoting unlawful activity also is categorically unprotected under the 
Central Hudson framework.  
166 Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1892, 1894 (2007). 
167 Menthe, supra note 128, at 133. 
168 C. Edwin Baker, A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1976). 
169 Id. 
170 Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. 




such” is “fundamentally inconsistent with the scheme of values inherent in modern first 
amendment doctrine.”172 Kozinski and Banner, among the doctrine’s most outspoken 
critics, have chided the Valentine Court for having seemingly “plucked the commercial 
speech doctrine out of thin air:”173 
Without citing any cases, without discussing the purposes 
or values underlying the first amendment, and without even 
mentioning the first amendment except in stating 
Chrestensen’s contentions, the Court found it clear as day 
that commercial speech was not protected by the first 
amendment.174 
Some of the harshest criticism has come from within the current Supreme Court. 
Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, regards the commercial speech doctrine as 
“paternalistic.”175 He believes strict judicial scrutiny176 should apply to commercial-
speech regulation, as it does with respect to protected noncommercial speech, and that 
“Americans’ rights of free speech should be defended consistently, whether they are 
acting as citizens or consumers.”177 
Aside from the public-purpose perspective that encouraged a hierarchy of 
constitutional values, an additional contributing factor in the doctrine’s development 
likely was the Court’s view of advertising messages as something other than speech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Id. at 379. 
173 Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. 
Rev. 627, 627 (1990).  
174 Id. at 628. 
175 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484. 
176 Strict judicial scrutiny requires the government to advance a “compelling interest” in 
the proposed restrictions on speech, as opposed a “substantial interest” required in 
commercial speech cases. 
177 Bruce Johnson, Online Symposium on Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
First Amendment Jurisprudence: Justice Thomas and Commercial Speech (Oct. 8, 2007), 
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justice-thomas-and-commercial-
speech. Interestingly, Justice Thomas was in the dissent in Alvarez; he would have upheld 
the Stolen Valor Act as constitutional. 
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Even though the First Amendment was available in Valentine as a shield against state 
encroachment with respect to speech rights, the Court did not seem to regard advertising 
as speech at all.  The Court’s reasoning in Valentine “suggests quite strongly … that the 
Court conceptualized advertising as a business, not a means of expression.”178  
In Valentine, therefore, the Court wasn’t facing a case 
about commercial speech; it was facing a case about 
advertising. And it was one of the easiest cases the Court 
ever decided. … Thirteen days … was just about as fast as 
any case was ever decided. Valentine wasn’t a case any of 
the Justices found necessary to dwell upon. … All this 
suggests that in 1942, the Justices considered the question 
whether the First Amendment has any application to 
advertising to be one that was easily resolved and not very 
important. Although the issue has never come up before, 
the Court disposed of it in a single paragraph containing no 
citations.179 
Indeed, other advertising-related Court opinions of the period were reviewed not 
from a free-speech perspective, but from that of whether or not the government had 
exceeded its police powers. In 1932, for example, the Court dismissed an appeal by a 
dentist whose permit for a sign had been denied on the basis that the dental practice’s 
corporate status, signaled by the abbreviation “Inc.,” displayed in “diminutive type” 
underneath the dentist’s name, amounted to a deceit.180 The state appellate court had 
upheld the denial of the permit, agreeing with the local judgment that the “dimly 
discernible” corporate insignia was a type of fraud, the protection against which was 
“among the important functions of government."181 According to the Supreme Court’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial 
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993). 
179 Id. at 757−58. 
180 Dr. Bloom, Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 259 N.Y. 358, 182 N.E. 16; 1932 N.Y. Lexis 951 
(1932). 
181 Id.  
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order of dismissal, the dentist’s appeal lacked “a substantial federal question” 182—in 
other words, the sign didn’t implicate “speech” rights. Two years later, in another case 
involving advertising by a dentist, the Court cited the role of local police powers in “the 
vital interest of public health.”183 It held states could prohibit advertising by licensed 
professionals “even though in particular instances there might be no actual deception or 
misstatement.”184  
The 1970s brought a retreat from Valentine’s bright-line distinction between 
constitutional protection for noncommercial versus commercial speech. A deep 
constitutional divide remained, however, particularly where falsehood was concerned. In 
1973, the Court indicated that non-discriminatory advertisements for job openings were 
constitutionally protected.185 In 1974, it held that an advertisement for abortion services 
was constitutionally protected because it “did more than simply propose a commercial 
transaction. It contained factual material of clear ‘public interest.’”186 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 
By 1975, the Court’s position on commercial speech appeared to have “been 
tempered”187 sufficiently that a Federal District Court the next year struck down as 
unconstitutional a ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices. On appeal in 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,188 the Supreme 
Court confirmed its shift toward constitutional protection for commercial speech. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Id. 
183 Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935).  
184 Id. 
185 See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376. 
186 Bigelow , 421 U.S. 809. This appeal was decided on the heels of Rowe v. Wade, the 
abortion-rights case. 
187 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755. The lower court relied on the Court’s holding in 
Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809.  See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755. 
188 425 U.S. 748. 
	  
45	  
adopted the lower court’s view “that First Amendment interests in the free flow of price 
information could be found to outweigh the countervailing interests of the State.”189 
According to the Court, commercial information—prescription drug prices, in this 
instance—played a positive role in the functioning of society: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes 
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as 
to who is producing and selling what product, for what 
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a 
predominantly free enterprise society, the allocation of our 
resources in large measure will be made through numerous 
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest 
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and 
well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensable.190 
In arriving at that conclusion, the Court first ruled that First Amendment 
protection extended to the recipients of commercial information “and not solely, if at all, 
to the advertisers themselves who seek to disseminate that information.”191 It 
acknowledged a string of previous decisions that signaled a “‘commercial speech’ 
exception” to the First Amendment but pointed to its holding in Bigelow v. Virginia:192 
“Last Term, in Bigelow v. Virginia, the notion of unprotected ‘commercial speech’ all but 
passed from the scene.”193 
Notwithstanding the Court’s shift toward a degree of constitutional protection for 
commercial speech, the notion of unprotected, deceptive commercial speech remained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Id. at 755. 
190 Id. at 765. 
191 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. 
192 421 U.S. 809. Bigelow concerned a newspaper editor’s conviction for publishing an 
advertisement in Virginia for abortion services in New York. A Virginia statute 
prohibited such advertisements, but the Court found the ad’s content included “factual 
material of ‘clear public interest’ that did more than “simply propose a commercial 
transaction.” 
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very much on the scene. In both Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, the Court counseled 
that deceptive or fraudulent commercial messages would be treated differently. This was 
based in part on the Court’s perception of two “common-sense differences” between 
commercial speech and noncommercial speech. One difference is that because 
commercial speakers are economically incentivized to speak, commercial speech is more 
durable than noncommercial speech;194 commercial speakers are less likely to be deterred 
from speaking, even in the face of regulation aimed at assuring truthfulness. Another 
difference is that commercial speech is presumed to be more verifiable195 than 
noncommercial speech; as a result, commercial speakers may be held to a higher standard 
of truthfulness.196 It reiterated that “untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has 
never been protected for its own sake”197 and “not all commercial messages contain the 
same or even a very great public interest element.”198 In searching for a public interest 
element, the Court seemed to turn to the underlying First Amendment theory employed in 
its analysis of noncommercial-speech cases. According to the Court, the First 
Amendment allows states to insure that the stream of commercial information flows 
“cleanly as well as freely,”199 and states have “no obstacle”200 to “dealing effectively with 
this problem” of false or deceptive commercial speech.201 The Court restated this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 See Id. at 748. 
195 See Id. 
196 Commentators have disputed the notion that commercial speech is either more durable 
or more verifiable. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 176 and Schmidt & Burns, infra 
note 215.  
197 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)). 
198 Virginia Pharmacy at 764. 
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perspective—that false or deceptive commercial speech is unprotected—twice more202 
following Virginia Pharmacy before embedding it in a judicial test for determining the 
constitutionality of commercial-speech regulation.  
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York 
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New 
York,203 decided in 1980, concerned a New York regulation banning regulated utilities 
from advertising in a way that would promote the use of electricity. The Court held that 
the advertising ban violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it “was more 
extensive than is necessary to serve the state interest in energy conservation.”204 It 
reasoned the total ban prevented the power company from “promoting electric services 
that would reduce energy use by diverting demand from less efficient sources, or that 
would consume roughly the same amount of energy as do alternative sources.”205 Central 
Hudson remains an important Supreme Court opinion. It re-articulated the modern 
commercial speech doctrine206 and prescribed a four-part test to be used by courts 
considering constitutional challenges to government restrictions on commercial speech. 
The four-part Central Hudson test addresses deceptive commercial speech at the outset: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 See Bates, 433 U.S. 350; Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447. 
203 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557. 
204 Id. at 572. 
205 Id. at 570. 
206 The original commercial speech doctrine, established in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 
U.S. 52, was that commercial speech was wholly outside the protection of the First 
Amendment. Central Hudson updated the doctrine by keeping misleading commercial 
speech on the sideline while clarifying the recognition of commercial speech as protected 
(per Virginia Pharmacy Board) if the government asserted a substantial interest likely to 
be advanced by a narrowly tailored regulation. In Central Hudson, the Court focused on 
its previous recognition of “the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government 
regulation, and other varieties of speech.” Id. at 572, citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447. 
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For commercial speech to come within the First 
Amendment, it at least must concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield 
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and 
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest.207  
In separating “misleading” commercial speech from First Amendment protection, 
the Court referenced earlier opinions in which it recognized the “informational function 
of advertising”208 and the importance of accuracy: “Even when advertising communicates 
only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that 
some accurate information is better than no information at all.”209 The Court reasoned 
that advertising’s potential role in allowing people to be adequately informed “to perceive 
their own best interests”210 depends upon the veracity of the information presented. 
Consequently, “there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”211  
Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson both emphasize the 
informational function of advertising as a means through which people can make well-
informed decisions. This harkens the marketplace of ideas theory employed in the service 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. This multiple-step inquiry is known as the Central 
Hudson test and is used by courts to assess the constitutionality of  restrictions on 
commercial speech. Originally, the third part of the inquiry was whether the regulation 
was “no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.” This was a “least-
restrictive means test” that the court modified in 1989 in favor of a “narrowly drawn,” 
“reasonable fit” approach. According to the Court, the commercial-speech doctrine’s 
treatment of commercial speech as subordinate and subject to “ample” regulatory 
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which imposes a heavy burden on the State.” Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York 
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477, (1989) [herein after SUNY v. Fox].   
208 Id. at 563. 
209 Id. at 562 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. 350). 
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of noncommercial speech. But as those opinions also show, the Court has stopped short 
of finding a legitimate place or role for falsity or deception in the commercial 
marketplace; it has continued to categorize deceptive commercial speech as 
constitutionally unprotected. 
Despite the Court’s “broadly stated” pronouncements about  “the exemption of 
false and misleading commercial speech from the protections of the first amendment,”212 
few of the Court’s commercial-speech cases have involved actual claims of or concerns 
about deception; only once has the Court repeated this statement in the context of speech 
which the Court found to be false or misleading and therefore unprotected.213 
Consequently, Court guidance regarding what constitutes false or deceptive commercial 
claims is scant. Four cases concerning lawyer advertising provided the Court an 
opportunity to consider deception in the commercial context and provide at least partial 
insight into its view of what is and is not deceptive. 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 
On the heels of Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, cases in which the Court 
signaled that deceptive or fraudulent commercial messages would be outside the First 
Amendment’s protection, the Court considered a state’s argument that lawyer advertising 
was inherently deceptive. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona214 arose in 1977 after Bates and 
another attorney were temporarily suspended from practicing law because they had 
placed newspaper advertisements offering legal services at “reasonable fees” and which 
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listed fees for certain services. 215 The State Bar cited concerns that price-related 
advertising by lawyers is necessarily misleading; legal services differ from client to 
client, meaning that prospective clients who subsequently learned that their cases were 
more complex and, therefore, more expensive, would have been misled by the lack of 
complete information contained in the ad.216 
The Court determined that, despite shortcomings and imperfections, the 
advertising at issue—fixed-price advertising featuring the low end of the price scale for 
routine legal services—was not necessarily deceptive and lawyer advertising generally 
“may not be subjected to blanket suppression.”217 Initially, the Bates Court’s reasoning 
regarding lack of deception in that case hinted at increasing protections for even false 
commercial speech. The opinion cast speakers and listeners as beneficiaries of an open 
marketplace of information that served substantial interests in the free flow of 
commercial speech. Consumers’ potential naiveté, said the Court, was no reason to 
suppress commercial information that did not paint a complete picture as to every 
prospective consumer:  
Advertising does not provide a complete foundation on 
which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny 
the consumer, on the ground that the information is 
incomplete, at least some of the relevant information 
needed to reach an informed decision. The alternative—the 
prohibition of advertising—serves only to restrict the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 See Id. The advertisement violated a rule prohibiting such lawyer advertising, and the 
lawyers challenged the rule and their suspension on First Amendment grounds. 
216 See Id. It was argued that advertising of legal services inevitably will be misleading 
(a) because such services are so individualized with regard to content and quality as to 
prevent informed comparison on the basis of an advertisement, (b) because the consumer 
of legal services is unable to determine in advance just what services he needs, and (c) 
because advertising by attorneys will highlight irrelevant factors and fail to show the 




information that flows to consumers. Moreover, this 
argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated 
enough to realize the limitation of advertising, and that the 
public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct 
but incomplete information. We suspect the argument rests 
on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we view 
as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of 
public ignorance. Although, of course, the bar retains the 
power to correct omissions that have the effect of 
presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is 
more disclosure, rather than less. If the naiveté of the public 
will cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it 
is the bar’s role to assure that the populace is sufficiently 
informed as to enable it to place advertising in its proper 
perspective.218 
 In a footnote to the opinion, the Court also noted that certain types of potential 
transactions—such as the hiring of a lawyer—provided an opportunity for clarification of 
any potentially misleading advertising through face-to-face communication: 
We recognize that an occasional client might fail to 
appreciate the complexity of his legal problem and will 
visit an attorney in the mistaken belief that his difficulty 
can be handled at the advertised price. This 
misunderstanding, however, usually will be exposed at the 
initial consultation, and an ethical attorney would impose, 
at the most, a minimal consultation charge or no charge at 
all for the discussion. If the client decides to have work 
performed, a fee could be negotiated in the normal manner. 
The client is thus in largely the same position as he would 
be if there were no advertising. In light of the benefits of 
advertising to those whose problem can be resolved at the 
advertised price, suppression is not warranted on account of 
the occasional client who misperceives his legal 
difficulties.219 
In this instance, the Court seemed poised to rule—as it had in Sullivan regarding 
false noncommercial speech—that the remedy for potentially false or misleading 
commercial speech was not regulation, but more speech.  But it declined to uniformly 
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accord additional “breathing room” to false commercial speech, again referring to 
perceived differences between commercial and noncommercial speech—durability and 
verifiability—it had first delineated in Virginia Pharmacy. Moreover, the “public and 
private benefits” of commercial speech “derive from confidence in its accuracy and 
reliability.”220 Therefore, “advertising that is false, deceptive or misleading of course is 
subject to restraint”221 and “the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has 
been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena.”222  
Bates provided the Court’s first opportunity to evaluate a case involving 
commercial speech following Virginia Pharmacy’s holding that commercial speech was 
protected. The informational function of advertising recognized in Virginia Pharmacy 
was present in Bates, the Court said. Also, Bates gave the shape to the Court’s earlier 
pronouncements, made somewhat casually in Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, regarding 
false or deceptive commercial speech. 
In Re R.M.J. 
Five years after Bates, the Court considered In Re R.M.J., another case in which a 
lawyer’s advertisements ran afoul of the state board charged with regulating lawyer 
conduct, this time in Missouri. In ruling for the lawyer, the Court noted the Bates holding 
that lawyer advertising was a form of First Amendment-protected commercial speech that 
“‘may not be subjected to blanket suppression,’”223 but that false, deceptive or misleading 
advertising by lawyers “remains subject to restraint.”224 It re-stated its position regarding 
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223 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 199 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383). 
224 Id. at 200. 
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advertising for professional services, in which the consuming public is likely to have 
“comparative lack of knowledge:”225 
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to 
the protections of the First Amendment. But when the 
particular content or method of advertising is subject to 
abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. 
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the 
States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain 
types of potentially misleading information, … if the 
information also may be presented in a way that is not 
deceptive. Thus, … the remedy in the first instance is not 
necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of 
disclaimers or explanation. Although the potential for 
deception and confusion is particularly strong in the context 
of advertising professional services, restrictions upon such 
advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to 
prevent the deception.226 
In other words, said the Court, advertising that is potentially misleading, as 
opposed to actually misleading, should be addressed with calls for greater clarity in the 
form of disclaimers or more effective explanation. Only inherently false or demonstrably 
false advertising may be banned, and such was not present in that case. 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio 
A decade after Bates, the Court heard Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
of the Supreme Court of Ohio227 and again provided feedback regarding deception.228 The 
state regarded two lawyer advertisements as deceptive in several respects. First, the ads 
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use of a contraceptive device. The drunk driving advertisement appeared to be an offer to 
represent criminal defendants on a contingent-fee basis, which was not allowed. The 
contraceptive-device advertisement gave information about health problems associated 
with the device and stated the availability of legal action against the manufacturer. It 
offered a similar fee arrangement to that in the first advertisement, and included an 
illustration of the device itself.   
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contained information about fee arrangements that failed to indicate clients would be 
responsible for litigation costs. Second, one of the ads contained illustrations, whose very 
nature created “unacceptable risks that the public will be misled, manipulated, or 
confused.”229 The Court agreed that the contingent-fee information was potentially 
misleading, because a layman may not be aware of the distinction between “legal fees” 
and “costs.”230 The appropriate remedy, said the Court, was the reasonable addition of 
clarifying disclosure language: 
[W]e have emphasized that because disclosure 
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s 
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, “[warnings] or 
[disclaimers] might be appropriately required … in order to 
dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or 
deception.” … We do not suggest that disclosure 
requirements do not implicate the advertiser’s First 
Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or 
unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend 
the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial 
speech. But we hold that an advertiser’s rights are 
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.231 
As for the potential of advertising visuals to mislead, the Court was “not 
convinced”232 that a prophylactic ban on the use of pictures or illustrations was the 
appropriate course: 
[A]cceptance of the State’s argument could be tantamount 
to adoption of a principle that a State may prohibit the use 
of pictures or illustrations in connection with advertising of 
any product or service simply on the strength of the general 
argument that the visual content of advertisements, may, 
under some circumstances, be deceptive or manipulative. 
… We are not persuaded that the identifying deceptive or 
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manipulative uses of visual media in advertising is so 
intrinsically burdensome that the State is entitled to forego 
that task in favor of the more convenient but far more 
restrictive alternative of a blanket ban on the use of 
illustrations.233 
Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of 
Accountancy 
Finally, in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional 
Regulation, Board of Accountancy,234 the Court considered a Florida lawyer’s challenge 
to a disciplinary action filed by the state board responsible for the regulation of 
accountancy and accountants. Even though the lawyer was not practicing as an 
accountant, her law-services advertising mentioned (truthfully) that she was both a 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and a Certified Financial Planner (CFP). According to 
the accounting board, the advertising was misleading because it implied that in providing 
the advertised services, she was subject to the regulations governing the practice of 
accounting. The Court ruled in the lawyer’s favor, reiterating that proof of actual harm is 
required to justify interfering with the valuable free flow of commercial information: 
“The State’s burden is not slight … ‘Mere speculation or conjecture’ will not suffice; 
rather the State ‘must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction 
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”235 
The commercial speech doctrine and its lesser protections for commercial speech 
have attracted considerable study and commentary, both positive and negative. Among 
those examinations, only a few have addressed the issue of constitutional protection for 
deceptive commercial speech. In 1979, Reich plotted a social and economic framework to 
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serve “as a starting point from which to develop standards for judicial review of 
governmental efforts to prevent deception.”236 He conceived of an approach in which 
courts—or, perhaps more appropriately, legislative bodies—weigh the social usefulness 
of commercial information against the costs of deception. In 1988, Schmidt and Burns 
proposed an approach to false commercial speech that mirrored, to some extent, the 
Court’s approach to noncommercial falsehood in Sullivan:  
[t]he first amendment should be read to limit regulation of 
false advertising to (1) explicit misrepresentations or (2) 
implicit misrepresentations (a) where the advertiser knew 
that the advertising had misleading implications; (b) where 
the advertiser should have known that it had such 
implications by virtue of a trade rule clearly proscribing the 
terminology or practice giving rise to such misleading 
implications; or (c) where the agency submits valid 
consumer survey evidence indicating that consumers were 
in fact misled. 237 
According to Schmidt and Burns, false commercial speech should be treated 
similarly to false noncommercial speech in some instances. They write, “uncertainties in 
the federal regulation of advertising chill legitimate commercial speech and … even some 
false and misleading speech should be protected to provide breathing room for legitimate 
commercial speech.”238 Howard and Menthe each have recommended doing away with 
the commercial speech doctrine. The former proposes instead a “relational framework” 
that examines a regulation’s impact on protected speech, the nature of the speech 
affected, and the justification for protecting a listener’s reliance on the regulated 
speech.239 The latter favors a regulatory regime “tied more closely to fraud protection,” 
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with proper plaintiffs being “those who can demonstrate some reliance on” falsehoods by 
corporations or individuals “about their business practices.”240 Aside from these few 
attempts to focus on noncommercial falsehood, the disparity between the Court’s 
treatment of noncommercial and commercial falsehood is entrenched and largely 
unquestioned. 
Summary 
Noncommercial falsehood is largely First-Amendment protected, while 
commercial falsehood is categorically excluded from protection. Unlike other 
unprotected categories of speech—libelous speech, inciting speech and obscene speech, 
which will be discussed in Chapter Three—there is no established judicial test or 
framework for identifying commercial fraud. Nor is there clarity or consensus regarding 
applicable terminology. In Alvarez, decided in 2010, the Supreme repeated the 
proposition that “fraud” is categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, but a 
return to several other cases summarized in this chapter reveals ambiguity as to what is 
meant by commercial “fraud.” In Alvarez, the Court cited Virginia Pharmacy Board, 
decided in 1976, as precedent for “fraud” as an excluded category of speech. In Virginia 
Pharmacy, however, decided in 1976, the Court used the terms “false or misleading” and 
“untruthful” to describe the type of commercial speech with which a state is free to deal 
“effectively.”241 Elsewhere the terms “deceptive” and “inaccurate” are used seemingly 
synonymously with “false,” “misleading,” and “untruthful.”242 
In between Virginia Pharmacy Board and Alvarez, the Court introduced a 
distinction between “actually misleading” advertising and that which is only “potentially 
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misleading,”243 holding that only inherently or demonstrably (“actually”) false 
advertising may be banned.244 Fraud, then, has been categorized as unprotected, but 
ambiguity exists as to what fraud means. Is it deceptiveness, as the FTC has said, or 
deception? Does fraud mean advertising claims that are potentially deceptive—as in, an 
ad claim could be deceptive, depending on how it is perceived? Or does fraud mean 
advertising claims that are actually deceptive—as in, the ad claim is actually misleading 
because it is factually incorrect and consumers have, in fact, been deceived? 
Given the Court’s caution against outright bans when disclaimers or the addition 
of clarifying language would serve the state’s interests, a logical reading would be that 
the categorical exemption for fraud is meant to include only actually deceptive claims. If 
that is the case, constitutional protection may extend to commercial claims that are 
potentially deceptive but not actually so. 
As noted at the outset, the potential criminalization of commercial speech deemed 
deceptive raises the constitutional stakes. The continuing blurring of the lines between 
what is commercial and what is not, and the difficulty inherent in determining what is 
deceptive and what is not, may necessitate a reconsideration of the constitutional chasm 
between noncommercial and commercial falsehood. At the very least, this reality merits a 
broad-view look at the current state of civil and criminal schemes of redress that pauses 
to consider both the general purpose and meaning of the First Amendment and specific 
Supreme Court precedent regarding falsity. The following chapters offer a first attempt at 
such. 
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT & UNPROTECTED CATEGORIES OF SPEECH 
 
Rejecting an absolutist view245 of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
adopted an expansive definition of “speech.” Rather than insisting that only spoken or 
written ideological speech about matters integral to democracy be considered speech, 
court opinions have expanded the definition of speech to include “expressive conduct”—
flag burning, for example—and of course, as seen in Chapter Two, nonideological, 
commercial speech. In keeping with this non-absolutist view, the Court also has said that 
liberty of speech and of the press is not an absolute right. When the right is or may be 
improperly exercised, governmental actors may attempt to prevent or punish its abuse.246 
Therefore, despite the First Amendment’s “shall not abridge” command, some 
abridgments on speech are compatible with the Constitution.  
Abridgements on speech take the form or either prior restraints or punishment 
after the fact. (See Figure 3.1) Prior restraints are imposed before the expression makes 
its way into the public discourse and are designed to keep it from doing so. Prior 
restraints (sometimes called previous restraint) are “administrative and judicial orders 
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such 
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communications are to occur.”247 They are “the essence of censorship.”248 Classic 
examples of prior restraints, according to the Court, are “temporary restraining orders and 
permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities.”249 
Licensing requirements imposed by the government also may act as prior restraints,250 as 
may attempts to attack future speech in retribution for a speaker’s past transgressions.251 
Past transgressions, however, may invite their own, subsequent punishment. 
According to the Court, the First Amendment’s “chief purpose” is to “prevent 
previous restraints upon publication.”252 Two opinions, Near v. Minnesota253 and New 
York Times Co. v. United States,254 are most often cited for the proposition. In Near, 
decided in 1931, the Court invalidated a lower court order permanently enjoining a 
newspaper publisher whose publication contained articles found to have violated a state 
nuisance statute. The statute allowed “malicious, scandalous or defamatory” publications 
to be permanently barred, which the Court found contrary to the First Amendment: 
The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by 
miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less 
necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint 
in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent 
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punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate 
remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.255 
In New York Times v. United States, the Court rebuffed efforts by the Federal 
Government to enjoin publication of excerpts of the Pentagon Papers, a classified study 
on the conduct of the Vietnam War. The Court noted, “any system of prior restraints of 
expression comes to the Unites States Supreme Court bearing a heavy presumption 
against its constitutional validity.”256  
Post-Publication Punishment 
Punishment after publication allows the speech into the public discourse but holds 
the speaker accountable for any harm caused by its dissemination. The Supreme Court 
has referred to “the time-honored distinction between barring speech in the future and 
penalizing past speech.” Its own decisions, the Court has noted, “have steadfastly 
preserved the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments,”257 clearly 
preferring the latter to the former. As Justices White and Stewart stated in concurrence in 
the Pentagon Papers case, 
The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions 
potentially relevant to these cases. … If any material here 
at issue is of this nature, the newspapers are presumably 
now on full notice of the position of the United States and 
must face the consequences if they publish. I would have 
no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sections 
on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity 
and the imposition of a prior restraint.258 
It has been argued—unsuccessfully—that because of their potential to deter if not 
eclipse future speech, post-speech penalties operate in fact as unconstitutional prior 
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restraints rather than a permissible post-publication punishment.259 For example, the 
seizing of assets, such as equipment and supplies, that makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to speak in the future is not a prior restraint if the seized assets were derived 
from some past criminal conduct.260 
Unprotected Speech May be Banned or Punished 
Both prior restraints and post-publication punishment are constitutionally 
tolerable when it comes to false commercial speech and several other categories of 
speech designated by the Court as being outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection. The rationale underlying this “categorical approach” to interpreting the First 
Amendment is that some types of speech lack redeeming social importance,261 are 
removed from any exposition of ideas,262 or present some grave and imminent threat that 
the government has the power to prevent.263 
Three excluded categories of speech, namely libelous speech, advocacy speech 
intended to incite imminent lawlessness, and obscene speech are particularly relevant to 
this research because of their interaction with criminal penalties. Also, for each of these 
categories, the Court has produced a test or framework of evaluation that may be useful 
in considering criminal sanctions for deceptive advertising. Each of these three categories 
of speech is discussed below.  
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Libelous speech264 is speech that conveys false statements of fact harmful to 
reputation. Provided states observe the constitutional limitations of New York Times v. 
Sullivan, they are free to treat libel as a civil harm, a criminal act, or both. All states 
permit private, civil lawsuits as a means of redress for libel. Many states, however, have 
eliminated criminal libel statutes or leave them on the books, unenforced.  
Criminal libel statutes traditionally were based not on concern for protecting 
individuals’ reputations as much as protecting the public from potential violence or 
retaliation that may result. In essence, criminal libel traditionally was about disturbances 
to the peace, not unlike punishment for “fighting words.”265 In states where criminal libel 
statutes remain active, however, the breach-of-peace rationale has tended to be replaced 
with a focus on punishing speech that calls into question someone’s character.266 In most 
states, therefore, criminal libel statutes are motivated by and address the same individual, 
reputational concerns as civil lawsuits but allow for potential criminal charges brought on 
behalf of the state. 
Although it has not declared criminal libel laws to be unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court has expressed reservations about criminal libel based on concerns for 
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breaches of the peace. According to the Court, to avoid criminal liability for libel, 
speakers are required to divine how another party may react to the speech. Making an 
offense of conduct because of its potential to disturb the peace “involves calculations as 
to the boiling point of a particular person or a particular group, not an appraisal of the 
nature of the comments per se.”267 Not only is such an appraisal nearly impossible to 
make, “this kind of criminal libel ‘makes a man a criminal simply because his neighbors 
have no self control and cannot refrain from violence.’”268 In other words, said the Court, 
“audiences,” not speakers, “are legally responsible for their reactions to speech.”269 
In addition, shortly after having established the actual malice standard for civil 
libel in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court extended the standard to criminal libel, 
ruling that proof of actual malice was required when the alleged libelous remarks concern 
a public official’s performance of public duties.270 Applying that standard in 1991, a 
Federal District Court in South Carolina declared that state’s criminal libel statute to be 
overly broad, vague and ultimately unconstitutional because it did not require a finding of 
“actual malice.” By relying on the lower threshold of common-law malice, the statute 
impermissibly restricted protected speech.271 
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 Despite clear constitutional infirmities, a number of states maintain enforceable 
criminal libel statutes.272 An argument in favor of criminal libel is that it enables the 
states to assume some of the burden of holding speakers accountable, particularly where 
anonymous, online speech is concerned. The time and resources required to unmask the 
identity of those responsible for posting the libel may be prohibitive, and many private 
citizens who have suffered genuine harm may not have the wherewithal to pursue civil 
lawsuits. 
Critics of criminal libel point to contemporary applications of the law designed 
“to intimidate the young and politically inexperienced,”273 such as a prosecution in Utah 
over a high-school student’s website “laced with obscenities and vulgar accusations” 
about the principal, teachers and other school personnel and students. The student was 
arrested and, without having been convicted of a crime, spent seven days in juvenile 
detention:274  
The problem with the crime of libel is, first, that it is too 
often used as a device for punishing criticism of those who 
direct the conduct of government—the so-called “best 
man”—and, second, that it does not promote or protect 
speech bearing even a tangential relationship to the 
requirements of self-government. It instead creates a 
“chilling effect” that makes speakers less likely to speak or 
criticize government in the future.275 
 
 The appropriateness of criminal libel statutes is a function of the effectiveness of 
alternative civil remedies and the detrimental effects of criminal libel enforcement on free 
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speech. In some jurisdictions, both criminal and civil penalties are among options for 
dealing with false speech harmful to reputation. 
Speech Inciting Imminent Lawlessness 
 Given the First Amendment’s clear protections for ideological speech, it follows 
that advocacy speech, even that which advocates violence or criminal conduct, is 
similarly protected. Truly threatening speech, however, is categorically excluded from 
constitutional protection. A challenge for regulators and courts is determining when mere 
advocacy ends and true threats to public safety begin. In 1969, the Supreme Court 
devised a test to help lower courts distinguish between mere advocacy and incitement to 
violence. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court reviewed an Ohio statute that “by its own 
words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of 
criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of 
action.”276 The Court stated that, in light of First Amendment principles, mere advocacy 
may not be curtailed. “The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” 
except where such advocacy is 1) directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and 2) is likely to incite or produce that action.277 
The temporal element present in the Brandenburg incitement test is significant; 
the passage of time between the speech and any ensuing “bad acts” by the listener means 
the undesirable conduct will not be imputed to the speaker. Only “immediate evil” 
coupled with “intent to bring it about,”278 warrants government intervention. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 435 (1969). 
277 Id. at 448. 




Obscenity as an unprotected category of speech frequently has met with both prior 
restraints and post-publication punishment in the form of state and federal criminal 
sanctions. In this context, obscenity refers not to foul language, but to hard-core sexual 
content—something more extreme than pornography, which is constitutionally 
protected.279 A more appropriate term may be “hardcore pornography,” but the Court has 
adopted the term “obscenity” to mean hardcore pornography and distinguish it from 
“regular”280 pornography. Despite obvious differences, deceptive advertising and 
obscenity, as legal concerns, share certain similarities. Obscenity is difficult to define 
with precision. The line between sexual content that is merely pornographic—and 
therefore constitutionally protected281—and sexual content that is hardcore and 
extreme—and therefore unprotected—is “not straight and unwavering.”282 Justice Potter 
Stewart famously wrote of obscenity, “I know it when I see it.”283 And Justice Harlan 
wrote of “the intractable obscenity problem.”284 In addition, obscenity, like deception, 
may be in the eye of the beholder. As Chief Justice Warren stated, “Present laws depend 
largely upon the effect that the materials may have upon those who receive them. It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Profane speech is constitutionally protected, as is non-hardcore pornography and 
indecency. Indecent speech, however, may face heightened regulation when disseminated 
on radio or television using the broadcast spectrum. 
280 Whatever that is. 
281 Constitutional protection for pornography concerns only pornographic material of and 
concerning adults; child pornography, like obscenity, is categorically unprotected speech. 
282 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring) 
283 Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
284 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part). 
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manifest that the same object may have a different impact, varying according to the 
community it reached.”285 
 The existence of a legal distinction between protected and unprotected sexual 
content requires the disseminator to be responsible for not only the speech itself, but for 
consumers’ reception and processing of it. In that respect, obscenity laws also are like 
criminal libel statutes based on breach of the peace—they make the speaker responsible 
for consumers’ reactions to the speech. 
The Supreme Court has struggled with how to properly define obscenity, but 
never with the notion that obscenity—however defined—is unprotected speech. It 
formally said so in 1957’s Roth v. United States, in which two businessmen questioned 
the constitutionality of a federal criminal obscenity statute under which they had been 
convicted: 
The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance 
within the area of protected speech and press. Although this 
is the first time the question has been squarely presented in 
this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous 
opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that 
obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and 
press.286 
  
Roth, then clearly established that obscenity is without First Amendment 
protection. Moreover, its unconstitutional status properly subjects it to federal criminal 
statutes. 
In Roth, the Court also began to give shape to a working, legal definition of 
obscenity. As a starting point, the Roth Court noted the distinction between sex and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Roth, 354 U.S. at 496 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
286 Roth, 354 U.S. at 481. 
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obscenity. Sex, often portrayed in art, literature and scientific works, “is a great and 
mysterious motive force in human life … it is one of the vital problems of human interest 
and public concern.”287 Obscenity, in contrast, is material “which deals with sex in a 
manner appealing to prurient interest.”288 
Within the decade, the Court again considered obscenity. Unlike Roth, where the 
Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of obscene material, the appellant in 
Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts289 challenged a state-level determination 
that the book at issue was obscene. Applying factors including an “utterly without 
redeeming social value” standard, the Court said it was not obscene. Because, in the 
Court’s estimation, the book had artistic and literary value, it could not be adjudged to be 
without social importance and undeserving of constitutional protection. 
In 1973, the Court devised a more nuanced test for identifying obscenity that 
remains in effect today. In Miller v. California, the Court considered an appeal from a 
conviction under a California obscenity law. Noting its inability “to agree on a standard 
to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation,”290 
the Court articulated a three-part test to “confine the permissible scope of such regulation 
to works which depict or describe sexual conduct.”291 The test essentially designates 
“hardcore” pornography as obscene: 
1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, would find that the material, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Id. at. 487. 
288 Id. 
289 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” et al. v. Att’y 
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The work was commonly known as “Fanny Hill.” 
290 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 22. 
291 Id. at 24. 
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taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in 
sex; 
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; 
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.292 
Acknowledging the flexibility in the Miller test and the resulting lack of a clear, 
national standard,293 the Court expressed satisfaction that the test’s provisions would 
“provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial activities 
may bring prosecution:”294  
Summary 
With the exception of deceptive advertising, the unprotected categories reviewed 
here each have been aided by the development of a framework that operates to limit 
restrictions on speech that may conflict with First Amendment safeguards. With libel, the 
actual malice standard helps protect noncommercial speech about public officials and 
figures. With potentially inciting speech, a lack of imminence allows advocacy speech to 
cycle freely. With obscenity, a three-part evaluation relying on community standards 
applied to works in their entirety protects a significant amount of sexually explicit 
material. Though very different from deceptive commercial speech in terms of content, 
these unprotected categories may offer insight into the constitution’s optimal operation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Id. 
293 According to the Court, “fundamental First Amendment limitations on the powers of 
the States do not vary from community to community, but this does not mean that there 
are, or should or can be, fixed uniform national standards of precisely what appeals to the 
‘prurient interest’ or is ‘patently offensive.’ These are essentially questions of fact, and 
our nation is too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such 
standards could be articulated for all 50 states to a single formulation, even assuming the 
prerequisite consensus exists.” Id. at 30. 
294 Id. at 27. 
	  
71	  
with respect to deceptive commercial speech. The regulation of deceptive advertising 
lacks a similar constitutional foil, which as Chapter Four will discuss, allows the FTC and 
DOJ to operate freely to address it.    
 
	  










FEDERAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES AND PENALTIES 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) employ a 
number of civil and criminal sanctions in the name of protecting consumers from 
commercial deception. This chapter examines them. It begins with an outline of FTC 
practices and procedures and the Commission’s view of legally actionable advertising 
deception; it concludes with an examination of DOJ authority and procedure and an 
outline of relevant criminal statutes. Such an examination provides necessary background 
and context for Chapter Five, which looks more specifically at the criminal law’s 
interaction with advertising.  
Civil: The FTC and Consumer Protection 
The FTC, described as “the heart of federal protection of consumers against 
abusive advertising practices,”295 is a civil law-enforcement agency and the sole federal 
agency with general jurisdiction over consumer fraud.296 Headquartered in Washington, 
D.C., the Commission employs more than 1,100 employees across the United States.297 
Five Commissioners, chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate, each serve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 BENDER 2 THE LAW OF ADVERTISING §15.03. 
296 Other federal agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal 
Communications Commission, also regulate advertising, but the FTC is the primary 
federal regulator with authority over advertising. 





seven-year terms.298 The FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, one of nine bureaus, is 
mandated “to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices.”299 In 
contrast to criminal proceedings, which name individuals as defendants, FTC civil 
actions target entities. For example, Acme Corporation may be the subject of an FTC 
proceeding, but any criminal charges arising from Acme’s operation would be brought 
against corporate officers or other employees in a position of authority or control. 
The Bureau maintains seven divisions, several of which focus on commercial 
deception. In particular, the Division of Advertising Practices acts to protect consumers 
“from unfair or deceptive advertising and marketing practices that raise health and safety 
concerns, as well as those that cause economic injury.”300 The Division of Marketing 
Practices acts to “stop scams; prevent fraudsters from perpetuating scams in the future, 
freeze their assets; and get compensation for scam victims.”301 The Division of 
Enforcement litigates civil contempt and penalty actions “to enforce federal court 
injunction and administrative orders in FTC consumer protection cases.”302 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 The FTC Chairperson is selected by the President. Only three commissioners may be 
from the same political party. 
299 Bureaus and Offices, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices (last 
visited July 15, 2014). 
300 Division of Advertising Practices, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-advertising-practices (last 
visited July 15, 2014). 
301 Division of Marketing Practices, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-marketing-practices (last 
visited July 15, 2014). 
302 Division of Enforcement, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-




Enforcement Division also maintains the Criminal Liaison Unit “to encourage criminal 
prosecution of consumer fraud.”303 
With a few exceptions, FTC authority extends to people, partnerships and 
corporations “engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”304 As such, the FTC has 
federal rule-making authority to issue industry-wide regulations; investigative authority 
over law violations by individuals and businesses; and law-enforcement authority to 
enforce federal consumer-protection laws. The FTC is empowered to: 
(a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct 
injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts 
or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to 
prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, 
business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make 
reports and legislative recommendations to Congress.305Constitutional authority for the 
FTC derives from the interstate commerce clause,306 which gives Congress power to 
regulate commerce  “among the several states.”307 The Commission’s original charge, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Id.  
304 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2012). Banks, savings and loan institutions, federal credit unions 
and common carriers are among those institutions not policed by the FTC. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 46(j)(6) (2012). 
305 Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC.GOV, 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act (last visited July 
15, 2014). 
306 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
307 “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
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expressed in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) ,308 was to work 
against “unfair methods of competition in commerce.”309 The Section provides: 
Unfair methods in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 
hereby declared unlawful. … If any person, partnership or 
corporation violates any rule … respecting deceptive acts 
or practices … then the Commission may commence a civil 
action against such person, partnership or corporation for 
relief…. Such relief may include, but shall not be limited 
to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of 
money or return or property, the payment of damages, and 
public notification respecting the rule violation or the unfair 
or deceptive act or practice … except that nothing … is 
intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary or 
punitive damages.310      
As “originally constituted,” Section 5 “was to be an instrument against restraint of 
trade” and “not directed at the problem of deceptive advertising.”311 Moreover, the term 
“commerce” in this context initially was defined312 as “interstate” commerce, meaning 
purely state and local business practices were outside the FTC’s authority. Subsequent 
amendments to Section 5, however, gave the FTC authority first over “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices” in addition to unfair methods of competition, and later also over such 
acts or practices in “or affecting” commerce. Consequently, a much broader range of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
309 The term “unfair methods of competition in commerce” in the granting legislation did 
not contemplate advertising practices at all, and in fact concerned competition only upon 
some showing of injury to a competitor or an inhibition of competition. See Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). 
310 The Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 41−77 (2012). 
311 BENDER, supra note 295, at §17.02 [1] 
312 The FTC Act defined “commerce” as “commerce among the several States or with 
foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or 
between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or 
foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign 
nation. See Act Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, amended by Act March 21, 1938 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)) (Act March 21, 1938, is commonly known as 
the Wheeler-Lea Act).   
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activity, even that which is purely intrastate or local, may come under the FTC’s 
auspices.313  The FTC Act, therefore, has been amended frequently to proscribe a 
multitude of activities, including unfair methods of competition, unfair acts or practices, 
deceptive acts or practices and false advertising.314 In addition, courts have held that the 
FTC Act authorizes only the Commission to act to protect consumers. Although it has 
been argued that the FTCA created a private right of action, courts have declined to allow 
aggrieved consumers to seek relief themselves directly under the statute, leaving the FTC 
to act on behalf of the consuming public. 
Notwithstanding its initial legislative restraints limiting it to interstate, 
competitive practices, the FTC from the beginning exhibited a desire to intervene on 
behalf of consumers by addressing advertising practices in or affecting commerce. It 
interpreted the original “unfair methods of competition” language broadly, rationalizing 
that harm to consumers from deceptive advertising resulted in harm to trade.315 In a 
notable 1931 example, the FTC entered a cease-and-desist order against a manufacturer 
and seller of a demonstrably bogus obesity cure whose advertisements it believed to be 
“calculated to mislead.”316 On appeal of the cease-and-desist order, the Supreme Court 
supported the FTC’s findings that the “preparation” was potentially physically harmful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 This expansive “in or affecting commerce” language was in the original 1938 bill 
sponsored by Senator Wheeler. The language was dropped over concerns it “would give 
the Commission to the right to go into a state and investigate intrastate commerce 
exclusively where it clearly and obviously was intrastate instead of interstate commerce.” 
See CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, WHEELER-LEA ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE 
RECORD 31 (1938). 
314 BENDER, supra note 295, at §17.02 [1]. 
315 See Ivan L. Preston & Jef I. Richards, A Role for Consumer Belief in FTC and 
Lanham Act Cases, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 10 (1993) [hereinafter Preston & Richards, 
Consumer Belief]. 
316 Raladam Co., 283 U.S. at 645. This outcome is frequently referenced in the legislative 
history of the Wheeler-Lea Act. 
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and its advertisements “dangerously misleading.”317 It upheld, however, a lower-court 
order reversing the FTC and negating the order. According to the Court, advertising that 
adversely affected consumers was outside the FTC’s reach unless it could be 
demonstrated to have resulted in harm to the advertiser’s competition: 
Findings, supported by evidence, warrant the conclusion 
that the preparation is one which cannot be used generally 
with safety to physical health except under medical 
direction and advice. If the necessity of protecting the 
public against dangerously misleading advertisements of a 
remedy sold in interstate commerce were all that is 
necessary to give the Commission jurisdiction, the order 
could not successfully be assailed. But this is not all.318 
The 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the FTC Act “came to the rescue”319 of the 
FTC, giving it jurisdiction over false advertising. The Amendment was a clear 
Congressional response to unfavorable court opinions regarding FTC authority and the 
perceived problem of deception in advertising. Legislative history preceding passage of 
the Wheeler-Lea Act reveals a Congress that had grown increasingly concerned about the 
FTC’s lack of authority to deter competitive acts or practices that were potentially 
harmful to consumers but that resulted in no actionable economic harm to competitors.320 
As the primary regulator of advertising in the United States, 321 the contemporary FTC 
enforces a variety of consumer-protection statutes322 that designate certain conduct as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Id. at 646. 
318 Id. at 646−47. 
319 BENDER, supra note 295 at § 17.02 [1]. 
320 See generally DUNN, supra note 313. 
321 Other federal agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also have jurisdiction over some aspects of 
advertising. The FTC, however, is the primary regulator.  
322 Among the statutes enforced by the FTC are: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the 
Truth-In-Lending Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Cigarette Labeling Act, the Do-
Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the 
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“unfair or deceptive” under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Toward this protective end, the 
FTC possesses investigative, enforcement and litigation authority over deceptive and 
misleading advertising. 
Investigative Authority 
Section 3 of the FTC Act sets forth the FTC’s general authority to investigate 
deceptive advertising, among other acts and practices.323 Originally, this authority 
included specific powers to issue subpoenas, administer witness oaths, examine witnesses 
and receive evidence. In 1980, as part of the FTC Improvement Act324, the Commission’s 
subpoena power in the area of consumer protection was augmented with the more 
flexible power to issue Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) to investigate unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.325 Like a subpoena, the issuance of a CID allows the FTC to 
obtain existing documents and elicit oral testimony; unlike a subpoena, a CID allows the 
FTC to require those under investigation to file written reports or answers to specific 
questions.326 As with a subpoena, a recipient of a CID may file a petition to quash or limit 
the scope of the demand. In the event of noncompliance, the FTC may petition a federal 
district court seeking enforcement.327 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, and the Controlling the Assault of 
Non-solicited Porn and Marketing Act of 2003.  
323 See 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2012). 
324 FTC Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980). 
325 The FTC continues to use subpoena power to investigate possible antitrust violations. 
326 CIDs also allow the production of tangible things and the service of entities not within 
U.S. jurisdiction. 
327 A corollary tool is the issuance of a Section 6(b) Order. Orders issued pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the FTC Act provide another investigative tool. Under Section 6(b), the 
FTC may request the filing of special reports or answers even when the requested 
information does not have a specific law-enforcement purpose. Such orders typically are 






The FTC exercises its enforcement authority in consumer-protection matters 
either administratively or judicially. Administrative enforcement actions are initiated on 
the Commission’s own authority; judicial enforcement actions commence and proceed 
with the aid of the courts.328   
Administrative Enforcement 
If an investigation provides the FTC with a “reason to believe” a violation of the 
law has occurred, the Commission’s administrative options are to pursue either a rule-
making329 or adjudicative response.330 When unfair or deceptive acts or practices are 
thought to be industry-wide and prevalent, the agency may initiate a rulemaking 
proceeding. Rulemaking proceedings include an opportunity for informal hearings that 
allow interested parties to cross-examine participants on a limited basis. Violations of 
promulgated industry-wide regulations may trigger civil penalties of up to $11,000 per 
offense.331 Penalties are collected via lawsuits filed in federal district court;332 in some 
cases, the FTC may file a lawsuit to seek consumer redress for injuries resulting from the 
violations.333 For advertiser-specific—as opposed to prevalent, industry-wide—practices, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 The FTC website labels judicial actions as “federal” actions in reference to their 
dependency on the federal courts. 
329 Under Section 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 57a, the Commission is authorized 
to prescribe “rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” within the meaning of Section 
5(a)(1) of the Act. To commence a rulemaking proceeding, the FTC must believe the 
practices to be addressed are “prevalent.”  
330 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and Law 
Enforcement Authority, FTC.GOV (July 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority#N_1_ [hereinafter Brief Overview]. 
331 See Id.  
332 See Id. 
333 See Id.  
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the FTC may turn to a series of adjudicative measures when it has reason to believe 
violations have occurred. Such proceedings begin with the issuance of a complaint, 
addressed to the advertiser, setting forth the charges. 
Consent Agreements 
Advertisers who are served with an administrative FTC complaint may choose to 
settle with the FTC at the outset, or to dispute the allegations in a more protracted 
process. Respondents who elect to settle the charges generally sign a consent agreement 
without admitting wrongdoing. A consent agreement spells out the advertiser’s consent to 
the entry of a final order and waiver of all right to judicial review. A final consent order 
is binding and generally bars the advertiser from making deceptive claims for a specified 
time—often decades—into the future. It also may set forth other requirements of the 
advertiser, such as financial recompense to consumers. With high-profile advertising 
campaigns deemed to be deceptive, the FTC also may require the advertiser to produce 
and finance corrective advertising to counter consumer misperceptions.334 
Administrative Trials 
A respondent who elects to contest the charges outlined in the complaint may 
seek adjudication before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Using the FTC’s rules of 
decision,335 the ALJ holds a trial-type proceeding and issues an “initial decision.” The 
initial decision includes findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the ALJ’s 
recommendation of either a dismissal of the complaint or a cease-and-desist order 
instructing the advertiser to discontinue making claims the commission has deemed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Corrective advertising is a significant but little-used alternative. 
335 See Brief Overview, supra note 330. 
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deceptive.336 Initial decisions issued by an ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission. 
Subsequent appeals may be made to any federal court of appeals with jurisdiction337 and 
ultimately to the Supreme Court.  A Commission order becomes final and binding upon 
the respondent 60 days after it is served; violations of final orders may invite civil 
penalties of up to $16,000 for each violation.338 In addition, following an adjudicative 
proceeding, the FTC may seek civil penalties from similar, non-respondent-violators—
meaning those who were not a party to the proceeding—if those violators had been 
advised that such acts or practices had been deemed to violate FTC standards.339 
Judicial Enforcement 
The administrative enforcement options described above require the FTC to first 
make an agency determination that an advertiser’s claims are deceptive and then seek the 
aid of a court to obtain civil penalties or consumer redress.340 The Commission, however, 
may instead opt to challenge an advertiser’s claims directly in court. Doing so allows the 
agency to seek intervention without first determining that the challenged conduct is 
unlawful. Unlike an administrative adjudication, in which a reviewing court must 
substantially defer to the Commission’s own interpretation of the FTC Act, a court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 Appeals from the ALC proceeding are to the full FTC and then to the federal court of 
appeals, followed by review at the Supreme Court. 
337 The respondent may file a petition for review with any court of appeals within whose 
jurisdiction the respondent resides or carries on business or where the challenged practice 
was employed. FTC Act, Section 5(c), 15 U.S.C. Sec 45(c). 
338 To assess a civil penalty or pursue mandatory injunctions or other equitable relief, the 
FTC must file suit in a federal district court seeking to have its order enforced.  
339 See Brief Overview, supra note 330. 
340 See Id. 
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handling a direct court challenge by the FTC is to accord the Commission no greater 
deference than it would any government plaintiff.341 
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act allows the FTC to seek injunctions against 
deceptive advertising claims. Preliminary, temporary injunctions may be sought 
whenever the FTC has “reason to believe” that any party “is violating, or is about to 
violate” the Commission’s prohibitions against deceptive advertising.342 In such cases, 
the FTC may ask a district court to enjoin the allegedly unlawful conduct pending 
completing of an FTC administrative proceeding. Since around the time of its 1983 
Policy Statement on Deception, the FTC has routinely sought permanent injunctions to 
challenge cases of basic consumer fraud and deception.343 In the FTC’s view, “a suit 
under Section 13(b) is preferable to the adjudicatory process because, in such a suit, the 
court may award both prohibitory and monetary equitable relief in one stop.”344 In 
addition, a judicial injunction becomes effective immediately, whereas a Commission 
cease-and-desist order is effective 60 days after it is received by the advertiser. 
Litigating Authority 
The FTC’s investigative and law-enforcement authority is enhanced by the ability 
of the Commission to independently represent itself in court, rather than relying on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 The FTC notes it “has tended to prefer administrative adjudication” where “a case 
involved novel legal issues or fact patterns.” Id. 
342 Id.  
343 According to the FTC, with the blessing of the courts, the Commission “began to 
make widespread use of the permanent injunction proviso of Section 13(b) in its 
consumer protection program,” arguing that the availability of permanent injunction via 
the statute entitled it to “obtain an order not only permanently barring deceptive practices, 
but also imposing various kinds of monetary equitable relief … to remedy past 
violations,” including the freezing of assets. 
344 A Brief Overview of the FTC’s Authority, supra note 330.  
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Attorney General.345 The FTC Act provides litigation authority in five categories of 
cases. Section 16 of the FTC Act allows such self-representation in suits for injunctive 
relief, suits for consumer redress, petitions for judicial review of FTC rules or orders, 
suits to enforce compulsory process and suits to prohibit recipients of compulsory process 
from disclosing the existence of the process in certain situations. In addition, the 
Commission may represent itself in a variety of cases involving civil penalties, if the 
Attorney General fails to do so after 45 days’ notice. When the Commission has 
represented itself in the lower courts, it also may do so before the Supreme Court. 
Approach to Deception 
The FTC is both a rulemaking and quasi-judicial body, meaning it has the ability 
to define what is “false” or “deceptive” commercial speech 346as well as investigate and 
prosecute offenders. Because reviewing courts generally defer to the FTC’s broad 
determinations regarding deceptive advertising, the Commission has significant latitude 
in identifying and prosecuting deceptive advertising.347  
The FTC Act defines the term “false advertisement” but provides only 
“skeletal”348 guidance as to what constitutes such, leaving the FTC and the courts to “add 
flesh to this skeletal prohibition.”349 Section 15 (a)(1) reads as follows: 
The term “false advertisement” means an advertisement, 
other than labeling, which is misleading in a material 
respect; and in determining whether any advertisement is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Id. 
346 For purposes of this work, the term advertising is used synonymously with the term 
“commercial speech.” 
347 See Belinda Welti, Note, The Need for a Statutory Definition of “Deceptive” 
Advertising, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 127, 127 (1984). 
348 JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: A BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL 
CONCEPT 12 (1990). 
349 Id.  
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misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other 
things) not only representations made or suggested by 
statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combination 
thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails 
to reveal facts material in the light of such representations 
or material with respect to consequences which may result 
from the use of the commodity to which the advertisement 
relates under the conditions prescribed in said 
advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary 
or usual.350  
Section 12 of the FTC Act addresses false advertisements for food, drugs, devices 
or cosmetics and specifically defines such as ads that are “misleading in a material 
respect.” Although limited to those particular types of advertisements, Section 12 is 
important because it provides for criminal misdemeanor charges related to advertising for 
those types of products, whose use can result in bodily harm. In addition, the section’s 
built-in definition of false advertising—misleading in a material respect—has influenced 
the Commission’s view of deception with respect to advertisements for those categories 
of product advertising covered by Section 5. 
In applying Section 5, the FTC continues to operate under its 1983 “Policy 
Statement on Deception” (Policy Statement), issued in response to a Congressional 
request for clarification of its enforcement policy against deceptive acts or practices.351 
That document defined deception as “a representation, omission or practice that is likely 
to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 15 U.S.C. § 55 (2012). The section continues: “No advertisement of a drug shall be 
deemed to be false if it is disseminated only to members of the medical profession, 
contains no false representation of a material fact, and includes, or is accompanied in 
each instance by truthful disclosure of, the formula showing quantitatively each 
ingredient of such drug.” Id. 
351 See Policy Statement, supra note 63. 
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detriment.”352 The Policy Statement “still forms the basis of all deception decisions.”353 
Conveyed claims evaluated for deceptiveness must be factual—meaning capable of 
verification—and material.354 
Material Versus Irrelevant Claims 
Misrepresentations or omissions in advertisements will be considered material if 
they are “likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding a product.”355 
Express claims regarding a product’s central characteristics, its cost or its performance, 
are presumed material, as are health- and safety-related claims.  Implied claims are 
presumed material when evidence suggests the marketer “intended to make a claim 
conveying a specific message.”356 Otherwise, a finding of materiality will be based on the 
record before the FTC.357  
Deception vs. Deceptiveness 
Prior to issuing the Policy Statement, the FTC had adjudicated deception without 
having specifically defined it, essentially doing so on a “case by case analysis”358 that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Id. The policy statement describes each of these elements. According to the policy 
statement, “a representation, omission or practice must be a material one for deception to 
occur,” meaning it must be “likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding 
a product.” 
353 BENDER, supra note 295, at §18.01[3]. 
354 Preston & Richards, Consumer Belief, supra note 315, at 3. 
355 FTC Policy Statement on Deception, referencing the Restatement of Torts, Second 
Edition, defines a material misrepresentation or omission as “one which the reasonable 
person would regard as important in deciding how to act, or one which the maker knows 
that the recipient, because of his or own peculiarities, is likely to consider important.” On 
the subject of materiality of deceptive advertising claims, see Jef I. Richards & Ivan L. 
Preston, Proving and Disproving Materiality of Deceptive Advertising Claims, 11 J. PUB. 
POL’Y & MARKETING, no. 2, 1992, 45−56. 
356 BENDER, supra note 295, at §19.02. 
357 See Id. 
358 Welti, supra note 352, at 129. 
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created “unpredictable results.”359 The Policy Statement was the Commission’s attempt 
to “synthesize the most important principles of general applicability” and “provide a 
concrete indication of the manner in which the Commission will enforce its deception 
mandate.”360 
In cases prosecuted prior to 1983, the Commission had adopted a legal concept of 
“deception” that clearly also encompassed “deceptiveness.” Actual deception was 
unnecessary and the term “deceptiveness” appeared to be “a surrogate indicator” of actual 
deception.361 The FTC then, traditionally has been concerned not only with an 
advertisement’s resulting actual deception, but also with its potential deceptiveness—that 
is, whether consumers could have been deceived by it.362 Advertisements with a 
“capacity or tendency to deceive or mislead”363 run afoul of the FTC’s deception 
mandate. Consequently, “some advertising claims may be prohibited as deceptive even 
though consumers may not believe them and so cannot be harmed by them.”364 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Id. 
360 The extent to which the Policy Statement was a synthesis or “in reality a complete 
shift in philosophy” has been widely debated. It has been noted that “although the manner 
of implementing these … inquiries may shift  along with the prevailing political 
philosophy, they still form the basis of all deception decisions.” BENDER, supra note 299, 
at §18.01 
361 Richards, supra note 348, at 13, citing Ivan L. Preston, The Difference Between 
Deceptiveness and Deception, and Why It Should Mater to Lawyers, Researchers, and 
Advertisers, 1982 PROC. OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF ADV. 81.  
362 An additional distinction exists between the terms “false” and “deceptive.” The FTC’s 
“legal criterion is deceptiveness, not falsity, in spite of the colloquial reference to ‘false 
advertising.’” Richards, supra note 361, at 28. A true-false framework “represents the 
explicit message,” and a deceptive-nondeceptive framework “is the conveyed 
message.”362 
363 Ivan L. Preston, The Federal Trade Commission’s Identification of Implications as 
Constituting Deceptive Advertising, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1988).  
364 Preston & Richards, Consumer Belief, supra note 320, at 1 
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In specifying that advertising be “likely to mislead” in order to provoke a finding 
of deception, the 1983 Policy Statement seemed to signal a return to a focus on actual 
deception, as opposed to the mere possibility of deception. But the Commission declined 
to require proof of actual deception, instead requiring the establishment of “a probability 
of deception.”365 Despite the 1983 language, the FTC has continued to police 
“deceptiveness” as well as “deception;” concern about a heightened standard does not 
appear to have been borne out366 and proof of actual deception is not required.367 
Intentional vs. Unintentional Deception 
Other concerns presented by the FTC’s policy on deception have included the role 
of intent and whether deceptive statements must be expressly included. In defining 
deception broadly, the FTC has adopted the position that an advertiser’s lack of intent to 
deceive is irrelevant to a determination of deception. Intention to deceive is not necessary 
for a finding of deception, but its existence may be an aggravating factor in FTC 
determinations.368 In addition, the FTC has expanded its regulatory potential by focusing 
on implied claims in ads, in addition to explicit ones. “Advertising and other sales claims 
stated not explicitly but by implication can be ruled deceptive without question”369 and 
“implied content is no less subject to regulation than is explicit content.”370 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Petty, supra note 67, at 11 (citing RICHARDS, supra note 53, at 12). 
366 See Preston 1990 (Although the FTC now applies the Miller definition in consumer 
cases, no litigated case has shown that the new standard makes a difference in the 
outcome.”) 
367 Petty, supra note 67, at 13 (citing Cliffdale Associates, 103 F.T.C. at 165). 
368 RICHARDS, supra note 348, at 12 (summarizing Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 
F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
369 Preston, supra note 363, at 1244.  





Reasonable vs. Gullible Consumers 
The FTC’s deception policy calls for advertising claims to be evaluated from the 
perspective of the reasonable consumer,  as opposed to the gullible or ignorant 
consumer:371 
The test is whether the consumer’s interpretation or 
reaction is reasonable. When representations or sales 
practices are targeted to a specific audience, the 
Commission determines the effect of the practice on a 
reasonable member of that group. In evaluating a particular 
practice, the Commission considers the totality of the 
practice in determining how reasonable consumers are 
likely to respond.372 
Early in its operation, the FTC employed an ignorant man standard by which it 
seemed determined “to protect everyone from everything which may deceive them.”373 
Presumably, this approach was meant to distinguish the FTC’s newly established 
consumer-protection function from that of common-law torts such as fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and to further a shift toward the enhanced consumer-protection 
orientation of caveat venditor.374 The FTC’s  “consumer acting reasonably under the 
circumstances” language, therefore, appeared to hint at a return in the direction of caveat 
emptor, under which the FTC could allow an increasing number of deceptive advertising 
claims to enter the marketplace. In practice, however, the FTC had moved away from a 
strict ignorant man standard375 prior to 1983, and it remains largely unfettered in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 See Ivan L. Preston, Reasonable Consumer or Ignorant Consumer? How the FTC 
Decides, 8 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 131, 131−43 (1974); RICHARDS, supra note 348. 
372 Policy Statement, supra note 62. 
373 Preston, supra note 371, at 142. 
374 See Id. A successful lawsuit for fraudulent misrepresentation relies upon a “reasonable 
man” standard. 
375 See Id.  
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ability to take action against any deceptive advertising claim when doing so would, in its 
view, serve a substantial public interest.  
Deception vs. Puffery 
Puffing, or puffery, is “exaggerated sales talk or opinion” that has long been 
present in advertising. In the FTC’s view, the truth or falsity of statements regarding the 
degree of quality of a product cannot be verified. Because of this, the FTC generally 
overlooks such exaggerated, opinion-like statements on the basis that “no reasonable 
consumer would seriously rely on them—therefore they will deceive no one.”376 
Therefore, statements deemed puffery (e.g., “the World’s most comfortable mattress”), 
are not considered deceptive if they speak to the quality of a given product. In contrast, 
statements representing objective actuality (e.g., “the World’s strongest padlock”) are 
verifiable as being either true or false and will likely not be regarded as puffery in the 
eyes of the FTC.377  
Extrinsic Evidence vs. Commission Intuition and Expertise 
The FTC’s leeway regarding deception includes the ability to infer the meaning of 
advertising claims on their face.378 In the alternative, the Commission may, in its 
discretion, consider evidence, such as consumer surveys or expert testimony, apart from 
the advertisement itself.379 Although the FTC has increasingly used extrinsic evidence to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Ivan L. Preston and Ralph H. Johnson, Puffery: A Problem the FTC Didn’t Want (and 
May Try to Eliminate), 49 JOUR. & MASS COMM. Q’TERLY 558 (1992). 
377 As Bender notes, courts have been more likely than the FTC to tolerate puffing. See 
BENDER, supra note 295, at § 10.06. 
378 See Deborah K. Owen & Joyce E. Plyler, The Role of Empirical Evidence in the 
Federal Regulation of Advertising, J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING, vol. 10, 1991, at 1. 
379 Ivan L. Preston, Data-Free at the FTC? How the Federal Trade Commission Decides 
Whether Extrinsic Evidence of Deception is Required, 24 AM. BUSI. LAW J. l 359, 360 
(1988); Owen & Plyler, supra note 378, at 1. 
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aid in determining meaning or the extent to which consumers may or may not have been 
deceived,380 there are no automatic triggers for doing so381 and no clear indicators of 
when intrinsic evidence will be inadequate.382 This practice owes in part to the theory that 
the FTC was created to “develop a special competence” and “accumulated expertise”383 
upon which it may rely and to which reviewing appellate courts are inclined to defer. 
Summary 
Although thoughtful people have differed as to the FTC’s application of the 
above-described elements of deception, its jurisdiction over deceptive advertising is clear 
and well established.384 The FTCA and the 1938 Amendment left the Commission “a 
great deal of flexibility to interpret and apply the Act as it saw fit.”385 As a result of this 
flexibility, it has been “noted that an advertisement is deceptive if the FTC says so.”386 
Nonetheless, the FTC’s purpose is “prophylactic, not punitive”387 and its broad authority 
and discretion is intended to serve the “preventative purpose”388 to “protect the 
consumers and competitors, not to punish advertisers for a bad intent.”389  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 See Owen & Plyler, supra note 378, at 1. 
381 Consequently, the FTC’s position with respect to extrinsic evidence has been 
described as having created “a state of confusion.” Preston, supra note 384, at 359. 
382 A former FTC Commissioner and attorney posited that the FTC’s need for more 
extrinsic evidence would increase as advertisers decrease their use of objective product 
claims in favor of implied claims. See Owen and Plyler, supra note 378. 
383 Owen & Plyler, supra note 383, at 1. 
384 See FTC Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–252, 94 Stat. 374; U.S. Safe Web 
Act of 2006, Pub L. 109–455, 120 Stat. 3372. 








Criminal: The DOJ and Consumer Protection 
Advertisers facing civil Federal Trade Commission action also may be subject to 
parallel criminal proceedings brought by the Department of Justice; in fact, the DOJ may 
target advertisers in the absence of FTC action. As noted above, in contrast to civil 
proceedings, which name business entities as defendants, DOJ criminal actions generally 
target individuals. For example, Acme Corporation’s corporate officers or other 
employees in positions of authority and control may be the subject of a DOJ prosecution, 
but civil FTC proceedings arising from Acme’s operation would name Acme itself. 
This section explains DOJ authority to address commercial deception and how 
that authority has touched and concerned advertising. It should be noted that advertisers 
facing potential parallel FTC/DOJ proceedings must react to two sets of interests—the 
FTC’s interest in protecting the public and the DOJ’s interest in enforcing the criminal 
laws. These interests do not necessarily coincide and in fact may place a defendant’s 
rights at odds with each other. After a brief introduction to the DOJ itself, the legal 
implications of such parallel proceedings are discussed first. This is followed by an 
overview of relevant federal, criminal statutes and their operation.  
Background 
The DOJ was established in 1870 to handle the legal business of the United 
States. As the central agency for the enforcement of federal laws, the DOJ, under the 
direction of the Attorney General of the United States, controls all criminal prosecutions 
and civil suits in which the United States has an interest.390 Enforcement of all federal 
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laws not specifically assigned to other divisions391 within the DOJ are supervised and 
enforced by the Criminal Division, which also has jurisdiction over civil matters. In 
contrast to the FTC’s preventative purpose, the DOJ mission includes seeking “just 
punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior.”392 The agency’s priorities include 
“protecting taxpayer dollars and consumers against financial fraud while ensuring 
competitive markets.”393  
Only the DOJ has the authority to prosecute federal, criminal matters. Working at 
the supervision and direction of the Attorney General, 93 United States Attorneys (USAs) 
have “plenary authority with regard to federal criminal matters” in their districts.394 A 
USA may pursue a potentially criminal act of commercial deception on his or her own, or 
do so in response to a referral from the FTC. Prosecution is initiated by the filing of a 
complaint, the request of an indictment from a grand jury, and in some cases, the filing of 
an information,395 each of which may be initiated without prior authorization from the 
DOJ’s Criminal Division. Similarly, a USA generally has authority to dismiss a criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Other Divisions with direct responsibility for enforcing criminal statutes are the 
Antitrust, Civil Rights, Environment and Natural Resources, and Tax Divisions. 
392 About DOJ, JUSTICE.GOV (Jan. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html. 
393 Department of Justice Accomplishments, JUSTICE.GOV (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/accomplishments/. 
394 U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 9-2.001, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS 
IN CRIMINAL DIVISION MATTERS/PRIOR APPROVALS, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.001. 
395 When permitted by law, the US Attorney may file an information in any case that, in 
his or her judgment, warrants such action. See U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 9-2.030, 
AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL DIVISION MATTERS/PRIOR 




complaint, indictment or information without seeking or obtaining prior authorization 
from the Criminal Division.396 
Parallel Proceedings 
Federal prosecutors are advised to commence or recommend federal prosecution 
if they believe “conduct constitutes a federal offense and that the admissible evidence 
will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.”397 Prosecutions should be 
declined when “no substantial interest would be served by the prosecution,”398 when the 
subject “is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction,”399 or if “there exists 
an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”400 When non-criminal 
alternatives—such as civil actions prosecuted by the FTC— are available, federal 
prosecutors are advised to “consider all relevant factors,”401 including: “1) The sanctions 
available under the alternative means of disposition; 2) The likelihood that an effective 
sanction will be imposed; and 3) The effect of non-criminal disposition on Federal law 
enforcement interests.”402 
When a person has committed a Federal offense, it is 
important that the law respond promptly, fairly, and 
effectively. This does not mean, however, that a criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Prior authorization to dismiss a criminal complaint is required in certain enumerated 
instances. See U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 9-2.145, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL DIVISION MATTERS/PRIOR APPROVALS, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.145. 
397 U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 9-27.220, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS 
IN CRIMINAL DIVISION MATTERS/PRIOR APPROVALS, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220 
398 U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 9-27.220, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS 









prosecution must be initiated. In recognition of the fact that 
resort to the criminal process is not necessarily the only 
response to serious forms of antisocial activity, Congress 
and state legislators have provided civil and administrative 
remedies for many types of conduct that may also be 
subject to criminal sanction. … Attorneys for the 
government should familiarize themselves with these 
alternatives and should consider pursuing them if they are 
available in a particular case. Although on some occasions 
they should be pursued in addition to the criminal law 
procedures, on other occasions they can be expected to 
provide an effective substitute for criminal prosecution.”403 
These guidelines notwithstanding, the Federal Government appears to have 
increasingly opted for criminal prosecution for those who run afoul of administrative 
agencies such as the FTC.404 Aside from the potential unpleasantness and expense of 
responding to two significant federal actions simultaneously, such parallel proceedings 
create practical and legal dilemmas for respondents/defendants. As a threshold matter, the 
criminal prosecution for conduct—such as deceptive advertising—generally understood 
to be under the civil purview of an administrative agency—such as the FTC—may 
implicate due process. For example, an advertiser reasonably may be expected to 
understand that the FTC regulates advertising and be familiar with FTC guidelines and 
procedures; it may be unreasonable, however, to expect the same advertiser to realize the 
potential for advertising conduct to trigger criminal prosecution.405 
Even more established are concerns about how a criminal proceeding may affect a 
civil proceeding, and vice versa. If a civil proceeding at the FTC unfolds first, any 
testimony offered by the advertiser could be used against him or her in the criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 9-27.250, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS 
IN CRIMINAL DIVISION MATTERS/PRIOR APPROVALS, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-
27.250.  
404 See BENDER, 1 BUSINESS CRIME ¶ 2.01. 
405 See Reynolds, supra note 78. 
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prosecution. 406 Because an individual claiming the Fifth Amendment407 right against 
self-incrimination must either assert the privilege in the civil proceeding408 or waive it 
altogether, this presents a Hobson’s choice409 for those concerned about potential 
criminal charges.410 A related risk is the potential for the Government to “take advantage 
of liberal civil discovery rules” to obtain evidence that “would not have been otherwise 
available but for the civil proceeding.”411 The FTC’s authority to issue Civil Investigative 
Demands, for example, is unique to it; the DOJ has no such investigative tool, but it may 
make use of information gathered by the FTC via a CID. Information and manpower may 
be exchanged, and prosecution may be withheld until after the civil action concludes; if 
criminal action remains in play, the civil-case defense “will be greatly affected,” with 
some defenses entirely withdrawn in order to avoid disclosure of evidence harmful to the 
possible or actual criminal prosecution.”412  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 A party involved in parallel proceedings may seek a protective or stay order with 
respect to the civil proceedings. Such an order would issue from an administrative law 
judge or federal district court judge, depending on the origin and path of the agency 
action. 
407 See U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
does not apply to corporations. See BENDER, supra note 404, at ¶ 2.02 [1][a][i]-[ii]. 
408 In civil cases, a defendant who asserts the privilege against self-incrimination faces 
the potential of severe sanctions. See BENDER, supra note 404, at ¶ 2.02 [1][a][iii][b]. 
409 A Hobson’s choice is one in which there is no real choice. 
410 As Bender summarizes, “there are strategic considerations in choosing to remain 
silent. By testifying, the defendant risks disclosure of defenses to the criminal action, as 
well as self-incrimination, perjury, or inconsistent statements useful to the prosecution for 
impeachment in the criminal proceedings. However, there are also important practical 
considerations. Exercising the right to remain silent can result in the imposition of 
sanctions … generally directed toward some proprietary interest held by the party 
charged …. Invocation of the Fifth Amendment … may result in automatic loss,” 
typically the defendant’s means of livelihood.” Id. ¶ 2.02 [1][a][i]. 
411 Id. at 2.01. 
412 BENDER, supra note 404, at 2.01. 
	  
96	  
The DOJ’s ability to pursue criminal sanctions, whether in the wake of 
administrative action or not, is limited only by its own discretion. In fact, the FTC Act 
itself leaves room for DOJ criminal prosecution for conduct under the FTC’s general 
authority: “Remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any 
other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law.”413 
When the DOJ moves to prosecute those responsible for advertising, it primarily 
relies on criminal statutes found in Title 18 of the United States Code, which addresses 
“Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” Chapter 63 is devoted to “Mail Fraud and Other Fraud 
Offenses.” Section 1341, labeled “Frauds and Swindles,” is the mail fraud statute. Section 
1343, the wire fraud statute, addresses “Fraud by Wire, Radio or Television.” Section 
1349, the “Attempt and Conspiracy” section allows for attempt and/or conspiracy to be 
charged, either by itself, or in addition to one or more of the other delineated forms of 
fraud. Following an overview of basic federal criminal procedure, each of these statutes 
is discussed below, beginning with wire fraud and mail fraud.  
Federal Criminal Procedure 
Federal criminal charges may be initiated in one of several ways. If someone is 
suspected of a federal crime, an arrest must be preceded by the issuance of a written 
Warrant for Arrest supported by probable cause that the accused committed the crime. 
Arrest warrants issue upon either a written Complaint by an Assistant United States 
Attorney (AUSA), or upon a written Indictment returned by a federal Grand Jury.414 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 15 U.S.C. 57(b)(6) (2012). 
414 A federal Grand Jury consists of a group of randomly selected citizens from across the 
judicial district that hears evidence and witnesses presented by the government. Defense 
attorneys are not allowed to appear before a grand jury. Federal grand juries meet several 
days each month for a term of approximately one year.  The Indictment is called a True 
Bill. If no probable cause is found, the grand jury returns a No Bill. 
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When an arrest warrant is based on a Complaint, the final decision to prosecute rests with 
the Grand Jury. In cases in which an accused waives Indictment and agrees to plead 
guilty, the Grand Jury is bypassed and an Information is filed with the U.S. District Court 
outlining probable cause. 
After being arrested on the basis of a Complaint, the accused has a right to a 
preliminary “probable cause” hearing before a United States Magistrate Judge within 10 
days. Arrests made following an Indictment or Information do not require a preliminary 
hearing; at this stage, however, the defendant (formerly the accused) must participate in 
an Arraignment before a federal Magistrate Judge and enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. 
Arraignment is followed either by a Plea Agreement or a Trial. A unanimous finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt triggers the preparation of a Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report, followed by Sentencing approximately eight weeks later. A sentence may include 
incarceration in a federal prison; a term of supervised release; the imposition of a 
monetary fine; and/or an Order of Restitution directing the defendant to pay the crime 
victims money lost or expenses incurred due to the offense. Convicted defendants may 
appeal415 a finding of guilt, the sentence, or both. 
Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud 
The mail and wire fraud provisions of the federal criminal code make it a crime 
“to devise a scheme to defraud another of property, when either mail or wire 
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communications are used in furtherance of the scheme.”416 Each use of the mail or wire 
constitutes a separate offense. Both statutes 
condemn fraudulent conduct that may also come within the 
reach of other federal criminal statutes. Both may serve as 
racketeering and money laundering predicate offenses. 
Both are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 
years; for not more than 30 years, if the victim is a financial 
institution or if the victim is a financial institution or the 
offense is committed in the context of major disaster or 
emergency.417 
The mail and wire fraud statutes are regarded as “powerful tools for 
prosecutors,”418 a prosecutor’s “secret weapon,” the “most prevalent and lethal weapon in 
the federal prosecutor’s arsenal,”419  “the vehicle of choice for the prosecution of ‘a large 
number and variety of federal white collar’ crimes”420 and “far-reaching in the modern 
era of federal courts.”421 DOJ policy regarding prosecutions of mail fraud and wire fraud 
suggests such should be reserved for “any scheme which in its nature is directed to 
defrauding a class of persons, or the general public, with a substantial pattern of 
conduct”422 and not invoked for isolated, individual transactions “resulting in minor loss 
to the victim;” the Department, however, acknowledges use of the statutes, with their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41930, MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW (2011). 
417 Id. at 1. 
418 Lee Greenwood, Article, Mail and Wire Fraud, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 717 (2008); 
Christopher J. Stuart, Article, Mail and Wire Fraud, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.  813 (2009); 
Elizabeth Qagner Pittman, Article, Mail and Wire Fraud, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 797 
(2010). 
419 Jack E. Robinson, The Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Correct Standards for 
Determining Jurisdiction and Venue, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 479, 479 (2008). 
420 Lauren D. Lunsford, Note, Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud and the Person of 
Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age, 99 KY. L. J. 379, 379 (2010-2011). 
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422 U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 9-43.000, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS 




“more severe sanctions,” is expanding, and—from its perspective—not necessarily 
inappropriately so.423 
The mail-fraud statute preceded the wire-fraud statute by 80 years. Congress 
passed the original mail-fraud statute424 in 1872 to address schemes to defraud involving 
the use of the mails.425 Today it specifically provides: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises… for the purpose of executing 
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any 
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any 
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the 
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any 
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any 
private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives 
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to 
be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the 
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to 
be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any 
such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both ….426  
At the time of the statute’s enactment, “use of the mails” meant “by means of the 
post-office establishment of the United States.”427 In response to alternative, private 
means of distribution over the next few decades, Congress in 1994 expanded “the mails” 
to include private or commercial carriers, such as Federal Express and United Parcel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Id. 
424 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).  
425 As Doyle has noted, “The mail fraud statute was first enacted … to prevent city 
slickers from using the mail to cheat guileless country folks,” a “prohibition thought 
necessary ‘to prevent the frauds which are mostly got up in the larger cities …  by 
thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the 
innocent people in the country.” DOYLE, supra note 416, at 1 (citing McNally v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting, 43 CONG. GLOBE 35 (1870)(remarks of 
Representative Farnsworth)). 
426 18 USCS §1341. Frauds and swindles. 
427 DOYLE, supra note 416, at 1. 
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Service, in addition to the United States Postal Service.428 Any use of the mails, even for 
intrastate deliveries made by interstate carriers, is subject to the mail fraud statute. 
The more contemporary wire-fraud statute429 was enacted in 1952.430 Initially, the 
statute addressed “Fraud by Radio,”431 but now also includes interstate transmissions by 
wire (telephone, microwave and the like) and television. The requirement that 
transmissions be “in interstate commerce” is not an element of wire fraud, but a 
jurisdictional requirement established by Congress to evoke its authority under the 
Constitution’s interstate commerce clause.432 Courts have interpreted this requirement to 
exclude from federal jurisdiction transmissions that are made intrastate—or example, a 
telephone call between parties in New York and Chicago would be interstate, but one 
between two parties in Chicago would be an intrastate wire transmission not subject to 
federal jurisdiction.433 The current wire-fraud statute specifically provides: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be 
transmitted by means of wire, radio or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any 
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose 
of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 See Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title 
XXV, §  25006, and Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(H), 108 Stat. 2087, 2147 (enacted as part 
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994); see also Cong. Rec. 
S2654-61 (March 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) and S10017-19 (July 30, 1993) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch). 
429 18 U.S.C. 1343. Fraud by wire, radio or television.  
430 The wire fraud statute was enacted as part of the 1952 amendments to the 
Communications Act. 
431 BENDER 6 BUSINESS CRIME ¶ 32.04 [1]. 
432 See United States v. Jinian (2013 CA9 Cal) 712 F.3d 1255. Transmissions in foreign 
commerce are also contemplated by the wire fraud statute, but are not explored here. 
433 See Boruff v. United States, 310 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Garrido 
(2013 CA9 Cal) 713 F.3d 985. 
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more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 
years, or both.434 
Except for the medium—mail, as opposed to wire—associated with the offense, 
and except for the covered intrastate use of the mails, the mail- and wire-fraud statutes 
are substantively identical and construed in pari materia, meaning “the interpretation of 
one is ordinarily considered to apply to the other.”435  
Elements of Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud 
To come within the statutes, a mailing or wire communication must be in 
furtherance of a scheme to defraud. It must involve a material deception, and the 
communication must have been made with the intent to deprive another of either money 
or property.436 Each of these elements is outlined below. 
Scheme to Defraud 
A “remarkable array of schemes”437 fall within the fraud statutes, including 
unsuccessful schemes and schemes in which use of the mail or wire was merely 
incidental or in reality failed to actually further the scheme. The breadth of the statute 
owes to the sweeping nature of the statutory language and also from courts’ liberal 
construction applied to this language.438 
Generally, a scheme to defraud involves the defendant’s misrepresentations or 
omissions “‘reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 18 USCS §1343 (2012). 
435 DOYLE, supra note 416, at 2. 
436 In addition to protecting against the deprivation of money and property (including 
certain intangible property rights), the statutes also protect against schemes to deprive 
others of “honest services.” The honest services provision, however, is limited to cases 
involving bribery or kickbacks. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2907 
(2010). 




comprehension.’”439 “No particular type of victim” (e.g. “gullible”) is required; it “makes 
no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to defraud are gullible or 
skeptical, dull or bright….”440 For purposes of conviction, a prosecutor does not have to 
show the intended victim actually relied on the fraud or suffered loss of money or 
property.441 Also, the defendant “need not devise the scheme him- or herself, but must 
simply willfully participate.”442 Similarly, the hiring of an agent will not insulate an 
advertiser if the advertiser “causes” the mailing or transmission, meaning that such is “the 
reasonable foreseeable consequence of his intended scheme.”443  
Materiality 
Neither statute specifically mentions a requirement that a scheme’s fraudulent 
aspects be “material,” but courts have regarded materiality as an inherent requirement 
based on the common, ordinary meaning of the word “defraud.”  “At the time of the 
statutes’ enactment, the word ‘defraud’ was understood to require … a misrepresentation 
or concealment of [a] material fact.”444 For mail- or wire-fraud purposes, “‘a statement is 
material . . . only if it has the natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing 
the person to whom it is was addressed.’”445 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 DOYLE, supra note 416, at 4 (quoting United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1245 
(11th Cir. 2008)).  
440 United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
441 See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
442 BENDER, supra note 431, at ¶ 32.04. 
443 DOYLE, supra note 416, at 2. 
444 Doyle, supra note 416, at 4 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-3-25 
(1999)). 
445  Id. at 4–5 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 633 F.3d 788, 802 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(parenthetical indications omitted); United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1324 
(11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2011); United 






Proof of fraudulent intent—not actual fraud—is a critical requirement in a mail- 
or wire-fraud prosecution.446 However, it must be shown that “some actual harm or injury 
was contemplated by the schemer.”447 Representations made with reckless indifference to 
their truth or falsity can indicate fraudulent intent,448 as can inferences drawn from 
statements and conduct.449 Intent to defraud under both the mail and wire fraud statutes 
“‘requires a willful act by the defendant with the intent to deceive or cheat, usually … for 
the purposes of getting financial gain for one’s self of causing financial loss to 
another.’”450 Intent will not be found if the defendant either did not know his scheme 
involved false representations,451 or knew that he could not deceive the recipient of his 
statements.452 
Mail Fraud or Wire Fraud as Criminal RICO Predicate Offenses 
Mail fraud and wire fraud are considered predicate offenses for an invocation of 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute and are frequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 948, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS IN 
CRIMINAL DIVISION MATTERS/PRIOR APPROVALS, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00948.htm. 
447 U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USAM 949, AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS IN 
CRIMINAL DIVISION MATTERS/PRIOR APPROVALS, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00949.htm. 
448 See United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982); USAM 949, supra 
note 447. 
449 See Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982); USAM 949, supra note 447. 
450 Doyle, supra note 416, at 5 (quoting United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 727, 727 (7th 
Cir. 2010)) (citing United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Weldon, 606 
F.3d 912, 918 (6th Cir. 2010)). 




alleged in RICO indictments.453 The RICO Act454 was enacted in 1970, primarily as a 
means of curtailing organized crime. The Act “provides powerful criminal penalties455 for 
persons who engage in ‘a pattern of racketeering activity’ … ‘and who have a specified 
relationship to an ‘enterprise’ that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”456 Despite the 
original legislative motivation, RICO “is not limited to organized crime prosecutions, but 
rather broadly applies to all criminal conduct within its ambit regardless of whether it 
involves organized crime.”457 RICO prosecutions differ from non-RICO actions in that 
the filing or dismissal of a RICO criminal indictment or information requires prior 
approval by the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section458 of the DOJ’s Criminal 
Division. Mail fraud and wire fraud are among more than 100 “serious federal offenses” 
that are considered “racketeering activity.”459 Where both mail fraud and wire fraud 
(and/or one of the other designated predicate offenses) exist within a prescribed time 
period, they may be regarded as a “pattern” of racketeering activity sufficient to sustain a 
RICO charge. An “enterprise” for RICO purposes includes “any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any group of individuals associated in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 See FRANK J. MARINE, CRIMINAL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 28, 
(Frank J. Marine et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009). 
454 18 U.S.C. §§1961–1968 (2012) 
455 RICO also provides for civil remedies. 
456 CRIMINAL RICO, supra note 453, at 1 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat 941 
(1970)). 
457 CRIMINAL RICO, supra note 453, at 5. 
458 The Organized Crime and Racketeering Section has “supervisory authority over all 
Government uses of the RICO statute.” Its aim it to “provide assistance to Government 
attorneys, and to promote consistent, uniform interpretations of the RICO statute.” Id. at 
18. 
459 Id. at 1 (“No crime can be a part of a RICO ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ unless it 
is included in this subsection.”). 
	  
105	  
fact although not a legal entity.”460 Potential criminal penalties under RICO depend on 
the underlying racketeering activity. Penalties may range “from a maximum life sentence, 
or any term of years up to life imprisonment and/or a fine under Title 18.”461 
The RICO Statute also prescribes civil penalties, including a private right of 
action, for patterns of racketeering activity.462 Civil actions seeking equitable relief may 
be brought by the Attorney General.463 Private litigants seeking recompense may sue for 
treble damages for injury to their business or property.464 To be successful in a civil 
RICO action, the United States must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “a 
defendant committed or intended to commit a RICO violation by establishing the same 
elements as in a criminal RICO case, except that criminal intent is not required.”465 The 
Government also must prove that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant will 
commit a violation in the future.”466 
Attempt and Conspiracy 
Section 1349, the “Attempt and Conspiracy” section of Chapter 63, is one of 
dozens of criminal conspiracy statutes in the United States Code. Enacted in 2002,  the 
section contemplates a specific attempt or conspiracy charge with respect to fraud and 
allows for the charging of attempt or conspiracy, either standing alone, or potentially in 
addition to one or more of the other delineated forms of fraud. The section provides: 
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Id. at 2. 
461 Id. at 3. 
462 FRANK J. MARINE & PATRICE M. MULKERN, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL 
ATTORNEYS 2, (2007). 
463 See 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) (2012). 
464 See 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (2012). 
465 CIVIL RICO, supra note 462, at 2. 
466 Id.  
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penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the 
commission of which was the object of the attempt or 
conspiracy.467 
An accused may be convicted of both conspiracy and the underlying offense (e.g. 
“wire fraud”), but not attempt and the underlying offense. As a result, a suspected 
fraudster could be charged with, and convicted of, multiple counts and combinations of 
wire fraud, conspiracy and attempt.  
The ability to charge conspiracy has long been among the AUSA’s options when 
charging mail or wire fraud. Prior to 2002, however, conspiracy charges ordinarily were 
brought under the general criminal conspiracy statute468 elsewhere in the criminal code. 
That statute outlaws conspiracy to commit any other federal crime but contains no 
general provision for criminal attempt. In enacting Section 1349, Congress specifically 
contemplated both attempt and conspiracy in concert with mail fraud and wire fraud and 
gave federal prosecutors an additional charging option (attempt) when it comes to fraud. 
Elements of Attempt and Conspiracy 
The law condemns attempt and conspiracy as “forms of introductory misconduct” 
that should be addressed “lest they result in some completed form of misconduct.”469 The 
two charges are similar in that neither attempt nor conspiracy requires the commission of 
the underlying offense. When there is intent to commit the substantive offense, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 18 USC §1349 (2012). 
468 18 U.S.C. 371 (2012) provides “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any 
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof 
in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect 
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object 
of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not 
exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.” 
469  CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41223, FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW: A 
BRIEF OVERVIEW 14 (2010). 
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impossibility of doing so will not be a defense to either attempt or conspiracy. 
Conspiracy differs from attempt in several ways. First, “conspiracy becomes a crime far 
sooner” than does attempt. Conspiracy under Section 1349 is a completed crime upon 
agreement, meaning, “Mere acts of preparation will satisfy the most demanding 
conspiracy statute.” The essence of conspiracy is an agreement to commit some act 
condemned by law.470 An agreement for criminal conspiracy purposes “may be evidenced 
by word or action; that is, the government may prove the existence of the agreement 
either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence from which the agreement may be 
inferred.”471 That is not the case with attempt, which “becomes a crime when it closely 
approaches a substantive offense.” Second, “there are no one-man conspiracies.”472 
Conspiracy requires two people acting in concert; a conspiracy may be inferred and 
charged, however, even when no co-conspirator has been identified.473 A single 
individual, conversely, may commit attempt. 474 
Summary 
The Department of Justice has tremendous discretion in whether and how it 
enforces federal criminal statutes, including the discretion to bring criminal charges that 
address activity already within the civil authority of administrative agencies. The mail 
fraud, wire fraud, attempt and conspiracy statutes have potentially broad application over 
a variety of criminal conduct, including, in some cases, commercial deception. Chapter 
Five considers the manner and circumstances of that application in practice. 
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472 Id. at 4. 
473 Id. at 5. As Doyle observes, “even the acquittal of a co-conspirator is no defense” to a 
conspiracy charge. Id. 










ADVERTISING AND THE FRAUD STATUTES 
 
Commercial speech and deception have frequently intersected with the federal 
fraud statutes. An examination of federal appellate opinions, described below, revealed 
the circumstances under which such interaction has occurred. Examined cases were 
culled from written opinions issued by United States Courts of Appeals. Although 
suitable for this study for the reasons set forth below, reliance on appellate opinions 
comes with a few caveats. The most apparent is that appellate opinions are issued only 
after an appeal has been filed following an exhaustive adversarial proceeding in a court of 
original jurisdiction. As a result, appellate opinions are not revealing of United States 
District Court indictments and trial outcomes that do not generate an appeal. Nor do they 
reflect those prosecutions that result in plea bargains prior to the commencement or 
conclusion of a trial. 
An additional limitation is that appellate opinions address not the facts of a lower-
court proceeding, but instead focus on some purported error of law. In the cases 
examined here, for example, issues raised on appeal concerned the appropriateness of 
admitted evidence, prosecutorial bias or misconduct, defense counsel competence or 
conflicts of interest, statute-of-limitations issues, juror bias or instruction, double 
jeopardy, sentence calculation or some other procedural defect. The focus in appellate 
opinions on appealable issues—errors of law, as opposed to errors of fact—necessarily 
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means that appellate opinions may not offer a complete recounting of the underlying facts 
on which a criminal indictment was based. Most appellate opinions, however, do 
delineate charged crimes. They also generally provide some background of the factual 
basis for the charged crime or crimes, and many provide a detailed accounting of the 
relevant facts. 
For these reasons, coupled with the ready availability of appellate opinions as a 
resource and the corresponding cumbersome process of gaining access to and screening 
significant numbers of criminal indictments, appellate opinions were selected as the units 
of analysis for this study. Because this study is intended to illuminate and not fully 
explicate the interplay between commercial speech and certain federal fraud statutes, 
reliance on appellate opinions for this purpose is appropriate.  
In this chapter, “advertising” is defined, as it was in the Introduction, as a “paid, 
mass-mediated attempt to persuade.”475 The term “paid” means the space or time in 
which the message appeared was purchased by the sponsor of the advertising. To sponsor 
an advertisement means to pay for its placement. “Mass-mediated” means the message 
was carried by a “communication medium designed to reach more than one person, 
typically a large number —or mass—of people.”476 Based on these definitions, 
advertising was identified in the examined opinions as paid-for messages printed or 
appearing in newspapers, magazines or online publications, or broadcast on television or 
radio stations. Internet advertising also was included. Although the language of the 
federal wire-fraud statute clearly contemplates telephone and fax transmissions 
(“writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds” “transmitted by means of wire, radio or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




television communication in interstate or foreign commerce”), from an advertising 
industry perspective, telephone and fax-based solicitations and those delivered by 
electronic mail have not traditionally been regarded as “advertising.” Therefore, sales 
messages transmitted by telephone, fax or electronic mail were excluded from the 
working definition of advertising provided above.477 Notwithstanding their exclusion 
from this definition, however, communications by telephone, fax and electronic mail 
feature prominently in wire fraud prosecutions, were frequently present in the search 
results, and are necessarily referenced in the findings and the discussion that follows in 
Chapter Six. 
Opinions for review were identified and selected using the LexisNexis Academic 
online database and search component available through the University of South 
Carolina’s Thomas Cooper Library. Initial screening and selection of cases commenced 
on the LexisNexis Academic home page with the search term “wire fraud,” which 
produced more than 2,500 results. (An ostensibly similar478 initial search using the search 
term “wire fraud” in the LexisAdvance database of “Cases, U.S. Federal,” produced more 
than 18,037 results. This is mentioned as support for the proposition, stated earlier, that 
the wire fraud statute is an oft-traveled federal prosecutorial avenue.) The search focused 
on “wire fraud” —as opposed to “mail fraud” or “wire fraud” and “mail fraud” because 
of anecdotal evidence that mail-fraud charges often accompany wire-fraud charges, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 Also, the FTC’s concern with deceptive advertising tends to be directed at messages 
conveyed by print and broadcast media. This study, therefore, focused on traditional print 
and broadcast messages. 
478 The LexisAdvance database is more extensive than LexisNexis Academic, but the 
search engines themselves revealed no apparent reasons for differences in the two results. 
The more limited result was viewed as sufficiently reliable for these purposes after 
additional screening applied to the larger initial results produced a number of duplicates 
found with the more limited results from LexisNexis Academic. 
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because of courts’ similar treatment of the two statutes.479 It is likely that the inclusion of 
“wire fraud” would have produced additional, earlier, examples of cases for particular 
study. 
A second screening added the search phrase “advert! or marketing” to the original 
“wire fraud” results. The term “advert!” was chosen for its potential to select cases that 
included the term advertising or advertisement; “marketing” was added for its potential to 
select cases in which marketing was used as a synonym for advertising. This narrowed 
the search results to 429 cases.480 Additional screening, using the search phrase “and not 
RICO” narrowed the results to 305 cases. This screening term was included in an attempt 
to omit cases brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
statute. RICO cases were excluded because, as noted in Chapter Three, violations of the 
wire fraud and mail fraud statutes are predicate offenses for a civil or criminal RICO 
charge. Consequently, an understanding of the mail and wire statutes’ operation is 
adequate to advance an understanding of conduct that could give rise to a RICO charge or 
charges involving mail or wire fraud.  
Of the 305 cases identified by this search process, LexisNexis flagged four as 
originating in state courts. An examination of those four cases revealed the presence of 
the search terms but confirmed their irrelevance to this study. Their exclusion produced 
301 cases with apparent relevance based on the computerized search terminology, 
including several that appeared twice because of multiple appeals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 As noted in Chapter Four, the mail- and wire-fraud statutes are substantively identical 
and construed in pari materia, meaning “the interpretation of one is ordinarily considered 
to apply to the other.”  
480 It should be noted that the fluid nature of the database—cases are added frequently—




A review of these 301 remaining cases was conducted with two goals: 1) identify 
the types of advertising-involved schemes that have invited federal, criminal prosecution 
and 2) ascertain the extent to which the First Amendment has been raised as a defense to 
criminal fraud. The second goal was aided by the introduction of the screening term “first 
amendment;” this identified 13 cases (out of 301) that mentioned the First Amendment in 
some respect. Accomplishing the first goal required reviewing the cases to determine if 
the search terms therein were central to the case, or if their appearance was incidental. A 
search term present in a case was deemed central if it seemingly had some bearing on the 
activities that ostensibly produced the wire fraud charge. For example, if a fraudulent 
scheme included the use of newspaper advertising to attract potential victims, the opinion 
was included. If the described advertising itself seemed to have inspired the prosecution 
(that is, the prosecution appeared to be advertising-inspired), the case was included.  
A term was deemed to be incidental if its appearance seemingly had no bearing on 
the facts or issue(s) presented in the case. Cases in which the search terms were present, 
but incidental, were excluded. For example, if a case mentioned “marketing” only to 
describe a job description or as part of an organization’s name, that case was excluded if 
its fact pattern failed to indicate that advertising activities played any role in the scheme 
or its prosecution. This screening and review process identified 60 opinions issued 
between 1966 and 2014 for more careful review. 
Findings 
Analysis of cases was instructive. The search results included cases from all 11 of 
primary federal circuits.481 The fewest results from any circuit, three, was from the First 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 Only the Federal and District of Columbia Circuits were unrepresented. The Federal 
Circuit serves as the appellate body for specialty courts and administrative agencies. For 
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Circuit, which includes the Districts of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto 
Rico and Rhode Island; the most—nine—were from the Seventh Circuit, which includes 
three districts in Illinois, two in Indiana and two in Wisconsin. Eight of the nine cases out 
of the Seventh Circuit were from 2003 or later. The Ninth Circuit—the largest in terms of 
geography482—produced seven of the examined cases. The remaining Circuits produced 
between four and six cases each. 
Common Schemes  
Although many fraudulent schemes are perpetuated without the use of 
advertising, the cases examined here indicate that fraudsters frequently incorporate 
advertising into their schemes, most often as a lure. The impersonal, mass-mediated 
aspect of advertising makes it possible for fraudsters to cast a wide, relatively cost-
effective net. A typology of common schemes incorporating advertising is presented in 
Appendix A.  
One of the most common fraud schemes involves the use of print advertising to 
entice prospective purchasers or investors to call a toll-free telephone number for more 
information. This type of scheme is outlined in Appendix A and identified as Scheme P-
1. During the response telephone call, telemarketers provide additional detail and solicit 
payment, which is provided over the telephone (usually with a credit card), wired using a 
funds-transfer service, or subsequently mailed using the United States Post Office or a 
private delivery service. Examples of this type of scheme abound. In United States v. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
examples, appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board are heard in the Federal 
Circuit. 
482 The Ninth Circuit includes the districts of Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii. 
Idaho, Montana Nevada, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon and Washington. 
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Ranney,483 the defendants ran newspaper advertisements in major daily newspapers in 
large cities across the country—except in Boston, where their operation was located. The 
advertisements solicited investment contracts for home heating oil and made 
representations which “did not accord with underlying reality.”484United States v. Lutz485 
in 1980 and United States v. Aggarwal486 fourteen years later featured newspaper 
advertisements in the Wall Street Journal promising pre-approval of 100 percent loans or 
financial backing for high-risk borrowers. Potential borrowers paid advance loan 
application fees, but, none received the promised funding. Similarly, in United States v. 
Anglin,487 the defendant’s advertisements in the Wall Street Journal and other well-
known publications promised a “guaranteed return” on investments, then instructed 
responding investors to wire money to a fake escrow account. Same for United States v. 
Williams,488 in which advertisements in financial publications promised access to quick 
capital or large investment returns.  
Charged schemes were not limited to loans and financing. United States v. 
Serian489 involved the promised sale of contact lenses via advertisements in national 
magazines. Orders were accepted by phone and payment was made by mail or credit 
card, but most customers never saw any lenses. In United States v. Kellett,490 
advertisements in national trade magazines offered bulk buying and selling of storage 
tanks. Customers responded with purchase orders and made payment by mail or wire, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183 (1st. Cir. 1983). 
484 United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183, 1185 (1st. Cir. 1983). 
485 See United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1980). 
486 See United States v. Aggarwal, 17 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 1994). 
487 See United States v. Anglin, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5984. 
488 See United States v. Williams, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 29350 
489 See United States v. Serian, 895 F.2d 431 (1990) 
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the storage tanks were never traded. And in U.S. v. Waters,491 prospective vacationers 
who responded to newspaper advertisements offering an oceanfront vacation rental were 
sorely disappointed to learn their follow-up phone call and deposit had secured not a 
vacation rental house, but a vacant lot.  
A variation on this scheme involves an in-person meeting following the 
advertisement and telephone call. This pattern is outlined in Appendix A and identified as 
Scheme P-2. In-person meetings tend to be used when the prospective financial outlay is 
large and opportunities for participation are limited. For example, in United States v. 
Lacefield,492 the defendant used newspaper advertisements and in-person presentations to 
misrepresent that certain contracts provided an opportunity to participate in a business 
opportunity with substantial income potential. (One scheme used print advertising and 
personal contact in a different way—not to lure participants, but seemingly to establish 
the appearance of legitimacy. In United States v. Keller, the defendant operated a bogus 
cancer clinic that recruited patients mostly by word-of-month. Those who came to the 
clinic and sought additional information were shown what appeared to be a magazine 
containing an article and advertisement about the clinic.493) Schemes that include 
broadcast advertising tend to be similar, inviting telephone calls that result in additional 
contact by the putative buyer with the putative seller, usually by telephone or electronic 
mail (Scheme B-1 in Appendix A), or sometimes in person (Scheme B-2). For example, 
in United States v. White,494 the defendant sponsored local, gospel radio advertisements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 See United States v. Waters, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23862.  
492 United States v. Lacefield, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23977. 
493 United States v. Keller, 784 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. 
Keller, 14 F.3d 1051 (5th Cir. 1994). 
494 United States v. White, 737 F.3e 1121 (2013). 
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offering “mortgage bailouts” for insolvent homeowners who subsequently contacted him 
for additional information. And in Mann (discussed) below, radio commercials were 
purported to be part of a fraud promising tax relief to those who sought additional 
information. 
The most far-reaching schemes (Scheme M-1 in Appendix A) tend to make use of 
multiple print and broadcast media. United States v. Andreadis495 (selling weight loss 
without dieting) and United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.496 (selling health-neutral 
cigarettes), both discussed below, involved multiple media, including newspapers, 
magazines and television commercials on a national scale.   
As noted, the potential criminal charges associated with such schemes of conduct 
depend on the choice of media and the manner in which those media reach the consuming 
public. Print media, for example, include newspapers and magazines. The traditional 
delivery mechanism for newspapers is home delivery for subscribers, plus in-store and 
newsstand sales for those who purchase an occasional edition but who do not subscribe. 
In addition, some out-of-town subscribers take delivery by mail. Print magazines 
traditionally have been delivered by mail to subscribers and sold individually in stores 
and on newsstands. For fraud-statute purposes, mail delivery of a newspaper or magazine 
containing a deceptive advertisement would invoke the mail-fraud statute, while the same 
advertisement in a publication delivered solely by home or newsstand delivery would not. 
An identical message in a radio or television commercial would subject the sponsor to the 
federal wire-fraud statute, but that message delivered in a speech to a throng of 
convention attendees would not. 
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Wire Fraud Plus Mail Fraud 
Most of the charged schemes were alleged to have made some use of both the 
mails and wire.497 A mail-fraud charge or charges accompanied the wire-fraud charge or 
charges in 38 (63 percent) of the 60 cases reviewed. Wire- or mail-fraud charges were 
accompanied by a conspiracy charge or charges in 17 cases (29 percent). Wire fraud was 
charged as a stand-alone crime in 10 (16 percent) of the examined cases, the earliest in 
1979. By 1997—probably owing to increased reliance on electronic mail over traditional  
“snail” mail—wire fraud appeared less likely to be accompanied by a mail-fraud charge. 
Also, around this time, the “wire” used appeared more likely to be the Internet instead of 
the telephone.  
Another finding was that wire- and mail-fraud prosecutions often include an 
additional charge or charges based on the specific underlying conduct. This occurred in 
22 (36 percent) of the 60 examined cases. For example, where the fraud involves the 
income tax code, a tax-evasion charge may be included; where the fraud involves an 
investment scheme, a bank fraud charge may be included. 
Using the number of indicted counts as a relative measure, it appears that the 
charged schemes differed greatly in scope, number of victims and the amount of money 
or property involved. Not every examined opinion provided specifics as to these details, 
but the available information revealed that the fraud statutes have been applied to a range 
of activity and dollar amounts or property values. Defendants in one case, for example,498 
faced 85 counts in a scheme that involved national advertising across many media and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497 See, e.g., ; United States v. Frazin 780 F.2d 1461 (9th 1986); United States v. Ranney 
719 F.2d 1183 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979); 
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that ensnared thousands of victims who each paid $3.00 to $5.00 per unit. Other 
defendants, including one who placed local newspaper advertisements and whose scheme 
consisted of convincing aspiring young models to part not with money or property but 
sexual favors, were indicted on only a single count.499 Disparities in the range of victims 
and the amount of money or property contemplated by the charged schemes reflects the 
statutory language that fails to establish a threshold for triggering the wire-fraud statute. 
The number and type of charged defendants also was instructive. Although appellate 
opinions do not provide a definitive accounting of the number of charged defendants in a 
given prosecution—many opt not to pursue an appeal—of the 60 opinions examined, 45 
featured a single defendant/appellant. Eight featured two defendant/appellants, and the 
remainder featured between three and six. With the exception of one of the three appeals, 
which referenced 15 original indicted defendants, the small number of defendants 
charged suggests that 1) most schemes cloaked in secrecy and are perpetuated by 
individuals working alone or with only a few others, and/or 2) most prosecutions 
ultimately target a scheme’s mastermind or those participants who have been deeply 
involved with the scheme. With few exceptions, the examined opinions referred to the 
“owner,” “founder,” “operator,” “president,” “head of,” “mastermind” or used another 
term that suggested the defendant(s) had originated and/or controlled the scheme. Where 
employees or participants, rather than mastermind(s), were charged, it was seemingly 
because the underlings had clear knowledge they were participating in a fraudulent 
scheme, even if they did not initiate or control it. 
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The examination also revealed that advertising agencies are not likely to be 
targets of wire fraud prosecutions, but are not necessarily exempt from such, either. The 
majority of the cases examined here involved operations devised purely for the purpose 
of perpetuating a fraud. In such cases, the mastermind(s) typically handles the ad creation 
and placement and does not involve an outside agent. But in situations where the business 
enterprise smacks of legitimacy and/or whose operation and advertising are widespread, 
an advertising agency is more likely to play a role. For example, in United States v. 
Andreadis, discussed below, the advertising agency that developed and placed the 
deceptive advertising copy in national media was indicted and convicted along with the 
mastermind.500 Generally, advertising agencies are exempt from liability for their clients’ 
advertising claims unless they knew or had reason to know of the defects. Agencies are 
not required to verify all information provided by their clients, but the FTC, for example, 
has said agencies have a duty to make sure the client can substantiate any claims the 
agency makes on its behalf. Although the DOJ has no similar policy or limitation, 
agencies that have no knowledge of defects or no reason to believe they should 
investigate further will likely be shielded from liability, if not prosecution, for lack of 
intent. Similarly, media outlets that merely carry advertising associated with a fraud 
generally are not legally responsible for advertising content and will not be considered 
part of the scheme.501  
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Advertising also may play a role in sentencing following a fraud conviction or 
plea agreement. The case analysis revealed a significant potential role for advertising in 
the sentencing of those convicted of wire or mail fraud. The federal, criminal code 
contains Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts promulgated by the United 
States Sentencing Commission.502 The guidelines assign a certain number of “points” to 
certain types of “offense behavior” or “offense characteristics” associated with a crime or 
one convicted of a crime. For example, a bank robbery is assigned a certain number of 
points, but a bank robbery committed with a gun merits additional points. More points are 
added if the robber has prior criminal convictions, for example. Those points are tallied 
and the range into which they fall determines generally the length of the sentence, 
including incarceration. Included in those guidelines is a “mass-marketing 
enhancement”503 that allows a court to impose a two-level sentencing increase “if the 
offense was committed through mass-marketing.”504 For purposes of the enhancement, 
“mass-marketing” means 
a plan, program, or campaign that is conducted through 
solicitation by telephone, mail, the Internet, or other means 
to induce a large number of persons to (i) purchase goods 
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entity who caused the advertising to be disseminated. 18 U.S.C. 54(b) (2012). 
502 18 USCS Appx § 1B1.3 (LexisNexis 2014). According to its Guidelines Manual, the 
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whose principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal 
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guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal 
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or services; (ii) participate in a contest or sweepstakes; or 
(iii) invest for financial profit.505 
This language has been interpreted to include, among other activity,506 local 
newspaper advertising seeking a single purchaser,507 advertisements in a national 
newspaper,508 advertisements on specialty websites,509 advertisements on auction 
websites,510 an advertisement on a single website,511 printed advertisements in brochures 
distributed by mail,512 radio commercials and television infomercials513 and 
advertisements in previously established (as opposed to newly created) specialty 
newspapers.514 
In one federal circuit, the mass-marketing enhancement has been limited in 
application, to situations in which the targets of the mass-marketing were also in some 
way victims of the fraudulent scheme. In that case, the court ruled that the mass-
marketing targeted the general public, but the fraud itself was perpetrated on financial 
institutions.515 These interpretations suggest that in a scheme to defraud consumers, 
virtually any advertising distributed by a printed newspaper, magazine, or online 
publication of any size, or distributed through the mail, may trigger the mass-marketing 
enhancement. It should be noted that, unlike the fraud statutes, which designate interstate 
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2007). 
507 See United States v. Morrison, 713 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 2013). 
508 See United States v. Parker, 302 Fed. Appx. 889 (11th Cir. 2008). 
509 See United States v. Christiansen, 594 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2010). 
510 See United States v. Blanchett, 41 Fed. Appx. 181 (10th Cir. 2002). 
511 See United States v. Tibor, 397 Fed. Appx. 242 (7th Cir. 2010). 
512 See United States v. Deming, 269 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2001). 
513 See United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2005). 
514 See United States v. Sloan, 492 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2006). 
515 See United States v. Lacey, 699 F.3d 710 (2d Cir. 2012). 
	  
122	  
mail, wire, radio or television communications as a jurisdictional qualifier, application of 
the mass-marketing enhancement following a fraud conviction does not require that the 
marketing plan, program or campaign be in interstate commerce. This means that in a 
fraud conviction, even if advertising does not provide the jurisdictional hook, its 
existence could compound the punishment. 
First Amendment Considerations 
As expected, the First Amendment has had little appreciable role or impact as a 
defense in fraud prosecutions. Because the first search excluded RICO cases, a second 
search, using the search terms “wire fraud” and “first amendment,” without the RICO 
exclusion, was performed to identify additional instances in which the First Amendment 
may have been raised as an issue in wire-fraud actions. (As indicated in Chapter Three, 
mail fraud and wire fraud are predicate offenses that may give rise to a Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations charge.) This search identified 20 cases, five of 
which also were present in the original 301 cases identified using the advertising-focused 
search terms. Excluding the overlap, 15 cases were identified in which a First 
Amendment issue had been raised in some capacity. Additional review indicated that, in 
almost half (seven) of those remaining 15 cases, the First Amendment had been 
introduced not as a defense, but by the reviewing court to explain the manner in which it 
was required to consider the defendant’s vagueness challenge.516 An additional seven 
cases concerned the petition clause of the First Amendment or otherwise failed to 
implicate the speech clause. This winnowing process identified a single case—United 
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States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.—in which a First Amendment argument had been raised 
as part of a substantive defense to a wire-fraud charge.  
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
United States v. Philip Morris was a high-profile civil RICO prosecution brought 
by the DOJ in 2009 against nine cigarette manufacturers and two trade organizations that 
represented tobacco interests. In Philip Morris, the scheme to defraud consisted of mail 
and wire fraud tied largely to the defendants’ advertising and other communications with 
the consuming public: 
The government …presented evidence tending to show that 
Defendants marketed and promoted their low tar brand to 
smokers … as less harmful than full flavor cigarettes 
despite either lacking evidence to substantiate their claims 
or knowing them to be false. …Defendants became aware 
that secondhand smoke poses a health risk to nonsmokers 
but made misleading public statements an advertisements 
about secondhand smoke in an attempt to cause the public 
to doubt the evidence of harmfulness.517 
The Court’s handling of the defendants’ First Amendment claims is illustrative of 
the lack of traction such claims establish. In particular, the Court rejected defendants’ 
argument that at least some of their statements were First Amendment protected. Said the 
court: “Of course, it is well settled that the First Amendment does not protect fraud. … 
Recognizing this fact, Defendants argue that their statements were not fraudulent, but 
those arguments are discussed and rejected elsewhere in this opinion.”518 The court also 
upheld the lower court’s requirement that the defendants disseminate “‘corrective 
statements’ concerning the topics about which they had previously misled 
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consumers,’”519 including “one-time full-page advertisements in thirty-five major 
newspapers, and as [sic] at least ten advertisements on a major television network over 
the course of one year.”520 Citing the commercial speech doctrine and the government’s 
power to regulate commercial transactions, the court found the corrective-advertising 
requirement to be appropriate: 
In limited circumstances, … courts have upheld the 
government’s ability to dictate the content of mandatory 
speech. This largely occurs in the commercial context. … 
Because commercial speech receives a lower level of 
protection under the First Amendment, burdens imposed on 
it receive a lower level of scrutiny from the courts.521 
It also rejected the defendants’ argument that the corrective statements were 
“freestanding” and not connected to existing advertising and should not be regarded as 
commercial speech. “Defendants’ various claims …constitute commercial speech. 
Defendants disseminate their fraudulent representations about the safety of their products 
… in attempts to persuade the public to purchase cigarettes.”522As Philip Morris 
illustrates, First Amendment claims have been essentially futile in the context of wire- 
and mail-fraud prosecutions.  
Additional Findings 
This research suggests that to date, advertising has directly intersected with 
federal fraud statutes most often not because the advertising was regarded as the fraud, 
but because of its utility as a jurisdictional hook to bring conduct within prosecutorial 
reach. Advertising, however, has rarely been the sole basis for establishing federal 
jurisdiction; most wire-fraud prosecutions involve some interstate use of “the wire” other 
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than, or in addition to, the dissemination of an advertisement via the radio or television 
broadcast spectrum. In other words, among the examined cases, the majority of wire-
fraud prosecutions could not be categorized as clearly “advertising-induced”—that is, 
enabled solely by the choice of advertising media—because the targeted conduct 
included some additional or alternative use of the wire. This appeared to be the case even 
in prosecutions where advertising was a component of the allegedly criminal conduct. In 
nearly all of the examined cases, some “other” (non-advertising) use of the wire clearly 
was present, irrespective of whether the defendant had, for example, sponsored radio or 
television advertising. In those cases, broadcast advertising may have been used to attract 
prospective buyers, but follow-up interaction may have included telephone conversations, 
money transferred by mail or some other interstate use of the wire apart from any 
advertising. In such cases, the presence of advertising—deceptive or not—is superfluous 
with respect to serving as the jurisdictional mechanism for bringing the conduct within 
federal control.  
Exceptions exist, however. The indictment of the South Carolina car dealer, for 
one, was predicated upon the use of broadcast advertising. The television and radio 
advertising served as the jurisdictional hook, but also appeared to have inspired the 
prosecution itself.  Six of the 60 examined opinions—10 percent—suggested that the 
indictments had been “advertising-inspired”—that is, the underlying conduct that gave 
rise to the fraud and related charges was the advertising itself.523 These cases, four of 
which are discussed below, illustrate advertising’s potential to become a substantive area 
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of focus for the wire-fraud statute. In United States v. Andreadis, the advertising schemes 
used to sell a “miracle weight-reducing drug” were depicted as the fraud. The defendants 
used mail-order advertising, print ads in national newspapers and magazines and 
television commercials to claim that Regimen Tablets “made possible ‘no-diet’ reducing, 
or reducing ‘without dieting’ and that the pills had been ‘clinically tested’ or ‘proven 
clinically effective.’” According to the Government, the defendants had intended to 
defraud because these representations and statements were scientifically and factually 
false. Moreover, the appellants knew the claims were false, and despite the falsity and 
knowledge thereof, the defendants had “continued to include these representations and 
statements in their advertising.” Andreadis’ conviction was upheld. 
In United States v. Caine, the Government claimed that multiple mail- and wire-
fraud charges arose after a corporation “embarked on a massive advertising campaign, 
replete with exorbitant and unjustified claims for its product,” a device purported to 
increase gasoline mileage in automobiles.”524 The advertisement contained “errors of 
omission and well as those of commission. There was no mention that the Unitron device 
was actually a can of engine detergent which needed to be replaced with every tankful of 
gas …. Nor did the advertisement indicate that the solid instrument shopped along with 
the fluid was simply a standard gasoline filter.”525 The Court also found evidence in 
“appellant’s administration of the enterprise,” such as failure to dispatch the product after 
payment was received or to process refunds, although the fraud charges themselves were 
seemingly directed at the advertising campaign. Caine’s conviction was upheld. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In United States v. Frazin526, the defendants were said to have “engaged in a 
fraudulent advertising campaign” by placing advertisements in out-of-state newspapers 
promising large investment returns. The jurisdictional requirement of the presence of 
interstate commerce evidently was established by the out-of-state advertising coupled 
with wire transfers from investors to the defendant. Frazin’s conviction was upheld. 
In United States v. Mann, a mail-fraud charge was tied to mail deliveries of a 
magazine that contained an advertisement placed by the defendant. A radio spot gave rise 
to the wire fraud count of the indictment. In Mann, advertising clearly triggered both the 
mail-fraud and wire-fraud charges, although it is unclear if the fraud was purported to be 
embedded in the content of the advertising—it claimed Mann’s package of research 
materials about the federal tax code could show people how to avoid filing income tax 
returns—or if the fraud was in Mann’s failure to provide promised materials after 
payment was received. Mann’s mail-fraud conviction was upheld. His wire-fraud 
conviction, however, was overturned because in the judgment of the appellate body, the 
radio advertising’s message was not sufficiently related to the actual fraud. Unlike the 
print ad, which offered a packet of legal information for sale, the radio spot did not 
advertise the legal packet, did not solicit any funds and did not refer to the magazine 
advertisement. 
Impact of Choice of Media 
The finding that relatively few (10 percent) of the federal fraud prosecutions 
examined appear to have been advertising-inspired was not unexpected. After all, the 
language of the wire-fraud statute itself contemplates the use of “wire, radio or television 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 780 F.2d 1461. 
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communication” for the purpose of executing “any scheme or artifice to defraud,” and 
this approach comports with that wording. 
More unexpected was the impact of a fraudster/advertiser’s choice of media in 
inviting or inoculating against a federal prosecution. Again, the statutory language 
implies this, but an aggregate consideration of the sampled opinions reiterates that “fraud 
by radio” may invite a federal prosecution—such would almost certainly be interstate 
communication—but an identical “fraud by billboard”527—a clearly intrastate 
communication—may not, because the jurisdictional requirement would not be met. So 
even though both messages might have been aimed at and received by consumers in their 
cars, only the radio message could implicate the federal fraud statute. Similarly, an ad in 
a local newspaper distributed via home delivery could not trigger a federal prosecution, 
but if the same newspaper was mailed to a few out-of-town subscribers, federal 
jurisdiction—owing to use of the mails—could be established. A 30-second television 
commercial—irrespective of the number of viewers—could subject the sponsor to the 
federal wire-fraud statute, but an identical message delivered in a speech to a throng of 
20,000 convention attendees could not. And a commercial handbill attached to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527 Billboards may be local in terms of geography, or they may appear alongside 
interstate highways. It is unclear if a billboard’s appearance alongside an interstate 
highway would meet the wire-fraud statute’s interstate commerce requirement for 
triggering federal jurisdiction. Court opinions from other arenas (hotels, for example), 
suggest such could conceivably invoke the interstate commerce clause. See Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Wire-fraud-specific opinions, 
however, suggest that a billboard, wherever located, would not by itself implicate 
interstate commerce for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1343. Electronic billboards controlled 
remotely by computer, however, could arguably be brought within the wire-fraud statute. 
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doorknobs of homes in a neighborhood528 would be safe from federal reach, but the same 
message delivered by mail or electronic mail could become a federal offense. 
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 The author, who finds these types of handbills to be highly annoying, proposes 









DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In an animated television commercial of recent vintage, a herd of sheep is in “the 
slammer” with a tough-guy convict who snarls, “What are you in for?” The sheep, trade 
characters for a national mattress manufacturer (no counting sheep required), are 
reluctant529 to admit their transgression: ripping off one of those mattress tags that reads,  
“Do Not Remove Under Penalty of Law.”530 Thinking quickly, Sheep # 1 barks an 
answer: “We got caught tearing … a man to pieces!” 
One can imagine a similar jailhouse scenario featuring a car salesman in the 
slammer for approving television commercials promising too-good-to-be-true prices on 
new cars. Without making too light of a potentially serious situation, the two scenarios 
are useful reminders that prosecutorial discretion is essentially all that stands between a 
deceptive advertiser and a federal, criminal prosecution. 
Re-Orientation 
The introductory chapter told of a car dealer and sales manager whose criminal 
indictment described advertising practices almost identical to those targeted by the FTC 
in Operation Steer Clear. The ultimate question presented is the appropriateness of 
criminal penalties for deceptive advertising in light of the First Amendment and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529 Sheepish, even. 
530 The sheep ripped off the tag in reaction to hearing another Serta mattress had 
eliminated the need for them to be counted. 
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desire for such as a matter of policy in an era of arguable overcriminalization. Count One 
of the car-dealer indictment was labeled “Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud as to 
Fraudulent Marketing,” followed by language regarding “a scheme … to defraud and to 
obtain money from the purchasers of automobiles by means of false and fraudulent 
pretenses.” It cites the dealership’s television and radio commercials as the scheme’s 
primary element. 
Considered in totality, the Count One language invites two potential readings. 
One is that the indictment was about a scheme to defraud prospective car buyers and that 
broadcast advertising was used to lure consumers into the scheme. With this reading, the 
scheme was in existence apart from the advertising; commercial messages were used to 
bring people into the scheme but were not part of the actual fraud, and their existence 
served as a jurisdictional hook for federal prosecutorial authority over fraudulent conduct. 
In other words, the prosecution was advertising-induced but not advertising-inspired; that 
is, the advertising itself was not necessarily regarded as the fraud, but the advertising 
played a role in bringing the conduct under federal control. 
Under this reading, the advertising’s mention in the indictment would have been 
necessary not because it was putatively deceptive, but because radio and television are 
covered by the wire-fraud statute, meaning their dissemination converts the fraud into 
something punishable under federal criminal law. With this interpretation of the 
indictment, the description of dubious advertising messages serves solely to provide 
support within the indictment for the notion that the sales operation was the fraud; if no 
one purchased or financed a car at the advertised price or rate, the sales operation must, 
therefore, have been fraudulent.  
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An alternative reading, equally if not more plausible given that Count One was 
labeled “Wire Fraud as to Fraudulent Marketing,” as opposed to “Wire Fraud as to 
Commercial Transactions” or something similar, is that the fraud described in Count One 
was the advertising itself—that the prosecution was advertising-inspired, as opposed to 
advertising-induced. Although the Count describes some in-person interactions between 
sales staff and prospective buyers, their role in the indictment could be reasonably 
regarded as providing support for the Government’s belief that the advertising itself was 
the problematic conduct—the sales talk and paperwork didn’t match the advertised 
prices, therefore the advertising must have been deceptive. Indeed, the bulk of Count One 
focuses on the dealership’s “fraudulent” messaging technique of “false and misleading 
advertising and advertising materials including radio and television advertisements.” 
Additional language in Count One seems to specify that the alleged  “deceptive 
marketing” consisted primarily of the information communicated to prospective 
customers via the broadcast commercials; this supports the notion that the broadcast 
advertising itself was the fraud and not just something that used “the wire” to advance the 
fraud. 
Irrespective of which interpretation controls, Chapter Five confirmed that most 
fraudulent schemes that result in federal indictment are conceived of and executed solely 
for the purpose of allowing the seller to make a dishonest dollar. In such scenarios, the 
seller fails to deliver on the agreed-upon bargain and, in fact, never intended—or had the 
ability—to do so. With respect to the South Carolina car dealer, there is little question 
that the dealership was, in fact, in the business of selling cars. It is also likely that many 
customers drove away with exactly the car and deal for which they bargained. In 
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addition, had the car dealer eschewed broadcast advertising and relied instead on 
intrastate communications—word of mouth, signage, or other “local” means of attracting 
prospective customers—the first charged count of the indictment would have been a legal 
impossibility. But for the broadcast advertising, the dealer/customer interaction could 
have been the same, but there could not have been a Count One. 
Count One, then, with its reliance on broadcast communications, highlights the 
potential vagaries of the wire-fraud statute with respect to choice of media: choose this 
medium and you’re safe; choose that medium and you’re in jeopardy. Count One also is 
ambiguous as to whether the alleged fraud was a sales scheme that happened to make use 
of deceptive broadcast advertising, or if the fraud was instead the dealership’s allegedly 
deceptive broadcast advertising. If one assumes the latter reading to be correct, it would 
mean deceptive broadcast advertising properly may be, for wire-fraud purposes, both the 
fraudulent scheme and the “wire” used for purposes of executing the scheme. This places 
deceptive advertising in the shared custody of the FTC and DOJ, effectively permitting 
the criminalizing of deceptive advertising apart from any severable fraudulent scheme. 
Clean Flow Versus Free Flow 
Given the speech interests involved, concern for assuring the clean flow of 
commercial information must not overly interfere with the free flow of commercial 
information. Flexibility in the federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes arguably serves public 
policy ends,531 but broad application of criminal laws to conduct regulated by the FTC 
may conflict with First Amendment freedoms and chill protected commercial speech. The 
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the applicability of criminal statutes to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 William T. Neese, Linda Ferrell, O.C. Ferrell, An analysis of federal mail and wire 
fraud cases related to marketing, J. OF BUSI. RES. 58 (2005) 910-918. 
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deceptive commercial speech. It has consistently held, however—often in perfunctory 
fashion, as if no explanation was necessary532—that the First Amendment does not shield 
fraud. At issue is the point at which commercial speech ceases to be merely deceptive and 
morphs into the more sinister thing called fraud, and the point at which punishment for 
fraud is in reality punishment for speech. Potential solutions may reside elsewhere in the 
law, in the Court’s larger body of First Amendment jurisprudence, or perhaps in some 
combination of the two. 
Referencing concepts encountered in previous chapters and borrowing from other 
areas of the law where applicable, it is possible to craft potential approaches that neither 
undermine the fraud statutes nor unduly suppress speech. Multiple parties—prosecutors, 
the courts, defense attorneys, advertisers, advertising agencies, media and consumers—
have potential roles in assuring an acceptable balance between speech rights and 
consumer-protection efforts. Following are practical considerations that relate to each of 
these actors, beginning with the legal community. 
Prosecutors 
Unless Congress restricts application of the fraud statutes, primary responsibility 
for maintaining the speech-rights/consumer-protection balance must rest with federal 
prosecutors, defense counsel and the courts. Prosecutors should use restraint in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion, and courts should manage such prosecutions with skepticism. 
Congress, in adopting the wire-fraud statute, clearly intended for federal prosecutors to 
have a means of dealing with fraudsters, some of whose schemes use radio or television 
advertising to identify potential victims. A potential first step would be for United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 As noted in Chapter Two, Kozinski and Banner made a similar observation about the 
origins of the commercial speech doctrine.  
	  
135	  
Attorneys to adopt a policy that allegedly deceptive advertising transmitted interstate by 
television or radio (or by mail) may serve as the jurisdictional basis for a fraud charge 
only when three factors are present. 
A Three-Factor Analysis 
First, it should be apparent that the seller’s entire business model, or at least the 
aspect of the business that is the subject of the advertising, is a scam and exists for no 
purpose other than the perpetuation of a fraud. Legitimate businesses whose advertising 
merely over-promises and under-delivers should be dealt with by either the FTC, state 
attorneys general or private lawsuits. This is not unlike the copyright law concept that 
protects technologies capable of substantially noninfringing uses but assigns liability to 
those whose sole or essential purpose is copyright infringement. 533 Additional support for 
this factor comes from criminal libel laws based on breach of the peace, which are 
disfavored because they presuppose a speaker can control how a listener will react to his 
objectionable message. Advertisers who “push the envelope” with aggressive sales 
messages should not be presumed to either intend or believe listeners will be duped into 
entering into disappointing transactions. 
Second, the entire transaction between seller and buyer/victim must have been 
conducted at arm’s length, with no opportunity for the victim to assess the credibility of 
the seller or truly reflect on the transaction prior to being ensnared. This borrows from the 
Brandenburg incitement test used by courts to distinguish between protected speech that 
merely advocates violence and unprotected speech that actually incites it. Because most 
such transactions necessarily will be performed using email, the telephone or the mails, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 See: Sony Corp of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, LTD, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
	  
136	  
this requirement also makes it more likely that jurisdiction may be established without 
reliance on the presence of broadcast advertising. 
Third, the transaction must not have included the signing of a contract. When a 
buyer agrees to terms in a written contract that differ from terms presented in an 
advertisement, the fraud may not relate back to the advertisement; the advertising, 
therefore, cannot be deemed to be part of the fraud for jurisdictional or other purposes.534 
Observing these factors will aid prosecutors in focusing on true fraud, as 
contemplated by Congress in enacting the fraud statutes, and leave deceptive advertising 
to the FTC.535 
The Judiciary 
As the check on the legislative and judicial branches, the judiciary should not 
rubber-stamp statutes and fraud prosecutions applied to deceptive advertising. 
Procedurally, courts should require prosecutors to be specific in identifying fraud 
separate from any advertising. The Supreme Court has said governments seeking to ban, 
restrict or punish deceptive commercial speech may not avoid the potentially difficult 
task of discerning the deceptive from the truthful. The right to control unprotected speech 
comes with the corresponding responsibility to assure that the speech being brought to 
heel is in fact in an unprotected category. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 A fourth potential factor would focus on the dollar value associated with the fraud. 
Prosecutors could establish a monetary threshold that must be crossed to trigger a wire-
fraud prosecution. Although the statute does not concern itself with the victim’s loss—it 
addresses the mere intent to deceive in a way that results in financial or property loss—
the establishment of a monetary threshold could function as a prosecutorial filter and 
means of prioritization. 
535 Concerns about selective enforcement and a focus on potential, versus actual, 
deception, also extend to the FTC. Potential conscriptions on FTC discretion, however, is 
a topic for another study. 
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When deceptive advertising is alleged to be the culprit, courts should require the 
Government to identify with specificity those particular advertisements believed to be 
deceptive and provide some objective support for that contention, either at a preliminary 
proceeding or at trial. For example, courts could require objective evidence in the form of 
survey research that demonstrates actual deception in accordance with some community 
standard for deception. In addition, it should be demonstrated that specific consumers 
allegedly victimized had “actual exposure” to specific advertisements deemed deceptive. 
Actual exposure should include some measure that the exposure was frequent enough to 
be effective.536 This borrows from the legal concept in copyright-infringement cases that 
alleged infringers must have had access to the work in question for there to be a specific 
finding of infringement. Without an access requirement, criminal prosecutions could 
advance on the view that advertising was potentially, as opposed to actually deceptive. A 
“potentially deceptive” (deceptiveness) standard may be appropriate for the FTC, but is 
too close to strict liability to be appropriate for DOJ actions, which should advance only 
with a showing of actual deception. 
Another approach would be for federal courts to adjudicate the elements of wire 
fraud with a more restrictive eye, particularly when deceptive advertising appears to be 
the focus of the prosecution. For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has 
declined to equate deceit with intent in fraud cases. The Second Circuit’s minority view 
requires evidence of tangible injury for a finding of intent to defraud in a mail- or wire-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536 Media buyers—those who purchase advertising time and space on behalf of clients—
are concerned with both the reach and frequency of a given advertisement. Simply 
reaching a viewer so that he or she is exposed to a commercial does not mean the 
exposure was effective. Multiple exposures typically are required before a commercial 
message is attended to and remembered. 
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fraud prosecution. Mere deceit that entices a customer to enter into a bargain is 
inadequate: 
We conclude that the defendants intended to deceive their 
customers but they did not intend to defraud them, because 
the falsity of their representations was not shown to be 
capable of affecting the customer’s understanding of the 
bargain nor of influencing his assessment of the value of 
the bargain to him, and thus no injury was shown to flow 
from the deception.537 
Defense Counsel 
As a first line of defense, defense attorneys representing advertisers charged with 
criminal fraud should request that courts require the Government to identify allegedly 
deceptive advertising with specificity, rather than claiming the advertiser’s commercials 
were deceptive in general. Another approach is to argue lack of deception, particularly 
when the terms of a transaction necessarily will differ from customer to customer—as 
with the financing and purchase of a new car or the hiring of a lawyer—and when 
additional, face-to-face contact with the seller or service provider leaves the prospective 
consumer in no worse position than before exposure to the advertisement. Bates538 in 
particular, addresses advertising for these types of transactions and could prove 
instructive for courts overseeing such cases. 
An additional strategy may be to argue that aggressive sales pitches featuring too-
good-to-be-true offers amount to protected puffery in some circumstances, even though 
the claims range beyond opinion and include seemingly verifiable statements of fact. 
When resources permit it, the introduction of objective survey research as to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 U.S. v. Regent Office Supply, 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1970). 
538 Bates, 433 U.S. 350. 
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believability of specific advertising claims may aid in establishing that, as with puffery, 
no deception exists.   
In addition, defense attorneys should raise First-Amendment-based arguments 
where deceptive advertising is concerned. Supreme Court precedent regarding deceptive 
commercial speech overwhelmingly has sprung from cases where the deterrent or 
punishment consisted of civil or administrative remedies. Room may exist to convince 
courts that civil penalties are adequate and criminal penalties are inappropriate. Deceptive 
advertising is distinguishable from obscenity, incitement to violence and other 
unprotected categories of speech where societal harm is more readily apparent and 
contributions to enlightened society are less so.  
Despite such arguments having gained little traction in the past, defense counsel 
and courts should be open to the possibility that Supreme Court precedent has not 
completely precluded a role for the First Amendment in the criminalization of deceptive 
advertising. Given the Supreme Court’s holdings that constitutional protection does not 
extend to fraud, there would seem to be little utility in examining the issue further. 
Considered in totality, however, the foregoing chapters suggest that First Amendment 
concerns regarding deceptive advertising perhaps should not be dismissed quite so 
summarily. 
The First Amendment 
Understanding why the First Amendment should weigh more prominently in this 
discussion requires a return to theoretical concerns and the public-purpose perspective 
ostensibly underpinning the First Amendment’s free-speech clause and—by extension—
the Supreme Court’s commercial-speech doctrine. As presented in Chapter Two, jurists 
and scholars largely agree that the protections found in the First Amendment were meant 
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to assure a well-functioning democracy. Ideological speech, it was presumed, must be 
protected because such is vital in a democratic society. Almost concurrently, the body of 
protected speech was expanded beyond speech by and about governance. Because of the 
constitutional framers’ affinity for art and literature and their belief such pursuits were 
essential to enlightened society, it was neither a stretch nor controversial for the Supreme 
Court to conclude that “speech about matters of public concern” should be defined 
broadly to include artistic and literary expression as well as speech about political 
matters. By 1976, when the body of protected speech was broadened to include 
commercial speech, First-Amendment-protected expression included speech capable of 
contributing to the exposition of ideas,539 and to truth, science, morality, and arts in 
general.540 
Commerce was business, however, and speech related to its conduct also was 
business, not expression worthy of First Amendment protection. And so it remained until 
1976, when the Court determined commercial speech was not so far removed from those 
pursuits that it lacked all constitutional protection. In fact, said the Court, any given 
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information may exceed his or her 
interest in political goings on. 
Despite acknowledging the potential importance of commercial speech to those 
operating within society, the Court was reluctant to regard it as a constitutional equal to 
noncommercial speech. Commercial speech is First-Amendment protected—just not to 
the same extent. In a nod to the public-purpose perspective, the Court rationalized the 
withholding of full protection for commercial speech by reference to “commonsense” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568. 
540 354 U.S. at 484. 
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distinctions between it and other varieties of speech. Commercial speech is easier to 
verify than news reports or political commentary. And commercial speech may be more 
durable than other kinds of speech, because of the motivation to make a profit.  
These rationales, in turn, prompted the Court to further subordinate false or 
deceptive commercial speech in the constitutional hierarchy, the result being that 
deceptive noncommercial speech arguably enjoys a greater degree of First Amendment 
protection than truthful commercial speech. 
In this hierarchy, the supposed enhanced verifiability of commercial speech 
compared to noncommercial speech looms large. Such a belief in the verifiability of 
commercial speech presupposes that sellers have the ability, and therefore, a 
responsibility, to understand their goods or services and represent them truthfully. It also 
assumes relative uniformity among consumers and the ability of sellers to assume that 
their commercial statements will be consistently received and understood as to each 
prospective buyer. Although this commonsense difference between commercial speech 
and other varieties of speech continues to undergird the commercial speech doctrine and 
the “commercial falsehood doctrine” identified in Chapter Two, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alvarez turns the verifiability distinction on its ear. It simultaneously upsets 
the public-purpose perspective that rationalizes the subordination of commercial speech. 
Recall that Alvarez involved a speaker—a public official new to a local municipal 
governing board—who falsely claimed to have been awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor and was charged with violating the Stolen Valor Act. The federal statute 
prohibited lying about having received such military decorations or honors and 
prescribed criminal penalties, including up to a year in prison. In holding the Act to be 
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unconstitutional, the Court seemed persuaded that because the lie was not made to secure 
employment or financial benefits reserved for Medal earners—it was made instead to 
enhance the speaker’s standing in the community—it was harmless. Alvarez’s lie was a 
“stand-alone” falsehood not associated with some kind of fraud, defamation or other 
legally cognizable harm and was, therefore, protected speech. 
While the Court may have been absolutely correct in finding Alvarez’s self-
promoting lie to be protected speech, in holding it to be so, the Court also suggested that 
if Alvarez had directed his lie toward financial gain instead of social and political 
standing, his transgression might have merited punishment. In other words, the Alvarez 
decision elevates concern for monetary gain (normally present in the commercial arena) 
over concern for information sharing in the democratic process (normally present in the 
noncommercial arena) and ignores the fact that Alvarez, in promoting himself, actively 
chose to bypass verified statements in favor of wholly fabricated ones. 
These observations are not made to suggest that noncommercial falsehood has 
been accorded “too much” constitutional protection in the hierarchy of values, or to 
suggest that noncommercial falsehood has been denied undue protection. They are 
offered to highlight the difficulties inherent in maintaining the hierarchy and to note that 
some leveling may be inevitable. In any hierarchical system, leveling necessarily is 
accomplished in one of three ways: either by elevating the subordinate, subordinating the 
superior, or both. The criminalization of deceptive advertising may further subordinate 
commercial speech (and commercial falsehood) and could have the unintended 
consequence of eroding First Amendment protection for noncommercial speech, 




Prosecutorial discretion and constitutional theory aside, advertisers, media and 
consumers also have roles to play. Legitimate commercial speakers can advance their 
own interests by recognizing the seriousness of consumer deception, the seriousness of 
potential remedies and penalties, and cleaning up their advertising copy. An appropriate 
mantra may be “When in doubt, leave it out.” Part of this reform should include a shift 
away from “keeping up with the Joneses.” The fact that every other directly competing 
car dealership, for example, seems to be running similar advertising does not make 
problematic advertising claims less problematic. Advertisers should look to trade groups 
or other industry advisory groups for guidance. Advertisers also must take responsibility 
for alerting their agencies that deception will not be tolerated.  
Agencies 
Advertising agencies must recognize that they are not shielded from liability, 
including criminal liability, for deceptive advertising claims made on clients’ behalf. In 
particular, agencies that have an industry-specific focus and churn out “stock” 
commercials for sale to advertisers across the country should recognize their potential 
liability for dubious advertising may be increased if they, not their clients, are in the 
creative and messaging driver’s seat. 
Advertisers and agencies also should have an understanding of how media 
choices may enhance the potential legal jeopardy associated with advertising. 
Distributing commercial messages through the mails or advertising on television or radio 
can catapult advertisers (and, potentially their agencies) into the federal judicial system 
and subject them to broadly written and applied criminal statutes and a process that at 




Although potentially difficult in an environment where advertising revenues have 
been in steady decline, media outlets can discourage deceptive advertising by refusing to 
carry advertising that appears to be selling a fraud. Media that provide creative services 
for prospective advertisers should refuse to aid in the creation of “too-good-to-be-true” 
messages and recognize that their immunity from civil fines or prosecution could be at 
risk if they actively participate in creating such messages. On the editorial side, media 
and consumer groups availing themselves of media can contribute to educating the public 
about consumer fraud, as the Court contemplated in Bates541 when it said public naiveté 
that causes advertising to be misleading can be addressed by helping the populace be 
sufficiently informed to place advertising in its proper perspective. 
Consumers 
Relatedly, consumers can take greater responsibility for their interactions with 
advertising messages and with sellers in the marketplace. A consumer whose response to 
an advertising message is to think “That’s too good to be true” should bear some 
responsibility for deciding to believe such a claim when his or her neighbors dismiss it as 
sales talk or puffing. This borrows from the “contemporary community standards” 
approach to distinguishing protected pornography from unprotected obscenity. 
Contemporary consumers, however sheltered, have access to a tremendous amount of 
online information with which to potentially assess the legitimacy of a commercial 
transaction. Consumers should be presumed to have taken some steps to insulate 
themselves from fraudulent transactions. Such a requirement is not unlike the tort law 
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concept of contributory negligence, where a civil plaintiff bears responsibility if his 
conduct falls below a standard necessary for his own protection. 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Study 
As noted in the Introduction, this study’s chief purpose was to examine the 
connection between advertising and federal, criminal fraud statutes and bring attention to 
a potential expansion of those statutes’ application. As a policy and allocation-of-
resources matter, concerns about overcriminalization suggest that any expansion of the 
fraud statutes, particularly where free-speech considerations exist, should be undertaken 
soberly and carefully. 
This study has been a first step in understanding how advertising impacts the 
fraud statutes and vice versa. Additional studies, both to monitor this potential trend and 
enhance understanding of the fraud statutes’ operation and their larger context, will be 
useful. For example, a comprehensive examination of fraud indictments should provide 
greater understanding of how advertising-related crimes are being charged. An 
examination of parallel FTC and DOJ proceedings will enhance understanding of the 
types and scope of conduct that gives rise to federal civil and criminal remedies. 
Examinations that draw from social science research and include more direct 
consideration of advertising typology and effects, as well as considerations of factors 
such as media planning measures and source credibility, also may help inform the 
discussion. 
Conclusion 
A concerned Congress in 1914 clearly intended for the FTC to marshal its 
resources and expertise to protect consumers from “false advertising of all industries and 
all commodities” in a “harmonized and unified way” with “consistent and uniform 
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methods of enforcement and penalization.”542  The same Congress also envisioned DOJ 
involvement for the intentional false advertising of foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics 
whose use threatened physical well being. Murkier is Congress’ intent with respect to the 
fraud statutes and their general application to advertising deception. 
In his examination of overcriminalization, attorney Harvey A. Silverglate 
suggests that, owing to the nature of modern federal criminal laws in the United States, 
the average professional likely commits several felonies a day. Silverglate critically 
points to, among other examples, efforts by federal prosecutors to bring criminal cases 
against corporations and their managers over workplace injuries and deaths: 
In other words, the statutes enacted by the Congress to deal 
with workplace safety issues were not sufficiently all-
encompassing and onerous for the taste of federal 
prosecutors. So they have decided to do precisely what 
Attorney General Robert Jackson, in 1940, warned his U.S. 
attorneys against: ‘pick people that he thinks he should get’ 
… and ‘then [search] the law books … to pin some offense 
on him.’”543  
Silverglate concludes that Congress should legislate in ways it deems essential 
and that reflect contemporary times. “But it is unacceptable meanwhile,” he says, “to 
tease prosecutions out of statutes that do not clearly proscribe the conduct involved. … 
Liberty and fairness are at stake.”544 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s pronouncements that deceptive commercial 
speech is categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, the protected status of 
truthful commercial speech requires precision and diligence in separating deception from 
truth and in separating protected speech from fraud. The Supreme Court has said so in the 
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context of civil or other regulatory penalties applied to deceptive commercial speech; 
such is no doubt more crucial when the proposed remedy is criminal sanctions. As Judge 
Kozinski has said, “Civil law often covers conduct that falls in a gray area of arguable 
legality. But criminal law should clearly separate conduct that is criminal from conduct 
that is legal.”545 
Returning one final time to the South Carolina car dealer’s federal prosecution as 
an exemplar, the true constitutional danger lies in allowing an environment where “I 
don’t like your ads” becomes motivation for federal prosecutors to investigate an 
advertiser’s business practices in search of conduct to which the fraud and related statutes 
may be applied.546 Unfettered application of the federal fraud statues in the arena of 
deceptive commercial speech could send consumer-protection efforts hurtling off track, 
making a return to course difficult. 
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546 Recall that Count Three of the aforementioned indictment charged conspiracy to 
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TYPOLOGY OF FRAUDULENT SCHEMES USING ADVERTISING 
 
 
Scheme P-1:  
Print ad in newspaper or magazine + customer response by telephone + payment. 
 
Scheme P-2: 
Print ad in newspaper or magazine + customer response by telephone + in-person 
meeting + payment. 
 
Scheme P-3: 
Print ad in newspaper or magazine + customer response by in-store visit + payment 
 
Scheme B-1: 
Broadcast ad on TV or radio + customer response by telephone + payment. 
 
Scheme B-2: 
Broadcast ad on TV or radio + customer response by in-store visit + payment. 
 
Scheme M-1: 
Ads in multiple print and broadcast media + customer response by telephone + payment 
 
Scheme I-1: 
Email from seller to buyer + customer response by email or telephone + payment 
 
Scheme I-2: 




















United States v. Aggarwal, 17 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2nd Cir. 1966) 
United States v. Anglin, No. 10-3857, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5984. 
Any v. United States, No. 94-1340, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4028 
United States v. Barson, No. 95-5174, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35719 
United States v. Blanchett, No. 01-3285, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6412 
United States v. Boling, 869 F.2d (6th Cir. 1989) 
United States v. Bowman, No. 95-5203, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 17057 
United States v. Caine, 441 F.2d 454 (2nd Cir. 1971) 
United States v. Calvin, No. 05-2146, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 19833 
United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004) 
United States v. Choate, 101 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Christiansen, 594 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2010) 
United States v. Condolon, 660 F.2d 7 (4th Cir.1979) 
United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1979) 
United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2006) 
United States v. Davis No97-1410 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18862 
United States v. Dees, 34 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Duliga, 204 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 2000) 
	  
155	  
United States v. Earles, 955 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Farrington, 499 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2007) 
United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986) 
United States v. Haley, No. 96-6430, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6886 
United States v. Halicki, No. 90-2076, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 13878 
United States v. Jacobson, No. 92-5046, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22534 
United States v. Keller, 14 F.3d 1051 (5th Cir.1994) 
United States v. Keller, 784 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1986) 
United States v. Kellett, No. 92-3208, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11017 
United States v. Lacefield, No. 06-5569, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23977 
United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1980) 
United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1989) 
United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222 (8th Cir. 1995) 
United States v. Marks, No. 95050290, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24990 
United States v. Marvin, 28 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2001) 
United States v. McHenry, 952 F.2d 1991 (9th Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Mornan, No. 04-1319, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16694 
United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2005) 
United States v. Obasi, 435 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2006) 
United States v. Parker, No. 07-13578, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25059 
United States v. Pearson, 340 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2003) 
United States v. Pepsny, No. 05-346, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17410 
United States v. Pirello, 255 F.3d (9th Cir. 2001) 
	  
156	  
United States v. Queen, 4 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183 (1st Cir. 1983) 
United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) 
United States v. Semulka, NO. 07-2717, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12566 
United States v. Serian, 895 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Sharpe, 995 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Sloan, 492 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2007) 
United States v. Tankersley, No, 03-3229, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9490 
United States v. Tibor, No. 09-2882, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21733 
United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2007) 
United States v. Waters, No. 94-5292, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16930 
United States v. White, 737 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 2013) 
United States v. Wild, 92 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir. 1988) 
United States v. Williams, No. 91-1473, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 29350 
United States v. Williams, No. 12-4167, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23863 
 
